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Abstract
In the past decade, image classification systems have witnessed major advances that led to
record performances on challenging datasets. However, little is known about the behavior of
these classifiers when the data is subject to perturbations, such as random noise, structured
geometric transformations, and other common nuisances (e.g., occlusions and illumination
changes). Such perturbation models are likely to affect the data in a widespread set of
applications, and it is therefore crucial to have a good understanding of the classifiers’
robustness properties. We provide in this thesis new theoretical and empirical studies on
the robustness of classifiers to perturbations in the data.
Firstly, we address the problem of robustness of classifiers to adversarial perturbations.
In this corruption model, data points undergo a minimal perturbation that is specifically
designed to change the estimated label of the classifier. We provide an efficient and
accurate algorithm to estimate the robustness of classifiers to adversarial perturbations,
and confirm the high vulnerability of state-of-the-art classifiers to such perturbations. We
then analyze theoretically the robustness of classifiers to adversarial perturbations, and
show the existence of learning-independent limits on the robustness that reveal a tradeoff
between robustness and classification accuracy. This theoretical analysis sheds light on the
causes of the adversarial instability of state-of-the-art classifiers, which is crucial for the
development of new methods that improve the robustness to such perturbations.
Next, we study the robustness of classifiers in a novel semi-random noise regime that
generalizes both the random and adversarial perturbation regimes. We establish precise
theoretical bounds on the robustness of classifiers in this general regime, which depend on
the curvature of the classifier’s decision boundary. Our bounds show in particular that
we have a blessing of dimensionality phenomenon: in high-dimensional classification tasks,
robustness to random noise can be achieved, even if the classifier is extremely unstable to
adversarial perturbations. We show however that, for semi-random noise that is mostly
random and only mildly adversarial, state-of-the-art classifiers remain vulnerable to such
noise. We further perform experiments and show that the derived bounds provide very
accurate robustness estimates when applied to various state-of-the-art deep neural networks
and different datasets.
Finally, we study the invariance of classifiers to geometric deformations and structured
nuisances, such as occlusions. We propose principled and systematic methods for quantifying
the robustness of arbitrary image classifiers to such deformations, and provide new numerical
methods for the estimation of such quantities. We conduct an in-depth experimental
evaluation and show that the proposed methods allow us to quantify the gain in invariance
that results from increasing the depth of a convolutional neural network, or from the
addition of transformed samples to the training set. Moreover, we demonstrate that the
proposed methods identify “weak spots” of classifiers by sampling from the set of nuisances
iii
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that cause misclassification. Our results thus provide insights into the important features
used by the classifier to distinguish between classes.
Overall, we provide in this thesis novel quantitative results that precisely describe the
behavior of classifiers under perturbations of the data. We believe our results will be
used to objectively assess the reliability of classifiers in real-world noisy environments and
eventually construct more reliable systems.
Key words: classification, robustness, adversarial perturbations, random noise, semi-random
noise, invariance, geometric transformations, nuisance, occlusions, deep learning, convolu-
tional neural networks.
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Résumé
Les systèmes de classification d’images ont récemment connu des avancées majeures qui ont
conduit à des performances impressionantes sur des données d’images complexes. Malgré ces
avancées, le comportement de ces systèmes lorsque les données subissent des perturbations,
telles que du bruit aléatoire ou des transformations géométriques complexes demeure mal
compris. Ces modèles de perturbations peuvent affecter les données dans de nombreuses
applications, et il est donc essentiel d’avoir une bonne compréhension des propriétés de
robustesse des classifieurs. Le but de cette thèse est de fournir une analyse théorique et
empirique approfondie de la robustesse des classifeurs aux perturbations qui peuvent affecter
les données.
Nous abordons dans un premier temps le problème de la robustesse des classifeurs à des
perturbations adverses. Les données subissent, dans ce modèle, des perturbations adverses
minimales nécessaires afin de changer la classe estimée par le classifieur. La première
contribution de cette thèse est un algorithme efficace permettant d’estimer la robustesse
des classifieurs aux perturbations adverses. Cet algorithme nous permet, entre autres, de
confirmer la vulnérabilité des classifieurs modernes à de telles perturbations. Nous analysons
ensuite théoriquement la robustesse des classifieurs aux perturbations adverses, et nous
montrons l’existence de limites fondamentales sur la robustesse qui révèlent un compromis
entre la robustesse et la performance. Cette analyse théorique nous permet de mieux
comprendre les causes de l’instabilité de classifieurs vis-a-vis de perturbations adverses, ce
qui représente une étape cruciale pour le développement de nouvelles méthodes améliorant
la robustesse des classifieurs à ces perturbations.
Nous étudions dans un second temps la robustesse des classifieurs à un nouveau régime de
perturbations semi-aléatoire, qui permet d’unifier les régimes aléatoires et adverses. Nous
établissons des bornes théoriques précises sur la robustesse des classifieurs dans ce régime
général, qui dépendent de la courbure de la frontière de décision du classifieur. Nos résultats
montrent en particulier que nous avons un phénomène de bénédiction de dimensionnalité,
car il est possible d’atteindre une grande robustesse au bruit aléatoire en haute dimension,
même si le classifieur est extrêmement instable aux perturbations adverses. Nous montrons,
cependant, que si le bruit est principalement aléatoire et seulement légèrement adverse,
les classifieurs modernes restent vulnérables à un tel bruit. Nous effectuons en outre des
expériences montrant que les résultats théoriques établis fournissent des estimations très
précises lorsqu’elles sont appliquées à divers réseaux de neurones profonds et à des ensembles
de données complexes.
Enfin, nous étudions l’invariance de classifieurs par rapport à des déformations géomé-
triques et nuisances structurées, telles que les occlusions. Nous proposons des méthodes
systématiques permettant de quantifier la robustesse des classifieurs d’images à de telles
déformations, et proposons des algorithmes numériques efficaces permettant d’estimer ces
quantités. Nous effectuons une évaluation expérimentale et montrons que les méthodes
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proposées permettent de quantifier le gain en invariance qui résulte de l’augmentation de la
profondeur des réseaux de neurones, ou de l’addition d’échantillons transformés aux jeu de
données d’apprentissage. De plus, nous démontrons que les méthodes proposées permettent
de découvrir les “failles” des classifieurs à l’aide d’un échantillonage dans l’ensemble des nui-
sances. Enfin, nos résultats fournissent des indications sur les caractéristiques importantes
utilisées par un classifieur afin de distinguer entre les classes.
En résumé, nous fournissons dans cette thèse de nouveaux résultats quantitatifs qui décrivent
précisément le comportement des classifieurs lorsque les données sont affectées par des
perturbations. Nous sommes convaincus que nos résultats seront utiles afin d’évaluer
objectivement la fiabilité des classifieurs et construire des systèmes plus robustes.
Mots clefs : classification, robustesse, perturbations adverses, bruit aléatoire, bruit semi-
aléatoire, invariance, transformations géométriques, nuisances, occlusions, apprentissage
profond, réseaux neuronal convolutif.
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1 Introduction
The goal of many computer vision tasks is to estimate categorical properties from visual
data, such as the presence or absence of a particular object in a scene. For example, in the
context of self-driving vehicles, one of the key tasks is to accurately recognize cars, traffic
signs and pedestrians, even when these are affected by clutter, noise, occlusions and other
forms of perturbation. One of the major difficulties in classification tasks is to correctly
recognize an object despite the large amount of variability and corruptions that might affect
the visual data in real-world tasks. While the human visual system is partially robust to
such perturbations, it is unclear whether classifiers enjoy the same robustness properties.
Understanding the robustness of classifiers to real-world perturbations is therefore primordial
in the quest of designing effective classifiers.
In this thesis, our primary focus is the analysis and the quantification of the classifiers’
robustness to different perturbations in the data. We study a diverse set of perturbations,
ranging from adversarial noise to random noise, as well as more structured nuisances such
as geometric transformations and occlusions. These different perturbation models are
likely to affect the data in a widespread set of applications. First, a classifier might be
subject to adversarial attacks, where a malicious agent having (partial or full) knowledge
of the classification model minimally alters the samples so as to “fool” the classifier. For
example, in person identification, an adversary would seek to minimally modify an existing
photo/fingerprint to fool the classifier to be granted access in restricted areas. In such hostile
environments, the robustness of classifiers against adversarial perturbations is therefore
crucial. In other classification applications, the captured data might be subject to random
noise due to the sensing process, data transmission, or any other component of the data
acquisition pipeline. This noise regime is very different from the adversarial regime, as no
prior knowledge on the classifier is used in the corruption process. Moreover, in computer
vision applications, visual data often undergoes structured perturbations, such as geometric
transformations, illumination changes and occlusions. These structured perturbations can
be seen as some sort of data corruption that act on an ideal representation of the object.
In all these cases, the major challenge in classification problems is then to factor out such
corruptions or nuisances, and recover the categorical property of interest from the perturbed
versions of the data.
The importance of analyzing the robustness of classifiers to different perturbations in the
data (e.g., adversarial perturbations) goes well beyond the designated applications (e.g.,
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security-related problems). In fact, the quantification of the amount of noise that is required
to modify the estimated label of an image is crucial for understanding the concepts that
are learned by the classifier. Perturbations reveal indeed the differences between the classes
from the point of view of the classifier, and therefore provide important insights on the
topology of the decision boundaries that separate the classes. For example, the analysis
of the perturbation required to transform a (typical) “car” image into an image classified
as “plane” allows us to understand the difference between these two concepts from the
perspective of the classifier. While such a perturbation would typically include specific
semantic objects (such as “airplane wings”) for a human observer, it is unclear whether the
typical classifiers use similar cues. The analysis of the robustness properties of classifiers is
therefore crucial for improving our understanding of classifiers that are often seen as black
box models.
Despite the importance of robust classification, many questions pertaining to the robustness
of classifiers for different perturbation models remain open. In particular, while recent
works (e.g., [Sze+14]) showed that state-of-the-art classifiers are extremely unstable to
adversarial perturbations, the causes of instability remain unclear. Moreover, the effect
of other typical perturbations on classifiers is unknown. For example, how are state-of-
the-art deep neural networks affected by random or partially random noise? We believe
these problems require quantitative answers and in-depth analyses, as they determine the
reliability of such classifiers in real-world environments where perturbations occur almost
systematically. An even more fundamental question is whether it is actually feasible to
learn robust and accurate classifiers. More generally, it is crucial to study the interplay
between the accuracy of a classifier and its robustness. Finally, when images undergo
structured perturbations (such as geometric transformations), it is important to quantify
the robustness of a classifier to such transformations. While most research papers report
the accuracy of the classifier on a standard split of training and testing sets, this measure
says little about the robustness of this classifier to structured nuisances. Designing an
appropriate measure that summarizes the robustness of a classifier to structured nuisances
(such as geometric transformations, or occlusions) is therefore an important question. In
particular, it permits to understand the weaknesses of classifiers with respect to real-world
nuisances.
1.1 Thesis outline
The thesis is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2, we review relevant works from the literature that relate to image classification
and in particular robustness and invariance properties.
In Chapter 3, we study the problem of estimating the robustness of classifiers to adversarial
perturbations. The estimation of the classifier’s robustness involves the minimization
of a non-convex objective function. We propose an efficient and accurate algorithm for
estimating the robustness of classifiers that is based on an iterative linearization of the
classifier’s decision function. The proposed method is shown experimentally to compare
favorably with respect to other methods in terms of the robustness estimation. Experimental
results moreover show that augmenting the training set with adversarial examples can
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increase the robustness to adversarial perturbations, and act as a regularizer to improve
the accuracy of the classifiers.
Next, in Chapter 4, we analyze theoretically the robustness of classifiers to adversarial
perturbations. The goal of this chapter is specifically to quantify how large the robustness
to adversarial perturbations can be for fixed classification families (e.g., the family of linear
classifiers). To do so, we establish learning-independent upper bounds on the robustness
to adversarial perturbations, and reveal the existence of a tradeoff between robustness
and classification accuracy. Specifically, we show that, for common classification tasks,
it is not possible to find a classifier in the considered family that achieves both a large
robustness and a large accuracy, independently of the training algorithm used to choose the
classifier. We precisely quantify this tradeoff using data-dependent measures that capture
the difficulty of the classification task with respect to the classifiers’ family. Our analysis
moreover suggests that the lack of robustness of classifiers is due to the lack of flexibility of
classifiers with regards to the difficulty of the classification task, and that the robustness
increases with the flexibility of the classification model. Experimental results finally confirm
the theoretical results.
In Chapter 5, we study the robustness of classifiers in a novel semi-random noise regime,
which generalizes random and adversarial noise. In the random noise regime, data points
are perturbed by noise the direction of which is picked uniformly at random in the input
space. The semi-random regime generalizes this model to random subspaces of arbitrary
dimension, where a worst-case perturbation is sought within the subspace. We conduct a
unified theoretical analysis on the robustness of classifiers in this general noise regime, and
establish precise bounds on the robustness of classifiers that depend on the curvature of
the classifier’s decision boundary. Specifically, we show that the robustness of classifiers
to random noise behaves as
√
d times the robustness to adversarial perturbations (where
d denotes the dimension of the data) provided the curvature of the decision boundary is
sufficiently small. This result highlights the blessing of dimensionality for the robustness
of classifiers to random noise, as it shows that it is theoretically possible to achieve a
large robustness to random noise even if the classifier is largely unstable to adversarial
perturbations. Our bounds notably extend to the general semi-random regime, where we
show that the robustness precisely behaves as
√
d/m times the distance to boundary, with m
the dimension of the subspace. This result shows in particular that, even when m is chosen
as a small fraction of the dimension d, it is still possible to find small perturbations that
are constrained to be in the subspace of dimension m and that cause data misclassification.
We conclude the chapter with experimental results showing that our theoretical estimates
are very accurately satisfied by state-of-the-art deep neural networks on various sets of
data, which suggests that the curvature of the decision boundary of such classifiers is small.
The focus of Chapter 6 is to study and quantify the invariance of classifiers, that is, their
robustness to geometric transformations of the images (e.g., translation, rotations, etc...).
We propose a principled and systematic method to measure the robustness of arbitrary
image classifiers to geometric transformations. Specifically, we define the invariance measure
as the minimal distance between the identity transformation and a transformation that
is sufficient to change the decision of the classifier. In order to define the transformation
metric, the key idea is to represent the set of transformed images as an image manifold;
the transformation metric is then naturally captured by the geodesic distance on the
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manifold. We propose a numerical algorithm for estimating the robustness of arbitrary
classifiers to low-dimensional transformation groups, which is based on the efficient Fast
Marching algorithm for computing geodesic distances on manifolds. We conduct an in-depth
experimental evaluation of the proposed metric and show that our method is able to quantify
the gain in invariance due to the increase of the depth of a convolutional neural network,
as well as the effect of data augmentation on the invariance of classifiers. The proposed
tool is then used to compare different networks in terms of their invariance, and can readily
be used to objectively assess the reliability of classifiers to geometric perturbations.
Finally, in Chapter 7, we generalize the idea of assessing the invariance of classifiers to
arbitrary parametric nuisance factors, such as occlusions, illumination changes or complex
geometric transformations. To do so, we develop a general probabilistic framework, whose
outcome is two-fold: the estimation of the robustness of classifiers to arbitrary nuisances,
and the efficient sampling from problematic regions in the nuisance space that potentially
lead to misclassification. The latter sampling technique is used to gain insights into the
“weak spots” of classifiers, as well as on the features used to distinguish between classes.
We apply the proposed framework to evaluate the robustness of state-of-the-art classifiers
in natural image classification and face recognition tasks, and show that these classifiers
are often only mildly robust to standard nuisances, such as occlusions. The visualization of
problematic samples moreover shows, for example, that a slight occlusion of specific features
in a face image can cause important errors in classification. Hence, besides the possibility
to measure the robustness of classifiers to standard nuisances, the proposed framework can
also be used to gain further insights on the actual discriminative image features that are
used in the classification process.
1.2 Summary of contributions
The main contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows:
• We propose an accurate and efficient algorithm for estimating the robustness of
classifiers to adversarial perturbations.
• We analyze the robustness of classifiers to adversarial perturbations, and show the
existence of learning-independent fundamental limits on the robustness of classifiers.
These limits depend on the classification risk, and reveal a novel robustness-risk
tradeoff.
• We show that, for classifiers with sufficiently flat decision boundaries, the robustness
to random noise is larger than the robustness to adversarial noise by a factor of the
square root of the data dimenstion.
• More generally, we analyze the robustness of classifiers to a noise model that interpo-
lates between random noise and adversarial noise, where minimal perturbations are
sought in a randomly chosen subspace. We derive precise bounds on the robustness
of classifiers in this generalized noise regime in terms of the curvature of the decision
boundary and the subspace dimension. We show that state-of-the-art classifiers
remain vulnerable to noise that is mostly random, and only mildly adversarial (i.e.,
where the subspace dimension is small).
4
1.2. Summary of contributions
• We propose a novel invariance score that measures the robustness of a classifier to
geometric transformations, and propose an algorithm for computing the invariance
score.
• We finally introduce a new probabilistic framework for assessing the robustness of
classifiers to parametric nuisance sets, such as occlusion or illumination changes. The
proposed framework allows us to discover the “weak spots” of any given classifier
using appropriate sampling strategies.
5

2 Prior art
2.1 Outline
In this chapter, we review the relevant works from the literature that are linked to the
general problems addressed in this thesis. We first review in Section 2.2 some of the
major advances in the problem of image classification, with a special emphasis on deep
convolutional networks, as these have been recently shown to largely outperform other
architectures. Next, in Section 2.3, we focus on the problem of robust classification. We
then delve into the related problem of achieving geometric invariance to transformations
and other nuisance variables in the data in Section 2.4. In this chapter, we give particular
emphasis on works that analyze and provide a better understanding of the inner mechanisms
of modern classification methods.
2.2 Advances in image classification
In this section, we review some of the key works in the broad domain of image classification,
with a special focus on recent architectures. The main challenge for accurately solving a
visual task (in particular, image classification) is building a successful visual representation,
which defines a mapping from pixels to meaningful features that can be used to solve the task.
Since the very beginning of computer vision, a large number of visual representations have
been proposed to tackle visual tasks [Sze10]. Prior to the popularization of deep learning for
image classification, visual representations were mostly built in a hand-engineered fashion.
Examples of such representations are SIFT [Low04], HOG [DT05], SURF [Bay+08]. See
[MS05] for other examples. These feature representations leverage the human expertise to
define plausible mappings from the pixels to features that satisfy the required properties (such
as local invariance to rotations and translation). Unlike hand-engineered representations,
the modern approach builds deep visual representations by gradually transforming the
image into more abstract (and more useful) representations using a number of elementary
operations. Deep representations take a broad inspiration from the hierarchical nature of
the architecture of the visual cortex, where visual data flows from the retina to different
visual areas [TFT01]. Deep visual representations are moreover learned from the data and
impose no specific priors related to the problem modality. Thanks to the rapid development
of GPUs, it is now possible to learn huge deep networks (possibly containing hundreds of
millions of parameters) that significantly outperform previous state-of-the-art results in
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many problems, such as natural image classification (ImageNet) [KSH12; Sze+15; SZ14],
face recognition [PVZ15; Tai+14], and fine-grained classification [Wah+11; JSZ+15]. Deep
convolutional networks build a representation of the data through the composition of linear
and nonlinear elementary operations. We briefly mention three of the key operations used
in deep convolutional networks as follows:
• Convolution: Given a three-dimensional feature map x ∈ RH×W×D, the convolu-
tion layer convolves x with learned filters f ∈ RH′×W ′×D×D′′ , and outputs y ∈
RH′′×W ′′×D′′ ; i.e.,
yi′′,j′′,d′′ = bd′′ +
H′∑
i′=1
W ′∑
j′=1
D∑
d=1
fi′,j′,d,d′′xi′′+i′−1,j′′+j′−1,d,
where bd′′ denotes the bias, and H ′′ = 1 +H −H ′ and W ′′ = 1 +W −W ′.
• Rectification: Modern deep convolutional neural networks use a half-rectification
activation functions defined by
y = max(0,x).
This simple nonlinearity has been shown to provide significant improvements with
respect to traditional sigmoid activation functions [GBB11; MHN13], and is also
tightly related to sparse coding [FDF15].
• Pooling : The goal of a pooling operation is to provide invariance to the classifier, by
computing summary statistics over groups of features. Given a feature map x, the
pooled representation is given by
yi′′,j′′,d = P
(
{xi′′+i′−1,j′′+j′−1,d}1≤i′≤W ′
1≤j′≤H′
)
,
whereW ′ and H ′ denote respectively the width and heights of the pooling regions, and
P denotes the pooling operator. Successful pooling operators include the average and
maximum; see e.g., [BPL10] for a comparison between different pooling mechanisms.
A pooling operation is often accompanied with a subsampling of the feature map.
Input layer
Convolution
y = F ? x+ b
Pointwise
rectification
Max pooling
+ subsampling
Fully connected
layer
Figure 2.1: Structure of a CNN, obtained by stacking a series of linear and nonlinear
elementary operations.
We refer to [VL15] for example for a detailed and hands-on description of other types of
elementary operations commonly used in CNN architectures. The resulting classifier is
a composition of many such operations, resulting in networks with possibly millions of
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unknown parameters. An example architecture of a simple CNN is illustrated in Fig. 2.1.
Once the architecture of the network is specified, the convolutional neural network is trained
in an end-to-end fashion using example images. Specifically, this step involves learning
the convolutional filters f . Convolutional neural networks are generally trained using
stochastic gradient descent (SGD) optimization, where the chain rule – or backpropagation
[LeC+98b] – is used in order to compute the gradients. Alternative optimization algorithms
have however been proposed recently, and have been shown to improve over standard
optimization algorithms [KB14; MG15; Mar10].
Figure 2.2: Images obtained using the visualization tool of [SVZ13] where the “goose” and
“ostrich” neurons in the last layer of a deep neural network are maximized. Image taken
from [SVZ13].
The recent impressive success of deep convolutional neural networks has triggered a signifi-
cant number of fundamental research questions related to our understanding of the internal
mechanisms leading to these successes. In an attempt to understand the features learned
by deep networks, visualization strategies have been proposed in [MV15; DB16]. These
visualization tools study the invertibility of the CNN representations; that is, to which
extent an image x can be recovered from its feature representation φ(x)? The visualization
of these inverse images gives an understanding of the information that is preserved in the
feature representations. In particular, these visualization strategies provide some empirical
understanding about the layers at which invariance in the representation is achieved. Other
visualization tools have been proposed in [ZF14; SVZ13], where the authors focus instead
on the visualization of images that maximize the activation of single neurons. Fig. 2.2
shows images obtained by maximizing class-specific neurons in a state-of-the-art deep neural
network. Experiments with these visualization tools show that, while neurons in lower layers
mostly fire in the presence of edges, neurons in higher layers tend to be more sensitive to
semantic objects with similar visual appearance. The invertibility of convolutional networks
has also been studied from a theoretical perspective. In [BSL14], the invertibility of pooling
operations used in neural network representations is analyzed. In particular, it is shown
that, when the linear weights of the neural network are sufficiently redundant, it is possible
to recover the original signals from pooled representations. Along the same lines, [ALM15]
show that neural nets have an associated simple generative model that generates input data
according to the conditional distribution characterizing the neural network.
Since the elementary operations that constitute convolutional neural networks are all
linear or piecewise linear, the associated feature mapping is globally piecewise linear in
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the image space. In [Mon+14], the number of linear regions (in the input space) of deep
neural networks is studied; this number is shown to grow exponentially with the number of
layers and polynomially in the size of the hidden layer. This growth therefore highlights
that deep networks are more flexible than shallow ones, and hence can compute more
“complicated” functions, which partly explains their success. Along the same lines of a
theoretical understanding of the effect of deep networks on the input space, the authors in
[ABB15] study the effect of applying half-rectification non-linearities on the input space,
and in particular, on the linear separability of the datapoints.
On the optimization front, several works have attempted to understand the landscape of the
non-convex objective function used to train deep neural networks [Dau+14; Cho+14]. In
[Dau+14], the authors show that the difficulty in training such neural networks comes from
the abundance of saddle points, not local minima, particularly in high dimensional problems
that we typically encounter in neural network training. The authors empirically show that
such saddle points are surrounded by high error plateaus that can make learning more
difficult. In [Cho+14], the authors provide a theoretical description of the optimization of
large neural networks, under strong statistical assumptions on the network. It is shown in
particular that, under such assumptions, most local minima of the objective function are
equivalent in the sense that they yield similar performance on a test set. The probability of
finding a bad local minima (i.e., large objective function) is further shown to decrease with
the network size; i.e., while for small-sized networks, “bad” local minimas have a non-zero
probability of being recovered, the probability of recovering such local minimas for large
networks is actually very small. Despite the strong statistical assumptions imposed on the
network, this work provides a better understanding of the shape of the objective function,
and explain why it is possible to train very deep networks using simple algorithms such as
stochastic gradient descent.
One of the main goals of this thesis is to develop analytical results in order to increase our
understanding of classification models, and in particular, the robustness of classifiers to
perturbations in the data. In the following sections, we review recent works related to the
robustness of classifiers to different perturbation models.
2.3 Classification robustness
Robustness of neural networks to adversarial perturbations
State-of-the-art deep neural networks have recently been shown to be unstable to adversarial
perturbations in the data [Sze+14]. Unlike random noise, adversarial perturbations are
minimal (or worst-case) perturbations that are sought to change the estimated label of the
classifier. The computation of adversarial perturbations involves solving an optimization
problem (that requires the knowledge of the classifier’s model), with the goal of going
beyond decision boundary of the classifier (see Fig. 2.3 (a) for an illustration). On vision
tasks, the results of [Sze+14] have shown that perturbations that are hardly perceptible to
the human eye are sufficient to change the decision value of a deep network, even if the
classifier has a performance that is close to the human visual system (Fig. 2.3 (b)). This
surprising instability to “invisible” perturbations has received a widespread interest, as it
highlights a fundamental difference with the human visual system, and raises important
10
2.3. Classification robustness
challenges.
Adv. perturbation
De
c i s
io
n 
bo
un
da
ry
x
Class 1
Class 2
(a) (b)
Figure 2.3: Illustration of adversarial perturbations. Left: schematic representation
of the perturbation. Right: Example images and adversarial perturbations. The left
column depict original images (correctly classified by the network), the middle column
shows the perturbations, and the right column shows the perturbed images (original image
+ perturbation) that are wrongly classified. This figure is taken from [Sze+14].
Beyond the obvious security concerns that this instability issue raises when classifiers are
deployed in hostile environments, it also reveals fundamental shortcomings in the concepts
and decision boundaries learned by state-of-the art classifiers. Specifically, this instability
shows that most datapoints lie very closely to decision boundaries, even for two classes
with significantly different semantic meaning. It should be noted that the authors in
[Sze+14] have previously imputed the high instability of deep neural networks to the high
“nonlinearity” of these classifiers. More precisely, the large Lipschitz constants associated to
the feature map of the CNN are thought to induce “blind spots” in the classifier causing the
instability to small perturbations. This explanation does not, however, take into account
the important fact that linear classifiers are not exempt from this instability to adversarial
perturbations. In that context, one of the contributions of this thesis is to provide a
quantitative analysis of the robustness of classifiers to adversarial perturbations, with the
goal of gaining a better understanding of this phenomenon.
While in [Sze+14], it is assumed that the adversary has full knowledge of the classification
model, other works have examined the robustness of classifiers to perturbations when the
adversary has only limited knowledge [Big+13; DSX10; GR06]. For example, in [Big+13],
the transformed data point is constrained to remain within a maximum distance from the
original sample, and it is further assumed that the attacker does not have direct access to the
model (but only to a surrogate). These attack models are more likely to occur in real-world
applications, as attackers often do not have complete control over the classification model.
Construction of robust classifiers with robust optimization
Following the original paper [Sze+14], several attempts have been made to construct deep
networks with better robustness to adversarial perturbations [CPE14; GR14]. While most
of these recent works that attempt to construct robust classifiers have mostly focused on
the robustness of the new generation of neural networks to perturbations in the data, the
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design of robust classifiers has been an active area of research and a long standing goal in
machine learning. Using a robust optimization approach, new learning algorithms have
been proposed for various learning tasks (see [CMX12] and references therein). A particular
emphasis was given to the extension of support vector machines (SVMs) to settings where
uncertainty corrupts the data. Assuming a disturbance model on the data samples, the
robust optimization approach for constructing robust classifiers seeks to minimize the worst
possible empirical error under such disturbances. In the context of SVM classification, the
problem of learning robust linear classifiers (w, b) corresponds to the following min-max
problem
min
w,b
max
U∈U
{
r(w, b) +
m∑
i=1
(
1− yi((xi + ui)Tw + b)
)
+
}
,
where xi and ui denote respectively the datapoints and perturbation vectors, yi ∈ {+1,−1}
denote the labels and r(w, b) is a regularization term. For certain uncertainty sets U , the
objective function can be written as a tractable convex optimization problem [XCM09;
Lan+03; Bha04; TG07], which makes the task of finding a robust classifier feasible.
Other works have applied robust optimization approaches to design robust classifiers against
new forms of perturbation. For example, in [GR06; DSX10], the authors propose a robust
optimization algorithm to train classifiers that are robust against missing features (e.g.,
missing pixels in a handwritten recognition task). In [CM08], the problem of robust
classification is examined when the noise affects the labels rather than the datapoints; it is
then shown that robust classifiers can also be trained using robust optimization.
Unlike the above works that mostly propose robust classification algorithms for SVM, we
focus in this thesis on more analytical aspects; e.g., can we actually find classifiers that
are robust to perturbations? Moreover, we mostly concentrate in this thesis on modern
successful architectures (e.g., deep neural networks) that have achieved huge progress in
the problem of image classification. It should be noted that the construction of robust
classification methods for deep neural networks is still an open problem.
Robustness at the learning stage
While most of the above works consider attacks that alter datapoints at test time, it is
equally important to achieve robustness to perturbations at the training stage. In particular,
the adversary might manipulate the training data, therefore leading to a modification of the
learned classification rule. This type of attack, dubbed poisoning attack, injects specially
crafted training samples in order to maximize the test error of the learned classifier. The
effect of poisoning attacks on different learning algorithms have previously been investigated
in [BNL12; Xia+15]. In [Bar+06; Dal+04], a taxonomy of different attacks at the training
stage requiring different levels of knowledge about the machine learning systems, and
methods to counter these attacks are described. It is important to stress that, while these
works study attacks that manipulate the learning system (e.g., change the decision function
by injecting malicious training points), as well as defense strategies to counter these attacks,
our focus in this thesis is more on robustness of fixed classifiers (not the learning algorithms).
We finally note that the stability of learning algorithms has also been defined and studied
12
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in [BE02; LP94a]. Specifically, in [BE02], the stability of learning algorithms is examined
with respect to a removal of an element in the training set; this notion of stability is further
shown to be useful in order to derive generalization error bounds. This is again a property
of the learning algorithm; we are however more interested in this thesis on the robustness
of fixed classifiers.
2.4 Classification invariance to geometric transformation and
nuisance factors
In visual tasks, it is not only crucial to have classifiers that are robust against additive or
adversarial attacks; it is also equally important to achieve invariance to structured nuisance
variables, such as illumination changes, occlusions or standard local geometric transforma-
tions of the image. Specifically, when images undergo such structured deformations, it is
desirable that the estimated label remains the same. In this part, we will first review some
of the works that impose invariance by modifying the distance measure or by appropriate
alignment. Then, we will review modern techniques that implicitly incorporate invariance
in deep feature representation. Finally, we will review the relevant works in the literature
that assess and analyze the invariance of classifiers to nuisance factors.
Transformation invariant distances and image alignment
One approach to introduce invariance in pattern recognition algorithms is to use transformation-
invariant distance measures. The geometrically transformed versions of a fixed image span a
low-dimensional nonlinear manifold in the high-dimensional space. Therefore, an appropriate
invariant distance measure in this case corresponds to the manifold distance between these
two transformation manifolds. Computing the transformation-invariant distance between
two patterns or, equivalently, the manifold distance is unfortunately a difficult problem in
general. The authors in [Sim+00] locally approximate the transformation-invariant distance
with the distance between the linear spaces that are tangent to both manifolds. [VL05] go
beyond the limitations of local invariance in tangent distance methods by embedding the
tangent distance computation in a multiresolution framework. In [KF09], global invariance
is achieved by approximating the original pattern with a linear combination of atoms from a
parametric dictionary. Thanks to this approximation, the manifold is given in a closed form,
and the objective function becomes equal to a difference of convex functions that can be
globally minimized using cutting plane methods. Unfortunately, this class of optimization
methods has a slow convergence rate with complexity limitations in practical settings.
Another approach for computing the transformation-invariant distance is to align (or
register) the images. Transformation-invariant distances can then be easily computed from
the aligned versions of the image. Feature-based approaches [Low04; DT05; Bay+08]
represent an efficient class of methods for image registration. They are usually built on
several steps: (i) feature detection, which searches for stable distinctive locations in the
images, (ii) feature description, which provides a description of each detected location with
an invariant descriptor, (iii) features matching between the images and (iv) transformation
estimation that estimates the global transformation by looking at matched features. Note
that it is crucial in this class of methods to describe the features in a transformation-
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invariant way for easier matching. Many other approaches for image alignment exist
[Pen+10; Mae+97; Ash07; FF13]; a comprehensive review of these approaches however
goes outside the scope of this thesis, and we refer to [ZF03; Sze10] for surveys on this topic.
Invariant feature representations
Deep convolutional networks build features that intend to be invariant to local geometric
deformations in the data, through the use of a cascade of convolution, pooling and nonlin-
earity operators as discussed earlier in this chapter [Jar+09]. Despite the success of these
architectures, their invariance properties are not fully understood. What is the effect of the
number of layers on the invariance of the architecture? Which nonlinearity and pooling
operations to use in order to enhance the invariance of the global representation? In [Mal12;
BM13], the authors use a similar structure to convolutional neural networks (i.e., cascade
of filtering, nonlinearity and pooling operations), and impose the requirement of stability of
the representation to local deformations, while retaining maximum information about the
original data. Formally, the feature mapping Φ is imposed to satisfy the following stability
conditions:
Stability to additive noise: ‖Φ‖ ≤ C‖‖, (2.1)
Stability to local deformations: ‖Φxτ − Φx‖ ≤ C‖x‖supu|∇τ(u)|, (2.2)
where τ(u) is a displacement field that deforms the image, xτ (u) = x(u− τ(u)), and | · |
is the matrix operator norm. It should be noted that the condition in Eq. (2.2) implies
the invariance of the feature representation to global translations (i.e., special case where
∇τ(u) = 0). In order to satisfy these constraints, a new architecture is proposed, the
scattering network, where successive filtering with wavelets and pointwise nonlinearities
are applied. It should be noted that the approach used to build this scattering network
significantly differs from traditional convolutional neural networks, as no learning of the
filters is involved. Scattering networks have been shown to achieve very high classification
accuracies on digit and texture classification tasks in [BM13; SM13]. Scattering networks
have also been applied to more complex tasks, such as natural image classification in
[OM15]. While yielding better results with respect to previously known unsupervised
dictionary learning methods and fixed-feature classification methods, scattering networks still
underperform supervised CNNs in terms of classification accuracy on these complex tasks.
In another effort to improve the invariance properties of deep convolutional neural networks,
the authors in [JSZ+15] proposed a new module, the spatial transformer, that geometrically
transforms the filter maps. Spatial transformer modules, similarly to convolutional modules,
are trained in a supervised way; in particular, the estimation of the transformation is
performed in order to maximize the classification accuracy. Using spatial transformer
networks, the performance of classifiers improve significantly, especially when images have
noise and clutter, as these modules automatically learn to localize and unwarp corrupted
images. Finally, another popular way of building more invariant representations is through
virtual jittering (or data augmentation), where training data are transformed and fed back
to the training set. One of the drawbacks of this approach is however that the training can
become intractable, as the size of the training set becomes substantially larger than the
original data set. To make the training more efficient with the augmented training sets,
new techniques have been proposed based on the non-uniform sampling of the training data
14
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[CJF16]. Besides, some works [Pau+14; Hau+16] have recently developed principled and
automatic approaches for transforming images. Despite these major advances in building
more robust and invariant representations, a thorough understanding and assessment of
the invariance to general nuisance factors of these classifiers remains open.
Analyzing the invariance of classifiers
We review in this section works that assess and analyze the invariance of classifiers to
transformations in the data. Several empirical works have been introduced to assess the
invariance of classifiers to geometric transformations in the data. In [Goo+09], the authors
develop simple tests to assess the invariance of neural networks to transformations of the
data. These tests consider controlled images of gratings, and measure the effect of applying
simple geometric transformations to the probe image. In a more recent work, [LV15] study
the equivariance property of image representations, that is the relation between the features
of the transformed images and those of the original image. The invariance is a special case
of equivariance where transformation has no effect. These experiments help understanding
at which layer invariance to simple transformations such as vertical flips, scale or rotation
is achieved. In [Bak+16], the view-point invariance of CNNs is analyzed. In particular, the
authors study the evolution of the view-manifold (that contain the features of the different
views of an object) with respect to the number of layers. It is shown that the information
on the view of an object is preserved till the last but one layer of the CNN. In other words,
CNNs preserve the structure of the view manifold, which supports the hypothesis that
this manifold in higher layers is “untangled” in higher layers, rather than being “collapsed”,
which goes in the same direction of [DC07] for the human brain. In [KDS16], an empirical
analysis of the ability of current CNNs to manage location and scale variability is performed.
It is shown in particular that CNNs are not very effective in factoring out location and
scale variability, despite the popular belief that the convolutional architecture and the local
spatial pooling provides invariance to such representations.
In [SC16; SDK15; ARP16], a more theoretical perspective is taken to analyze the invariance
of modern classification methods to nuisance variables. Specifically, in [SC16], the authors
propose a new mathematical formalism of visual representations, and define the notion
of optimal representation. The optimality of a representation essentially formalizes the
intuitive definition of a representation that satisfies the property of invariance to nuisance
variables, and retaining maximal information of the original images. Connections with
existing representations (shallow and deep) are further shown. This work has suggested
well-grounded modifications of existing architectures that led to significant improvements
in the problem of feature correspondence in single-view and multi-view settings [DS15;
Don+15].
Despite the importance of the invariance property of classifiers to nuisance variables, there
exists no systematic method to test the invariance of classifiers to arbitrary nuisance
variables in the data, up to our knowledge. We provide in this thesis tools to quantify the
invariance of black-box classifiers to arbitrary nuisance variables.
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2.5 Summary
We summarize the main points of this chapter, in the light of the contributions of this
thesis and upcoming challenges:
• Recent works have shown that impressive performance can be reached with deep CNN
classifiers. This has triggered an important number of works that attempt to explain
the success of such architectures.
• One of the fundamental properties of classifiers is their robustness to perturbations
in the data. The robustness of deep CNN classifiers has nevertheless only been
very recently investigated empirically. One of the aims of this thesis is to provide
analytical results on the robustness of classifiers, and to lay a theoretical foundation
for a rigorous study of the robustness.
• The invariance of classifiers to nuisance variables has also been studied to a large
extent by previous works. Despite the abundance of analytical works that try to
provide a better understanding of the invariance properties of modern classifiers,
no framework exists for systematically measuring and quantifying the invariance to
geometric transformations, or more generally, the robustness to general nuisance
variables.
16
3 Estimation of classifiers’ robustness
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we propose an algorithm to estimate the robustness of classifiers to
adversarial perturbations. Adversarial perturbations (also called worst-case noise) are
minimal perturbations that are sought to switch the estimated label of the classifier. In
vision tasks, the empirical results of [Sze+14] have shown that adversarial perturbations
that are hardly perceptible to the human eye are sufficient to change the classification
decision of a deep network, even if the classifier has a very good accuracy. While [Sze+14]
estimated adversarial examples by solving a series of penalized optimization problems,
this algorithm unfortunately does not scale up to large datasets, and therefore hinders
the understanding of the robustness of state-of-the-art deep neural networks in general
settings. The efficient and accurate computation of adversarial examples is moreover a key
component for improving the robustness of classifiers. We therefore believe that an accurate
and efficient method to compute the robustness of classifiers is a necessary starting point
towards a better understanding of the limits of current architectures and to design robust
classification methods.
Our new algorithm for estimating the robustness to adversarial perturbations is based on
an iterative linearization of the classifier’s decision function. When the decision boundaries
are linear, we show that the robustness can be expressed in closed form and our algorithm
iteratively uses such update rules for an accurate computation of the robustness. We perform
an extensive experimental comparison, and show that 1) our method computes adversarial
perturbations more reliably and efficiently than existing methods 2) augmenting the training
set with adversarial examples increases the robustness to adversarial perturbations. We
also show that using imprecise approaches for the computation of adversarial perturbations
could lead to different and sometimes misleading conclusions about the robustness. Hence,
the proposed method provides a better understanding of this intriguing phenomenon and
of its influence factors.
The chapter is organized as follows: in Section 3.2, we introduce important definitions and
notations on the robustness of classifiers. We then present our algorithm in the binary case
Part of this chapter has been published in [MDFF16].
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Figure 3.1: Schematic representation of an adversarial perturbation. The vector r∗(x)
denotes the adversarial perturbation that moves the datapoint x to the boundary, and
∆adv(x) denotes its `2 norm.
in Section 3.3, and the multi-class case in Section 3.4. We finally provide experimental
results in Section 3.5, where we compute the robustness of state-of-the-art classifiers, and
compare the proposed optimization method for computing the robustness to other existing
methods.
3.2 Definitions & notations
We first introduce the framework and notations that are used for analyzing the robustness
of classifiers. Throughout this thesis, we use f to denote an arbitrary classification function,
and kˆf the classification rule associated to f . In binary classification tasks, we have
f : Rd → R, and the estimated label of a datapoint x ∈ Rd is typically obtained by taking
the sign of f(x); hence, kˆf (x) = sign(f(x)). For notation simplicity, when the classification
function f is clear from the context, we use kˆ(x) instead in order to denote the estimated
label of x. Given a datapoint x ∈ Rd, we denote by y(x) the ground-truth label of x. We
denote by µ the probability measure on Rd of the datapoints we wish to classify. We assume
moreover that this probability distribution has bounded support; that is, P
x∼µ
(x ∈ B) = 1,
where B = {x ∈ Rd : ‖x‖2 ≤ M} for some M > 0. The performance of a classifier f is
usually measured by its risk, defined as the probability of misclassification measured on the
data distribution µ:
R(f) = P
x∼µ
(kˆ(x) 6= y(x)). (3.1)
For a fixed datapoint x ∈ Rd, we define r∗(x) to be the minimal perturbation that changes
the estimated label of the classifier1 at x; i.e.,
r∗(x) = argmin
r∈Rd
‖r‖2 subject to kˆ(x+ r) 6= kˆ(x). (3.2)
1A borderline perturbation vector sending the datapoint exactly to the boundary is assumed to change
the label of the classifier.
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Quantity Notation Dependence
Risk R(f) [Eq. (3.1)] µ, y, f
Pointwise robustness to adversarial perturbations ∆adv(x) [Eq. (3.3)] f,x
Average robustness to adversarial perturbations ρadv(f) [Eq. (3.4)] f, µ
Table 3.1: Quantities of interest and their dependencies.
The robustness to adversarial perturbations is quantified by taking the norm of the vector
r∗(x):
∆adv(x) = ‖r∗(x)‖2. (3.3)
In the above definitions of r∗(x) and ∆adv(x), we removed the explicit dependence on
the classifier f to simplify notations, as the classifier will be clear from the context. An
illustration of these quantities is provided in Fig. 3.1.
Note that unlike random noise, the above definition corresponds to a minimal noise, where
the perturbation r is sought to flip the estimated label of x. This justifies the adversarial
nature of the perturbation. It is important to note that, while x is a datapoint sampled
according to µ, the perturbed point x+ r∗(x) is not required to belong to the dataset (i.e.,
x+ r∗(x) can be outside the support of µ). It should also be noted that while we use here
the `2 norm to quantify the perturbation, other norm choices are also possible; we refer to
Appendix A.2 for a discussion of the norm choice.
The global robustness to adversarial perturbation of f is finally defined as the average of
∆adv(x) over all x ∼ µ:
ρadv(f) = E
x∼µ
(∆adv(x)). (3.4)
In words, ρadv(f) is defined as the average norm of the minimal perturbations required to
change the estimated labels of the datapoints. Note that ρadv(f) is a property of both the
classifier f and the distribution µ, but it is independent of the true labels of the datapoints
y.2 Moreover, it should be noted that ρadv is different from the margin considered by
SVMs. In fact, SVM margins are traditionally defined as the minimal distance to the
(linear) boundary over all training points, while ρadv is defined as the average distance to
the boundary over all training points. In addition, distances in our case are measured in
the input space, while the margin is defined in the feature space for kernel SVMs. Table 3.1
shows a summary of the different quantities.
3.3 Computation of the robustness for binary classifiers
As a multiclass classifier can be viewed as aggregation of binary classifiers, we first propose
an algorithm for measuring the robustness of binary classifiers. That is, we assume here
kˆ(x) = sign(f(x)), where f is an arbitrary scalar-valued image classification function
f : Rd → R. We also denote by B , {x : f(x) = 0} the zero level set of f , which represents
2In that aspect, our definition slightly differs from the one proposed in [Sze+14], which defines the
robustness to adversarial perturbations as the average of the norms of the minimal perturbations required
to misclassify all datapoints.
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Figure 3.2: Adversarial examples for a linear binary classifier.
the classifier’s decision boundary. We begin by analyzing the case where f is an affine
classifier f(x) = wTx+ b, and then derive the general algorithm, which can be applied to
any differentiable binary classifier f .
In the case where the classifier f is affine, it can easily be seen that the robustness of f at
point x0, ∆adv(x0), is equal to the distance from x0 to the separating affine hyperplane
B = {x : wTx+ b = 0} (Figure 3.2). The minimal perturbation to change the classifier’s
decision corresponds to the orthogonal projection of x0 ontoB. It is given by the closed-form
formula:
r∗(x0) := argmin ‖r‖2 (3.5)
subject to f(x0 + r)f(x0) ≤ 0
= −f(x0)‖w‖22
w.
Assuming now that f is a general binary differentiable classifier, we adopt an iterative
procedure to estimate the robustness ∆adv(x0) and the corresponding perturbation r∗(x0).
Specifically, at each iteration, f is linearized around the current point xi and the minimal
perturbation of the linearized classifier is computed as
argmin
ri
‖ri‖2 subject to f(xi) +∇f(xi)Tri = 0. (3.6)
The perturbation ri at iteration i of the algorithm is computed using the closed form
solution in Eq. (3.5), and the point xi+1 for the next iteration is computed as xi+1 = xi+ri.
The algorithm stops when xi changes the sign of the classifier. The proposed algorithm for
binary classifiers is summarized in Algorithm 1 and a geometric illustration of the method
is shown in Figure 3.3.
In practice, Algorithm 1 can often converge to a point exactly on the zero level set B. In
order to reach the other side of the classification boundary, the final perturbation vector rˆ
is multiplied by a constant 1 + η, with η  1. In our experiments, we have used η = 0.02.
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Algorithm 1 Computing minimal perturbation for binary classifiers
1: input: Image x, classifier f .
2: output: Perturbation rˆ.
3: Initialize x0 ← x, i← 0.
4: while sign(f(xi)) = sign(f(x0)) do
5: ri ← − f(xi)‖∇f(xi)‖22∇f(xi),
6: xi+1 ← xi + ri,
7: i← i+ 1.
8: end while
9: return rˆ =
∑
i ri.
x0
x1
B
Rd
Figure 3.3: Illustration of Algorithm 1 for d = 2. Assume x0 ∈ Rd. The green plane is the
graph of x 7→ f(x0) +∇f(x0)T (x− x0), which is tangent to the classifier function (wire-
framed graph) x 7→ f(x). The orange line indicates where f(x0) +∇f(x0)T (x− x0) = 0.
x1 is obtained from x0 by projecting x0 on the orange hyperplane of Rd.
3.4 Computation of the robustness for multiclass classifiers
We now extend our algorithm to the multiclass case, in particular to the commonly used
one-vs-all classification schemes. In this scheme, the classifier has L outputs where L is
the number of classes. Therefore, a classifier can be defined as f : Rd → RL and the
classification is performed as follows:
kˆ(x) = argmax
k
fk(x), (3.7)
where fk(x) is the output of f(x) that corresponds to the kth class. Similarly to the binary
case, we first present our robustness estimation algorithm for the linear case and then we
generalize it to other classifiers.
3.4.1 Affine multiclass classifier
Let f(x) be an affine classifier, i.e., f(x) = W>x+ b for a given W ∈ Rd×L and b ∈ RL.
Since the mapping kˆ is the outcome of a one-vs-all classification scheme, the minimal
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Figure 3.4: For x0 belonging to class 4, let Bk = {x : fk(x)− f4(x) = 0} for k = {1, 2, 3},
denote the decision boundaries with respectively class 1, 2 and 3. These hyperplanes are
depicted in solid black lines and the boundary of polyhedron P is shown in green dotted
line. We recall that P is the polyhedron defining the region where f outputs label kˆ(x0)
(kˆ(x0) = 4 in this example).
perturbation r∗(x0) to fool the classifier at x0 can be rewritten as follows
r∗(x0) = argmin
r
‖r‖2
s.t. ∃k 6= kˆ(x0) : w>k (x0 + r) + bk ≥ w>kˆ(x0)(x0 + r) + bkˆ(x0),
(3.8)
where wk is the kth column of W. Geometrically, the above problem corresponds to the
computation of the distance between x0 and the boundary of the convex polyhedron P ,
P =
L⋂
k=1
{x : fkˆ(x0)(x) ≥ fk(x)}, (3.9)
where x0 is located inside P . The interior of polyhedron P defines the region of the space
where f outputs the label kˆ(x0). This setting is depicted in Figure 3.4. The solution to the
problem in Eq. (3.8) is given as follows:
Fact 1. Define rk(x0) to be the optimal perturbation when only classes k and kˆ(x0) are
considered:
rk(x0) = argmin
r
‖r‖2 such that fk(x0 + r) ≥ fkˆ(x0)(x0 + r). (3.10)
When the functions fk are affine, we have for all k 6= kˆ(x0),
rk(x0) =
|fk(x0)− fkˆ(x0)(x0)|
‖wk −wkˆ(x0)‖22
(wk −wkˆ(x0)). (3.11)
Moreover, the minimum perturbation r∗(x0) corresponds to the perturbation rk(x0) with
minimum `2 norm.
Proof. Let x0 ∈ Rd. We have
rk(x0) = argmin
r
‖r‖2 such that (wk −wkˆ(x0))
T (x0 + r) + bk − bkˆ(x0) ≥ 0.
Note that, by definition of kˆ(x0), we have fk(x0) ≤ fkˆ(x0)(x0). Hence, the above problem
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Figure 3.5: For x0 belonging to class 4, let Bk = {x : fk(x)− f4(x) = 0} for k ∈ {1, 2, 3}
denote the decision boundaries with class 1, 2 and 3 respectively. We approximate these
decision boundaries with affine hyperplanes, and the resulting decision boundary (that is
the boundary of polyhedron P˜0) is shown in green.
corresponds to the orthogonal projection of the datapoint x0 onto the affine hyperplane
of Rd with normal vector wk −wkˆ(x0) and bias bk − bkˆ(x0). The orthogonal projection is
given by the formula in Eq. (3.11). To relate r∗(x0) to rk(x0), note that
‖r∗(x0)‖2 = min
r
‖r‖2 s.t. r ∈
⋃
k 6=kˆ(x0)
{fk(x0 + r) ≥ fkˆ(x0)(x0 + r)}
= min
k 6=kˆ(x0)
min
r
‖r‖2 s.t. fk(x0 + r) ≥ fkˆ(x0)(x0 + r)
= min
k 6=kˆ(x0)
‖rk(x0)‖2.
In other words, to compute r∗(x0), we project x0 on the different hyperplanes that form
the polyhedron P , and we then choose the one with minimal `2 norm. We recall that the
robustness ∆adv(x0) at x0 is then obtained by taking the `2 norm of the perturbations; i.e.,
∆adv(x0) = ‖r∗(x0)‖2. The global robustness score ρadv(f) is then estimated by computing
the mean of ∆adv(x) on datapoints x ∼ µ.
3.4.2 General classifier
We now extend the algorithm to the general case of multiclass differentiable classifiers. For
general non-linear classifiers, the set P in Eq. (3.9) that describes the region of the space
where the classifier outputs label kˆ(x0) is no longer a polyhedron. Following the explained
iterative linearization procedure in the binary case, we approximate the set P at iteration i
by a polyhedron P˜i
P˜i =
L⋂
k=1
{
x : fk(xi)− fkˆ(x0)(xi) (3.12)
+∇fk(xi)>(x− xi)−∇fkˆ(x0)(xi)
>(x− xi) ≤ 0
}
.
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We then approximate, at iteration i, the distance between xi and the boundary of P by
the distance to the boundary of P˜i. Specifically, at each iteration of the algorithm, the
perturbation vector that reaches the boundary of the polyhedron P˜i is computed, and the
current estimate is updated. A schematic representation of the linearization of the decision
boundary is shown in Fig. 3.5. The method is given in Algorithm 2. It should be noted
that the proposed algorithm operates in a greedy way and is not guaranteed to converge
to the optimal perturbation in Eq. (3.3). However, we have observed in practice that our
algorithm yields very small perturbations that are believed to be good approximations of
the minimal perturbation.
Algorithm 2 Computing minimal perturbation in multi-class case
1: input: Image x, classifier f .
2: output: Perturbation rˆ.
3: Initialize x0 ← x, i← 0.
4: while kˆ(xi) = kˆ(x0) do
5: for k 6= kˆ(x0) do
6: Compute
rk(xi) =
|fk(xi)− fkˆ(x0)(xi)|
‖∇fk(xi)−∇fkˆ(x0)(xi)‖22
(∇fk(xi)−∇fkˆ(x0)(xi)). (3.13)
7: end for
8: Let ri be the vector rk(xi) with minimal `2 norm.
9: xi+1 ← xi + ri
10: i← i+ 1
11: end while
12: return rˆ =
∑
i ri
It should be noted that the optimization strategy employed to compute the perturbations
is strongly tied to existing optimization techniques. In the binary case, it can be seen as
Newton’s iterative algorithm for finding roots of a nonlinear system of equations in the
underdetermined case [Rus06]. This algorithm is known as the normal flow method. The
convergence analysis of this optimization technique can be found for example in [WW90].
Our algorithm in the binary case can alternatively be seen as a gradient descent algorithm
with an adaptive step size that is automatically chosen at each iteration. Finally, the
linearization in Algorithm 2 is also similar to a sequential convex programming algorithm
where the constraints are linearized at each step.
3.4.3 Extension to `p norm
While we have measured the perturbations using the `2 norm, our algorithm for measuring
the robustness is however not limited to this choice, and the proposed algorithm can simply
be adapted to find minimal adversarial perturbations for any `p norm (p ∈ [1,∞)). To
do so, the update step in Eq. (3.13) of Algorithm 2 must be substituted by the following
update
rk(xi) =
|fk(xi)− fkˆ(x0)(xi)|
‖w′k‖qq
|w′k|q−1  sign(w′k),
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with w′k = ∇fk(xi)−∇fkˆ(x0)(xi), and where  is the pointwise product and q =
p
p−1 .
3 In
particular, when p =∞ (i.e., the supremum norm `∞), this update step becomes
rk(xi) =
|fk(xi)− fkˆ(x0)(xi)|
‖w′k‖1
sign(w′k). (3.14)
3.5 Experimental results
3.5.1 Setup
We now test our algorithm on deep convolutional neural networks architectures applied
to MNIST [LeC+98a], CIFAR-10 [KH09], and ImageNet [Rus+15] image classification
datasets. We consider the following deep neural network architectures:
• MNIST: A two-layer fully connected network, and a two-layer LeNet convolutional
neural network architecture [LeC+99]. Both networks are trained with SGD with
momentum using the MatConvNet [VL15] package.
• CIFAR-10: We trained a three-layer LeNet architecture, as well as a Network In
Network (NIN) architecture [LCY14].
• ILSVRC 2012: We used CaffeNet [Jia+14] and GoogLeNet [Sze+15] pre-trained
models.
In order to evaluate the robustness to adversarial perturbations of a classifier f , we compute
the average normalized robustness ρˆadv(f), defined by
ρˆadv(f) =
1
|D |
∑
x∈D
∆ˆadv(x)
‖x‖2 , (3.15)
where ∆ˆadv(x) = ‖rˆ(x)‖2 is the estimated adversarial robustness at x computed using the
proposed approach, and D denotes a set of datapoints sampled from µ.4
To correctly assess the robustness and draw conclusions on the robustness of a classifier f ,
it is important to compare ρˆadv(f) to the right quantity. To do so, we define the intrinsic
“data” robustness ρˆd, which measures a distance between different classes in the dataset. Let
x1, . . . ,xm be training datapoints, and y(x1), . . . , y(xm) denote their ground truth labels.
We define the intrinsic “data” robustness to be
ρˆd =
1
m
m∑
i=1
min
j:y(xj)6=y(xi)
‖xi − xj‖2
‖xi‖2 . (3.16)
Note that this quantity is independent of the classifier f , and only depends on the dataset. It
represents the average normalized norm of the minimal perturbation required to “transform”
a training point to a training point of another class, and can be seen as a distance measure
3To see this, one can apply Holder’s inequality to obtain a lower bound on the `p norm of the perturbation.
4In practice, for MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, we set D to be the test data. We set D to be the
validation set for the ILSVRC 2012 experiments.
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Classifier Test error ρˆadv (Ours) time ρˆadv [GSS15] time ρˆadv [Sze+14] time ρˆd
LeNet (MNIST) 1% 2.0× 10−1 110 ms 1.0 20 ms 2.5× 10−1 > 4 s 8.3× 10−1
FC500-150-10 (MNIST) 1.7% 1.1× 10−1 50 ms 3.9× 10−1 10 ms 1.2× 10−1 > 2 s 8.3× 10−1
NIN (CIFAR-10) 11.5% 2.3× 10−2 1100 ms 1.2× 10−1 180 ms 2.4× 10−2 >50 s 7.4× 10−1
LeNet (CIFAR-10) 22.6% 3.0× 10−2 220 ms 1.3× 10−1 50 ms 3.9× 10−2 >7 s 7.4× 10−1
CaffeNet (ILSVRC2012) 42.6% 2.7× 10−3 510 ms* 3.5× 10−2 50 ms* - - 4.7× 10−1
GoogLeNet (ILSVRC2012) 31.3% 1.9× 10−3 800 ms* 4.7× 10−2 80 ms* - - 4.7× 10−1
Table 3.2: The adversarial robustness of different classifiers on different datasets. The time
required to compute one sample for each method is given in the time columns. The times
are computed on a Mid-2015 MacBook Pro without CUDA support. The asterisk marks
determines the values computed using a GTX 750 Ti GPU.
between the different classes in the data set. The quantity ρˆd therefore provides a baseline
for comparing the robustness to adversarial perturbations, and we say that f is not robust
to adversarial perturbations when ρˆadv(f) ρˆd.
We compare the proposed approach to state-of-the-art techniques to compute adversarial
perturbations, namely the methods in [Sze+14] and [GSS15]. The method in [Sze+14]
solves a series of penalized optimization problems to find the minimal perturbation, whereas
[GSS15] estimates the minimal perturbation by taking the sign of the gradient
rˆ(x) =  sign (∇xJ(θ,x, y)) ,
with J the cost used to train the neural network, θ is the model parameters, and y is the
label of x. The method is called fast gradient sign method. In practice, in the absence of
general rules to choose the parameter , we chose the smallest  such that 90% of the data
is misclassified after perturbation.5
3.5.2 Results
We report in Table 3.2 the accuracy and average robustness ρˆadv of each classifier computed
using different methods. We also show the running time required for each method to
compute one adversarial sample.
It can be seen that the proposed approach estimates smaller perturbations (hence closer to
the minimal perturbation defined in Eq. (3.3)) than the ones computed using the other
approaches. For example, on the ILSVRC2012 challenge dataset, the average perturbation
is one order of magnitude smaller compared to the fast gradient sign method. It should be
noted moreover that the proposed approach also yields slightly smaller perturbation vectors
than the method in [Sze+14]. The proposed approach is hence more accurate in detecting
directions that can potentially fool neural networks. As a result, the proposed approach
can be used as a valuable tool to accurately assess the robustness of classifiers. On the
complexity aspect, the proposed algorithm is substantially faster than the standard method
proposed in [Sze+14]. In fact, while the approach in [Sze+14] involves a costly minimization
of a series of objective functions, we observed empirically that our algorithm converges in a
5Using this method, we observed empirically that one cannot reach 100% misclassification rate on some
datasets. In fact, even by increasing  to be very large, this method can fail in misclassifying all samples.
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few iterations (i.e., less than 3) to a perturbation vector that fools the classifier. Hence, our
method reaches a more accurate perturbation vector compared to state-of-the-art methods,
while being computationally efficient. This makes it readily suitable to be used as a baseline
method to estimate the robustness of very deep neural networks on large-scale datasets.
It can be seen that, despite their very good test accuracy, these methods are extremely
unstable to adversarial perturbations, as we have ρˆadv(f) ρˆd (where ρˆadv(f) is computed
using the proposed method) for all tested classifiers on CIFAR-10 and ILSVRC2012 datasets.
Note for example that a perturbation that is 1000 times smaller in magnitude than the
original image is sufficient to fool a state-of-the-art deep neural network on the ILSVRC2012
dataset.
We illustrate in Figure 3.6 perturbed images generated by the fast gradient sign and the
proposed approach. It can be observed that the proposed method generates adversarial
perturbations which are hardly perceptible, while the fast gradient sign method outputs a
perturbation image with higher norm.
Figure 3.6: An example of adversarial perturbations. First row: the original image x that
is classified as kˆ(x)=“whale”. Second row: the image x+ r classified as kˆ(x+ r)=“turtle”
and the corresponding perturbation r computed by the proposed algorithm. Third row:
the image classified as “turtle” and the corresponding perturbation computed by the fast
gradient sign method [GSS15]. Our approach leads to a smaller perturbation.
It should be noted that, when perturbations are measured using the `∞ norm, the above
conclusions remain unchanged: the proposed method yields adversarial perturbations that
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Classifier Proposed Fast gradient sign
LeNet (MNIST) 0.10 0.26
FC500-150-10 (MNIST) 0.04 0.11
NIN (CIFAR-10) 0.008 0.024
LeNet (CIFAR-10) 0.015 0.028
Table 3.3: Values of ρˆ∞adv for four different networks based on the proposed method (smallest
`∞ perturbation) and fast gradient sign method with 90% of misclassification.
are smaller (hence closer to the optimum) compared to other methods for computing
adversarial examples. Table 3.3 reports the `∞ robustness to adversarial perturbations
measured by ρˆ∞adv(f) =
1
|D |
∑
x∈D
‖rˆ(x)‖∞
‖x‖∞ , where rˆ(x) is computed respectively using the
proposed method (with p =∞, see Section 3.4.3), and the fast gradient sign method for
MNIST and CIFAR-10 tasks.
Evidence of optimality of perturbations computed using the proposed method.
The proposed approach to solve the optimization problem in Eq. (3.3) is not exact and
involves an iterative linearization of the decision boundary. The estimated perturbation is
therefore only guaranteed to provide an upper bound on the optimal perturbation ∆adv(x).
To provide an accurate assessment of the classifiers’ robustness, it is however important
that the estimated perturbation is as close as possible to the optimal one ∆adv(x), and the
error due to the approximation should be small. It should further be noted that a necessary
condition for optimality of a perturbation r in the sense of Eq. (3.3) is that r is collinear
to the gradient of the boundary at x0 + r. The following result formalizes this necessary
condition:
Fact 2. The optimal perturbation r∗ := r∗(x0) is collinear to the gradient of the decision
boundary at x0 + r∗, given by
g(x0 + r
∗) := ∇(fkˆ(x0) − fk∗)(x0 + r
∗),
where k∗ denotes the closest class to kˆ(x0): k∗ = argmin
k 6=kˆ(x0)
‖rk‖2, provided g(x0 + r∗) 6= 0.
Proof. Let k 6= kˆ(x0). We recall that
rk = argmin ‖r‖22 subject to fk(x0 + r) ≥ fkˆ(x0)(x0 + r).
We write the gradient of the Lagrangian of above minimization problem, and we have at
optimality 2rk + λ∇(fkˆ(x0)− fk)(x0 + rk) = 0. Hence, rk is collinear to the gradient of the
decision boundary at x0 + rk. Since r∗ is the vector rk with minimal norm, we conclude
the result.
To empirically assess the optimality of the estimated perturbation rˆ(x0) obtained with
Algorithm 2, we evaluate the collinearity between the gradient at the decision boundary,
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r∗
rˆ
g(x0 + r∗)
g(x0 + rˆ)
x0
Figure 3.7: Illustration of the quantities used in the computation of Eq. (3.17). Note that
for the optimal perturbation r∗, we have g(x0 + r∗) is collinear to r∗. The quantity in Eq.
(3.17) measures the angle between the estimated perturbation rˆ and the gradient vector
g(x0 + rˆ).
g(x0 + rˆ(x0)) and the estimated perturbation rˆ(x0). We define the inner product I(x0) by
I(x0) =
|〈rˆ(x0), g(x0 + rˆ(x0))〉|
‖rˆ(x0)‖2‖g(x0 + rˆ(x0))‖2 . (3.17)
It should be noted that, when rˆ(x0) = r∗(x0) is the optimal perturbation, we have I(x0) = 1,
as the perturbation is collinear to the gradient to the decision boundary according to the
above result. See Fig. 3.7 for an illustration. We show in Fig. 3.8 the distribution of I(x0)
obtained for random choices of images x0 from the ILSVRC2012 validation set, for the two
networks CaffeNet and GoogLeNet. Interestingly, the inner product I for both networks
receives values close to 1. Note for example that we have P(I(x) > 0.8) ≈ 0.8 for CaffeNet,
which shows that in most examples, the estimated perturbation is approximately aligned
with the gradient of the decision boundary. Note moreover that the average inner product
in both cases is ≈ 0.9. While not providing a formal proof that the perturbations obtained
using our method are optimal, this experiment shows that the estimated perturbations
approximately satisfy the necessary optimality condition I(x) = 1.
Figure 3.8: Empirical distribution of I(x) (quantity defined in Eq. (3.17)) for a randomly
chosen population of images x from ILSVRC 2012 validation set on CaffeNet and GoogleNet.
The y axis is the empirical probability that I(x) > δ, and the x axis is the threshold δ.
Fine-tuning using adversarial examples.
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Figure 3.9: Effect of fine-tuning on adversarial examples computed by two different
methods for (a) LeNet on MNIST, (b) fully-connected network on MNIST, (c) NIN on
CIFAR-10, (d) LeNet on CIFAR-10. The proposed method is labeled as “DeepFool”.
In this section, we fine-tune the networks of Table 3.2 on adversarial examples to build
more robust classifiers for the MNIST and CIFAR-10 tasks. Specifically, for each network,
we performed two experiments: (i) Fine-tuning the network on adversarial examples
computed using the proposed method, (ii) Fine-tuning the network on the fast gradient sign
adversarial examples. We fine-tune the networks by performing 5 additional epochs, with a
50% decreased learning rate only on the perturbed training set. For each experiment, the
same training data was used through all 5 extra epochs. For the sake of completeness, we
also performed 5 extra epochs on the original data. The evolution of ρˆadv for the different
fine-tuning strategies is shown in Figures 3.9(a) to 3.9(d), where the robustness ρˆadv is
estimated using the proposed method, since this is the most accurate method, as shown
in Table 3.2. Observe that fine-tuning with our computed adversarial examples increases
the robustness of the networks to adversarial perturbations even after one extra epoch.
For example, the robustness of the networks on MNIST is improved by 50% and NIN’s
robustness is increased by about 40%. On the other hand, quite surprisingly, fine tuning
with adversarial samples computed using the method in [GSS15] can lead to a decreased
robustness to adversarial perturbations of the network. We hypothesize that this behavior
is due to the fact that perturbations estimated using the fast gradient sign method are
much larger than minimal adversarial perturbations. Fine-tuning the network with overly
perturbed images decreases the robustness of the networks to adversarial perturbations. To
verify this hypothesis, we compare in Figure 3.10 the adversarial robustness of a network
that is fine-tuned with the adversarial examples obtained using the proposed method, where
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norms of perturbations have been deliberately multiplied by α = 1, 2, 3. Interestingly, we
see that by magnifying the norms of the adversarial perturbations, the robustness of the
fine-tuned network is decreased. This might explain why overly perturbed images decrease
the robustness of MNIST networks: these perturbations can really change the actual class
of the digits, hence fine-tuning based on these examples can lead to a drop of the robustness
(for an illustration, see Figure 3.11). This lends credence to our hypothesis, and further
shows the importance of designing accurate methods to compute minimal perturbations.
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Figure 3.10: Fine-tuning based on magnified adversarial perturbations computed using our
approach.
α = 1 α = 2 α = 3 α = 4
Figure 3.11: From “1" to “7" : original image classified as “1" and the perturbed images
(using our approach) classified as “7" using different values of α.
Table 3.4 lists the accuracies of the fine-tuned networks. It can be seen that fine-tuning with
the proposed approach can improve the accuracy of the networks. Conversely, fine-tuning
with the approach in [GSS15] has led to a decrease of the test accuracy in all our experiments.
This confirms the explanation that the fast gradient sign method outputs overly perturbed
images that lead to images that are unlikely to occur in the test data. Hence, it decreases
the performance of the method as it acts as a regularizer that does not represent the
distribution of the original data. This effect is analogous to the phenomena observed in
geometric data augmentation schemes, where large transformations of the original samples
have a counter-productive effect on generalization.6
To emphasize the importance of a correct estimation of the minimal perturbation, we
now show that using approximate methods can lead to wrong conclusions regarding the
adversarial robustness of networks. We fine-tune the NIN classifier on the fast gradient sign
adversarial examples. We follow the procedure described earlier but this time, we decreased
the learning rate by 90%. We have evaluated the adversarial robustness of this network at
different extra epochs using the proposed method and the fast gradient sign method. As
6While the authors of [GSS15] reported an increased generalization performance on the MNIST task
(from 0.94% to 0.84%) using adversarial regularization, it should be noted that the their experimental
setup is significantly different as [GSS15] trained the network based on a modified cost function, while we
performed straightforward fine-tuning solely on adversarial samples.
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one can see in Figure 3.12, the red plot exaggerates the effect of training on the adversarial
examples. Moreover, it is not sensitive enough to demonstrate the loss of robustness at the
first extra epoch. These observations confirm that using an accurate tool to measure the
robustness of classifiers is crucial to derive conclusions about the robustness of networks.
Classifier Proposed Fast gradient sign Clean
LeNet (MNIST) 0.8% 4.4% 1%
FC500-150-10 (MNIST) 1.5% 4.9% 1.7%
NIN (CIFAR-10) 11.2% 21.2% 11.5%
LeNet (CIFAR-10) 20.0% 28.6% 22.6%
Table 3.4: The test error of networks after the fine-tuning on adversarial examples (after
five epochs). Each columns correspond to a different type of augmented perturbation.
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Figure 3.12: How the adversarial robustness is judged by different methods. The values are
normalized by the corresponding ρˆadvs of the original network. The proposed method is
labeled as “DeepFool”.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed a new algorithm to estimate the robustness of classifiers to
adversarial perturbations. It is based on an iterative linearization of the decision boundary
of the classifier to generate minimal perturbations that change the estimated label of the
classifier. We provided extensive experimental evidence on multiple datasets and classifiers,
showing the benefits of the proposed method for computing adversarial perturbations in
terms of accuracy and computational efficiency. Due to its accurate estimation of the
adversarial perturbations, the proposed algorithm provides an efficient and accurate way to
evaluate the robustness of classifiers and to enhance their performance by proper fine-tuning.
The proposed approach can therefore be used as a building block to accurately estimate
the minimal perturbation vectors, and build more robust classifiers.
Unfortunately, even with proper fine-tuning, state-of-the-art classifiers have not reached
the required level of robustness, despite achieving a very good accuracy. It should be noted
that several methods have recently been proposed to improve the robustness of classifiers to
adversarial perturbations through regularization techniques and modified objective functions
[GR14; LHL15; Hua+15], robust optimization [SYN15], foveation mechanisms [Luo+15]
distillation [Pap+15] and modified activation functions [ZG16]. While these methods are
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shown to yield improvements on the robustness of the deep neural networks, the design
of highly robust classifiers is still an open problem. We believe that prior to achieving
this goal, a fundamental question remains: does there actually exist robust and accurate
classifiers belonging to the commonly used families of classifiers?
In the following chapter, we provide a quantitative answer to the above question, and show
the existence of fundamental limits on the robustness of classifiers to perturbations, which
reveals a tradeoff between robustness and risk.
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4 Analysis of classifiers’ robustness
4.1 Introduction
The instability of classifiers we have explored in the previous chapter raises interesting
theoretical questions that we initiate in this chapter. What causes classifiers to be unstable
to adversarial perturbations? Are deep networks the only classifiers that have such unstable
behaviour? Is it actually feasible to learn robust and accurate classifiers? Providing
theoretical answers to these questions is crucial in order to have a better understanding
of the robustness of classifiers, and potentially to achieve better robustness. The goal
of this chapter is specifically to quantify how large can the robustness to adversarial
perturbations be for fixed classification families (e.g., the family of linear classifiers). To
do so, we establish learning-independent upper bounds on the robustness of classifiers to
adversarial perturbations, ρadv(f), in terms of the classifier’s risk R(f) and data-dependent
quantities. An important implication of these learning-independent limits is that in common
classification cases, it is not possible to find a classifier in the family that achieves both a
large robustness ρadv(f) and a small risk R(f), independently of the training algorithm
used to choose f .
In more details, we assume in this chapter binary classification tasks for simplicity, and
that the estimated label is hence provided by kˆf (x) = sign(f(x)). We first provide a
general upper bound on the robustness of classifiers to adversarial perturbations ρadv(f),
and then compute specific instances of the obtained upper bound for the families of
linear and quadratic classifiers. In both cases, our upper bounds are expressed in terms
of the classification risk, as well as distinguishability measures, which depend on the
considered family of classifiers, and measure informally the difficulty of the classification
task with respect to the considered classifiers’ family. Specifically, for linear classifiers,
the distinguishability is defined as the distance between the means of the two classes,
while for quadratic classifiers, it is defined as the distance between the matrices of second
order moments of the two classes. For both classes of functions, our upper bounds are
valid for all classifiers in the family independently of the training procedure. Our upper
bounds reveal the existence of a key tradeoff between classification robustness and risk,
Part of this chapter has been published in [FFF15b]. A long version [FFF15a] is currently under review.
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
(f) (g) (h) (i) (j)
Figure 4.1: (a...e): Class 1 images. (f...j): Class -1 images.
quantified by the distinguishability quantity. This tradeoff implies in particular that in
difficult classification tasks involving a small value of distinguishability, any classifier in the
set with low misclassification rate is vulnerable to adversarial perturbations. Importantly,
the distinguishability parameter related to quadratic classifiers is much larger than that
of linear classifiers for many datasets of interest, and suggests that it is harder to find
adversarial examples for more flexible classifiers.
The chapter is organized as follows. We introduce in Section 4.2 a simple running example
used throughout the chapter to illustrate our results. Our general upper bound on the
robustness to adversarial perturbations is proposed in Section 4.3, and the bound is
specialized for the class of linear and quadratic classifiers in Sections 4.4 and 4.5, respectively.
4.2 Running example
We start our analysis with a simple running example used throughout this chapter that
illustrates the notion of adversarial robustness, and highlights its difference with the notion
of risk.
We consider a binary classification task on square images of size
√
d×√d. Images of class 1
(resp. class −1) contain exactly one vertical line (resp. horizontal line), and a small constant
positive number a (resp. negative number −a) is added to all the pixels of the images.
That is, for class 1 (resp. −1) images, background pixels are set to a (resp. −a), and pixels
belonging to the line are equal to 1 + a (resp. 1− a). Fig. 4.1 illustrates the classification
problem for d = 25. The number of data points to classify is equal to N = 2
√
d.
Clearly, the most relevant concept (in terms of visual appearance) that permits to separate
the two classes is the orientation of the line (i.e., horizontal vs. vertical). The bias of the
image (i.e., the sum of all its pixels) is also a valid concept for this task, as it separates the
two classes, despite being much more difficult to detect visually. The class of an image can
therefore be correctly estimated from its orientation or from the bias. Let us first consider
the linear classifier defined by
flin(x) =
1√
d
1Tx− 1, (4.1)
where 1 is the vector of size d whose entries are all equal to 1, and x is the vectorized
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image. flin exploits the difference of bias between the two classes and achieves a perfect
classification accuracy for all a > 0. Indeed, a simple computation gives flin(x) =
√
da
(resp. flin(x) = −
√
da) for class 1 (resp. class −1) images. Therefore, the risk of flin is
R(flin) = 0. It is important to note that flin only achieves zero risk because it captures
the bias, but fails to distinguish between the images based on the orientation of the line.
Indeed, when a = 0, the data points are not linearly separable. Despite its perfect accuracy
for any a > 0, flin is not robust to small adversarial perturbations when a is small, as a
minor perturbation of the bias switches the estimated label. Indeed, a simple computation
of the expected robustness leads to ρadv(flin) =
√
da; therefore, the adversarial robustness
of flin can be made arbitrarily small by choosing a to be small enough. More than that,
among all linear classifiers that satisfy R(f) = 0, flin is the one that maximizes ρadv(f) (as
we show later in Section 4.4). Therefore, all zero-risk linear classifiers are not robust to
adversarial perturbations, for the classification task under consideration.
Unlike linear classifiers, a more flexible classifier that correctly captures the orientation of
the lines in the images will be robust to adversarial perturbation, unless this perturbation
significantly alters the image and modifies the direction of the line. To illustrate this point,
we consider the simple setting where d = 4, and define the quadratic binary classifier
fquad(x) = x1x2 + x3x4 − x1x3 − x2x4, (4.2)
where x1, . . . , x4 denote the coordinates of x ordered from top-left pixel to bottom-right
in a columnwise fashion. It should be noted that this classifier achieves zero risk (i.e.,
R(fquad) = 0), as it outputs 1 for vertical line images, and −1 for horizontal line images.
The exact computation of the adversarial robustness of quadratic classifiers is, in general,
much more involved than for the linear case. However, in this simple classification example
with d = 4, ρadv(fquad) can be computed in closed form:
Fact 3. In the above settings, the robustness to adversarial perturbations of the quadratic
classifier in Eq. (4.2) satisfies ρadv(fquad) = 1/
√
2.
Proof. We have fquad(x) = xTAx, with
A =
1
2

0 1 −1 0
1 0 0 −1
−1 0 0 1
0 −1 1 0
 .
We perform a change of basis, and work in the diagonalizing basis of A, denoted by P. We
have
P =
1
2

1 1 −1 −1
0 −√2 −√2 0√
2 0 0
√
2
1 −1 1 −1
 , A = PT

1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1
P.
By letting x˜ = Px, we have fquad(x˜) = x˜21− x˜24. Given a point x and label y, the following
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(a) Original (b) flin (c) fquad
Figure 4.2: Robustness to adversarial noise of linear and quadratic classifiers. (a): Original
image (d = 4, and a = 0.1/
√
d), (b,c): Minimally perturbed image that switches the
estimated label of (b) flin, (c) fquad. Note that the difference between (b) and (a) is hardly
perceptible, this demonstrates that flin is not robust to adversarial noise. On the other
hand images (c) and (a) are clearly different, which indicates that fquad is more robust to
adversarial noise
problem is solved to find the minimal perturbation that switches the estimated label:
min
r˜
r˜21 + r˜
2
4 s.t. y((x˜1 + r˜1)
2 − (x˜4 + r˜4)2) ≤ 0.
Let us consider the first datapoint x = [1 + a, 1 + a, a, a]T (the other points can be handled
in an exactly similar fashion). Then, it is easy to see that x˜1 = 1 and x˜4 = 0, and the
minimal perturbation is achieved for r˜1 = −1/2 and r˜4 = 1/2. In the original space, this
point corresponds to r = PT r˜ = [0,−1/2, 1/2, 0]T . Therefore, ‖r‖2 = 1/
√
2, and we obtain
ρadv(fquad) = 1/
√
2.
It should be noted that, while the robustness of the linear classifier flin depends on the
bias a, and can be very small (when a → 0), the robustness of the quadratic classifier
ρadv(fquad) is much larger. This is due to the fact that the quadratic classifier exploits the
most visual/strong concept that separates the two classes; that is, the orientation of the
line. The robustness of both classifiers flin and fquad is illustrated in Fig. 4.2. While a
hardly perceptible change of the image is sufficient to switch the estimated label for the
linear classifier, the necessary perturbation for fquad is a much larger one, which modifies
the direction of the line to a great extent.
The above example highlights several important facts, which are summarized as follows:
• Risk and adversarial robustness are two distinct properties of a classifier.
While R(flin) = 0, flin is definitely not robust to small adversarial perturbations.1
This is due to the fact that flin only captures the bias in the images and ignores the
orientation of the line.
• To capture orientation (i.e., the most visual concept), one has to use a
classifier that is flexible enough for the task. Unlike the class of linear classifiers,
the class of polynomial classifiers of degree 2 correctly captures the line orientation,
for d = 4.
• The robustness to adversarial perturbations provides a quantitative mea-
sure of the strength of a concept. Since ρadv(flin)  ρadv(fquad), one can
1The opposite is also possible, since a constant classifier (e.g., f(x) = 1 for all x) is clearly robust to
perturbations, but does not achieve good accuracy.
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confidently say that the concept captured by fquad is stronger than that of flin, in
the sense that the essence of the classification task is captured by fquad, but not by
flin (while they are equal in terms of misclassification rate). In general classification
problems, the quantity ρadv(f) provides a natural way to evaluate and compare the
learned concept; larger values of ρadv(f) indicate that stronger concepts are learned,
for comparable values of the risk.
As illustrated in the above toy example, the robustness to adversarial perturbations is
key to assess the strength of a concept. In real-world classification tasks, weak concepts
correspond to partial information about the classification task (which are possibly sufficient
to achieve a good accuracy), while strong concepts capture the essence of the classification
task.
In the remainder of this chapter, our goal is to quantify how large can the robustness to
adversarial perturbations be, for fixed classification families (e.g., family of linear classifiers).
To do so, we establish upper bounds on the adversarial robustness ρadv(f) in terms of
the classifier risk R(f) for all classifiers in the family. These learning-independent limits
show that it is not possible to achieve a large robustness jointly with a small risk for many
classification tasks of interest, independently of the training algorithm used to choose f .
4.3 Upper bound on the adversarial robustness
We now introduce our theoretical framework for analyzing the robustness to adversarial
perturbations. We recall that f : Rd → R is a binary classifier, and that the associated
decision function kˆf (x) = sign(f(x)). We recall that µ denotes the data distribution, and
we denote by µ1 and µ−1 the probability measures of class 1 and class −1 datapoints,
respectively. We also denote by p±1 the classwise prior probabilities, defined by P
x∼µ
(y(x) =
±1), where we recall that y(x) is the ground truth label of x. We finally recall that the
data distribution is assumed to be of bounded support; that is, P
x∼µ
(x ∈ B) = 1, where
B = {x ∈ Rd : ‖x‖2 ≤M} for some M > 0.
We first present a key assumption on the classifier f for the analysis of adversarial robustness.
Assumption (A). There exist τ > 0 and 0 < γ ≤ 1 such that, for all x ∈ B,
dist(x, S−) ≤ τ max(0, f(x))γ ,
dist(x, S+) ≤ τ max(0,−f(x))γ ,
(4.3)
where dist(x, S) = minz{‖x− z‖2 : z ∈ S} and S+ (resp. S−) is the set of points x such
that f(x) ≥ 0 (resp. f(x) ≤ 0):
S+ = {x : f(x) ≥ 0},
S− = {x : f(x) ≤ 0}.
In words, the assumption (A) states that for any data point x, the residual max(0, f(x))
(resp. max(0,−f(x))) can be used to bound the distance from x to a data point z classified
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−1 (resp. 1).
Bounds of the form Eq. (4.3) have been established for various classes of functions since the
early of work of Łojasiewicz [Łoj59] in algebraic geometry and have found applications in
areas such as mathematical optimization [Pan97; LP98]. For example, Łojasiewicz [Łoj59]
and later [LP94b] have shown that, remarkably, assumption (A) holds for the general class
of analytic functions. In [NZ03], (A) is shown to hold with γ = 1 for piecewise linear
functions. In [LL94], error bounds on polynomial systems are studied. Proving inequality
(4.3) with explicit constants τ and γ for different classes of functions is still an active area
of research however [LMP14]. In Sections 4.4 and 4.5, we provide examples of function
classes for which (A) holds, and explicit formulas for the parameters τ and γ.
The following result establishes a general upper bound on the robustness to adversarial
perturbations:
Lemma 1. Let f be an arbitrary classifier that satisfies (A) with parameters (τ, γ). Then,
ρadv(f) ≤ 41−γτ
(
p1Eµ1(f(x))− p−1Eµ−1(f(x)) + 2‖f‖∞R(f)
)γ
.
The proof can be found in Appendix A.1. The above result provides an upper bound on the
adversarial robustness that depends on the risk of the classifier, as well as on a measure of
the separation between the expectations of the classifier values computed on distribution µ1
and µ−1. This result is general, as we only assume that f satisfies assumption (A). In the
next two sections, we apply Lemma 1 to two classes of classifiers, and derive interpretable
upper bounds in terms of a distinguishibality measure (that depends only on the dataset)
which captures the notion of difficulty of a classification task. Studying the general result in
Lemma 1 through two practical classes of classifiers shows the implications of such a limit
on the adversarial robustness, and illustrates the methodology for deriving family-specific
upper bounds on the adversarial robustness from the above general upper bound.
4.4 Robustness of linear classifiers to adversarial perturba-
tions
We define the classification function f(x) = wTx+ b. Note that any linear classifier for
which |b| > M‖w‖2 is a trivial classifier that assigns the same label to all points, and we
therefore assume that |b| ≤M‖w‖2.
We first show that the family of linear classifiers satisfies assumption (A), with explicit
parameters τ and γ.
Lemma 2. Assumption (A) holds for linear classifiers f(x) = wTx+ b with τ = 1/‖w‖2
and γ = 1.
Proof. Let x be such that f(x) ≥ 0. The goal is to prove that dist(x, S−) ≤ τf(x)γ
(the other inequality can be handled in a similar way). We have f(x) = wTx+ b. Thus,
dist(x, S−) = f(x)/‖w‖2 =⇒ τ = 1/‖w‖2, γ = 1.
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Using Lemma 1, we now derive an interpretable upper bound on the robustness of linear
classifiers to adversarial perturbations. In particular, the following theorem bounds ρadv(f)
from above in terms of the first moments of the distributions µ1 and µ−1, and the classifier’s
risk:
Theorem 1. Let f(x) = wTx+ b such that |b| ≤M‖w‖2. Then,
ρadv(f) ≤ ‖p1Eµ1(x)− p−1Eµ−1(x)‖2 +M(|p1 − p−1|+ 4R(f)). (4.4)
In the balanced setting where p1 = p−1 = 1/2, and if the intercept b = 0 the following
inequality holds:
ρadv(f) ≤ 1
2
‖Eµ1(x)− Eµ−1(x)‖2 + 2MR(f). (4.5)
Proof. Using Lemma 1 with τ = 1/‖w‖2 and γ = 1, we have
ρadv(f) ≤ 1‖w‖2
(
wT
(
p1Eµ1(x)− p−1Eµ−1(x)
)
+ b(p1 − p−1) + 2‖f‖∞R(f)
)
(4.6)
Observe that
i. wT
(
p1Eµ1(x)− p−1Eµ−1(x)
) ≤ ‖w‖2‖p1Eµ1(x)−p−1Eµ−1(x)‖2 using Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality.
ii. b(p1 − p−1) ≤M‖w‖2|p1 − p−1| using the assumption |b| ≤M‖w‖2,
iii. ‖f‖∞ = maxx:‖x‖2≤M{|wTx+ b|} ≤ 2M‖w‖2.
By plugging the three above inequalities in Eq. (4.6), we obtain the desired result in Eq.
(4.4).
Finally, when p1 = p−1 = 1/2, and the intercept b = 0, inequality (iii) can be tightened to
‖f‖∞ ≤M‖w‖2, and directly leads to the stated result Eq. (4.5).
Our upper bound on ρadv(f) depends on the difference of means ‖Eµ1(x) − Eµ−1(x)‖2,
which measures the data distinguishability between the classes. Note that this term is
classifier-independent, and is only a property of the classification task. The upper bound
only depends on f through the risk R(f). Thus, in classification tasks where the means
of the two distributions are close (i.e., ‖Eµ1(x)− Eµ−1(x)‖2 is small), any linear classifier
with small risk will necessarily have a small robustness to adversarial perturbations. Note
that the upper bound logically increases with the risk, as there clearly exist robust linear
classifiers that achieve high risk (e.g., constant classifier). Fig. 4.3 pictorially represents the
ρadv vs R tradeoff diagram as predicted by Theorem 1. Each linear classifier is represented
by a point on the ρadv–R diagram, and our result shows the existence of a region that linear
classifiers cannot attain.
Quite importantly, in many interesting classification problems, the quantity ‖Eµ1(x) −
Eµ−1(x)‖2 is small due to large intra-class variability (e.g., due to complex intra-class
geometric transformations in computer vision applications). Therefore, even if a linear
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R(f)
ρadv(f)
Not achievable by
linear classifiers
0
Figure 4.3: Adversarial robustness ρadv versus risk diagram for linear classifiers. Each point
in the plane represents a linear classifier f . The non-achievable zone is shown (Theorem 1).
In the simplified case of Theorem 1, the intercept is equal to 12‖Eµ1(x)− Eµ−1(x)‖2, and
the slope is equal to 2M .
classifier can achieve a good classification performance on such a task, it will not be robust
to small adversarial perturbations. It should be noted that this limitation on the robustness
to adversarial perturbations is learning-independent ; that is, it is not possible to go beyond
this fundamental limit, even if one modifies the training algorithm used to choose f .
Illustration of the results on the running example
We now illustrate our theoretical results on the example of Section 4.2. In this case, we
have ‖Eµ1(x) − Eµ−1(x)‖2 = 2
√
da. By using Theorem 1, any zero-risk linear classifier
satisfies ρadv(f) ≤
√
da. As we choose a 1/√d, accurate linear classifiers are therefore
not robust to adversarial perturbations for this task. We note that flin (defined in Eq.(4.1))
achieves the upper bound and is therefore the most robust accurate linear classifier one can
get, as it can easily be checked that ρadv(flin) =
√
da. In Fig. 4.4 the exact ρadv vs R curve
is compared to our theoretical upper bound2, for d = 25, N = 10 and a bias a = 0.1/
√
d.
Besides the zero-risk case where our upper bound is tight, the upper bound is reasonably
close to the exact curve for other values of the risk (despite not being tight).
4.5 Adversarial robustness of quadratic classifiers
We now study the robustness to adversarial perturbations of quadratic classifiers of the form
f(x) = xTAx, where A is a symmetric matrix. Besides the practical interest of quadratic
classifiers in some applications [GE08; Cha+10], they represent a natural extension of linear
classifiers. The study of linear vs. quadratic classifiers provides insights into how adversarial
robustness depends on the family of considered classifiers. Similarly to the linear setting,
we exclude the case where f is a trivial classifier that assigns a constant label to all data
2The exact curve is computed using a bruteforce approach that enumerates all possible partitioning of
the data points with linear classifiers.
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Figure 4.4: The exact ρadv versus risk achievable curve, and our upper bound estimate on
the running example.
points. That is, we assume that A satisfies
λmin(A) < 0, λmax(A) > 0, (4.7)
where λmin(A) and λmax(A) are the smallest and largest eigenvalues of A. We moreover
impose that the eigenvalues of A satisfy
max
(∣∣∣∣ λmin(A)λmax(A)
∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣λmax(A)λmin(A)
∣∣∣∣) ≤ K, (4.8)
for some constant value K ≥ 1. This assumption imposes an approximate symmetry of the
extremal eigenvalues of A around 0, thereby disallowing a large bias towards any of the
two classes.
We first show that the assumption (A) is satisfied for quadratic classifiers, and derive
explicit formulas for τ and γ.
Lemma 3. Assumption (A) holds for the class of quadratic classifiers f(x) = xTAx where
λmin(A) < 0, λmax(A) > 0 with τ = max(|λmin(A)|−1/2, |λmax(A)|−1/2), and γ = 1/2,
Proof. Let x be such that f(x) ≥ 0, and the goal is to prove that dist(x, S−) ≤ τf(x)γ (the
other inequality can be handled in a similar way). Assume without loss of generality that
A is diagonal (this can be done using an appropriate change of basis). Let ν = −λmin(A).
We have f(x) =
∑d−1
i=1 λix
2
i − νx2d. By setting ri = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d − 1} and
rd = sign(xd)
√
f(x)/ν, (where sign(x) = 1 if x ≥ 0 and −1 otherwise) we have
f(x+ r) =
d−1∑
i=1
λix
2
i − ν(xd + sgn(xd)
√
f(x)/ν)2
= f(x)− 2νxdsgn(xd)
√
f(x)/ν − f(x)
= −2ν|xd|
√
f(x)/ν ≤ 0.
Hence, dist(x, S−) ≤ ‖r‖2 = ν−1/2
√
f(x) =⇒ τ = ν−1/2, γ = 1/2.
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The following result builds on Lemma 1 and bounds the adversarial robustness of quadratic
classifiers as a function of the second order moments of the data distribution and the risk.
Theorem 2. Let f(x) = xTAx, where A satisfies Eqs. (4.7) and (4.8). Then,
ρadv(f) ≤ 2
√
K‖p1C1 − p−1C−1‖∗ + 2MKR(f),
where C±1(i, j) = (Eµ±1(xixj))1≤i,j≤d, and ‖ · ‖∗ denotes the nuclear norm defined as the
sum of the singular values of the matrix.
Proof. The family of classifiers under study satisfies assumption (A) with τ = max(|λmin(A)|−1/2, |λmax(A)|−1/2),
and γ = 1/2 (see Lemma 3). By applying Lemma 1, we have
ρadv(f) ≤ 2τ
(
Eµ1(xTAx)− Eµ−1(xTAx) + 2‖f‖∞R(f)
)1/2
.
Observe that
i. p1Eµ1(xTAx)−p−1Eµ−1(xTAx) = 〈A, p1C1−p−1C−1〉 ≤ ‖A‖‖p1C1−p−1C−1‖∗ us-
ing the generalized Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, where ‖·‖ and ‖·‖∗ denote respectively
the spectral and nuclear matrix norms.
ii. |f(x)| = |xTAx| ≤ ‖A‖‖x‖ ≤ ‖A‖M ,
iii. ‖A‖1/2τ = max(|λmin(A)|, |λmax(A)|)1/2 max(|λmin(A)|−1/2, |λmax(A)|−1/2) ≤
√
K.
Applying these three inequalities, we obtain
ρadv(f) ≤ 2‖A‖1/2τ (‖p1C1 − p−1C−1‖∗ + 2MR(f))1/2
≤ 2
√
K (‖p1C1 − p−1C−1‖∗ + 2MR(f))1/2 .
In words, the upper bound on the adversarial robustness depends on a distinguishability
measure, defined by ‖C1 − C−1‖∗, and the classifier’s risk. In difficult classification
tasks, where ‖C1 −C−1‖∗ is small, any quadratic classifier with low risk that satisfies our
assumptions in Eq. (4.7, 4.8) is not robust to adversarial perturbations. Similarly to the
linear case, these bounds are learning-independent, and hold uniformly for any classifier in
the considered family.
Note that, while the distinguishability is measured with the distance between the means
of the two distributions in the linear case, it is defined here as the difference between the
second order moments matrices ‖C1 −C−1‖∗. Therefore, in classification tasks involving
two distributions with close means, and different second order moments, any zero-risk
linear classifier will not be robust to adversarial noise, while zero-risk and robust quadratic
classifiers are a priori possible according to our upper bound in Theorem 2. This suggests
that robustness to adversarial perturbations can be larger for more flexible classifiers, for
comparable values of the risk.
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R(f) ρadv(f) Upper bound
flin 0 2 a [0.01] 2 a [0.01]
fquad 0 1/
√
2 [0.7] 2
√
1 + 4a [2.02]
Table 4.1: Summary of quantities computed for the running example of Section 4.2, with
d = 4. In blue, we show numerical values obtained with a = 0.005, for easier numerical
comparison.
Illustration of the results on the running example
We apply the obtained upper bound for the example in Section 4.2, with d = 4. A simple
computation gives ‖C1 −C−1‖∗ = 2 + 8a ≥ 2. Note that this term is significantly larger
than the difference of means (equal to 4a, when d = 4). Hence, our upper bound for
quadratic classifiers is much larger than for linear classifiers; in particular, the former upper
bound does not forbid the existence of a quadratic classifier that achieves both a large
robustness to adversarial perturbations and low risk for this simple classification task. In
fact, the quadratic classifier fquad defined in Eq.(4.2) achieves zero-risk R(f) = 0, and has
a large robustness ρadv. Table 4.1 summarizes the risk, adversarial robustness and the
upper bounds on the adversarial perturbations for flin and fquad. Note that for small values
of a, we have ρadv(flin) ρadv(fquad), and the corresponding upper bound for quadratic
classifiers is much larger than for the family of linear classifiers. The large difference in
robustness between these two classifiers is due to the fact that fquad differentiates the images
from their orientation, unlike flin that uses the bias to distinguish them. The minimal
perturbation required to switch the estimated label of fquad is therefore one that modifies
the direction of the line, while a hardly perceptible perturbation that modifies the bias
is enough to flip the label for flin. Note finally that while flin achieves the upper bound
on the robustness, fquad does not meet the upper bound. This result might suggest the
existence of other quadratic classifiers that are more robust to adversarial perturbations,
while having zero risk.
4.6 Experimental results
In this section, we illustrate our results on practical classification examples. Specifically,
through experiments on real data, we seek to confirm the identified limit on the robustness
of classifiers. We also study more general classifiers to suggest that the trends obtained
with our theoretical results are not limited to linear and quadratic classifiers.
4.6.1 Binary classification using SVM
We perform experiments on several classifiers: linear SVM (denoted L-SVM ), SVM with
polynomial kernels of degree q (denoted poly-SVM (q)), and SVM with RBF kernel with
a width parameter σ2 (RBF-SVM(σ2)). To train the classifiers, we use the Liblinear
[Fan+08a] and LibSVM [CL11] implementations, and we fix the regularization parameters
using a cross-validation procedure.
We first consider a classification task on the MNIST handwritten digits dataset [LeC+98a].
We consider a digit “4” vs. digit “5” binary classification task, with 2, 000 and 1, 000 randomly
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chosen images for training and testing, respectively. In addition, a small random translation
is applied to all images, and the images are normalized to be of unit Euclidean norm. Table
4.2 reports the accuracy of the different classifiers, and their robustness to adversarial
perturbations estimated using the method in Chapter 3. Despite the fact that L-SVM
performs fairly well on this classification task (both on training and testing), it is highly non
robust to small adversarial perturbations. Indeed, ρ̂adv(f) is one order of magnitude smaller
than the distance between the two classes ρˆd = 0.72 (see Eq. (3.16) for the definition of
the data robustness ρˆd). Visually, this translates to an adversarial perturbation that is
hardly perceptible. The instability of the linear classifier to adversarial perturbations can
be predicted from Theorem 1, as the distinguishability term 12‖Eµ1(x)−Eµ−1(x)‖2 is small
(see Table 4.4). In addition to improving the accuracy, the more flexible classifiers are also
more robust to adversarial perturbations, as predicted by our theoretical analysis. In fact,
we see in Table 4.4 that the distinguishability measure for second order classifiers is much
larger than for linear classifiers, hence allowing in principle for more robust classifiers in
this family. It should further be noted that the third order classifier is slightly more robust
than the second order one, and RBF-SVM with small width σ2 = 0.1 is more robust than
with σ2 = 1. Note that σ controls the flexibility of the classifier in a similar way as the
degree in the polynomial kernel. Interestingly, in this relatively easy classification task,
RBF-SVM(0.1) achieves both a good performance (low risk), and a high robustness to
adversarial perturbations. The observations we draw from this experiment hence confirm
the spirit of our theoretical analysis, where we showed that the limit on the robustness of
classifiers improves with the flexibility of the family of classifiers. Fig. 4.5 illustrates the
robustness of the different classifiers on an example image.
Model Train error (%) Test error (%) ρ̂adv
L-SVM 4.8 7.0 0.08
poly-SVM(2) 0 1 0.19
poly-SVM(3) 0 0.6 0.24
RBF-SVM(1) 0 1.1 0.16
RBF-SVM(0.1) 0 0.5 0.32
Table 4.2: Training and testing accuracy of different models, and robustness to adversarial
noise for the MNIST task. Note that for this example, we have ρˆd = 0.72.
(a) (b) ∆adv = 0.08 (c) ∆adv = 0.19 (d) ∆adv = 0.21 (e) ∆adv = 0.15 (f) ∆adv = 0.41
Figure 4.5: Original image (a) and minimally perturbed images (b-f) that switch the
estimated label of linear (b), quadratic (c), cubic (d), RBF(1) (e), RBF(0.1) (f) classifiers.
We now turn to a natural image classification task, with images taken from the CIFAR-10
database [KH09]. The database contains 10 classes of 32× 32 RGB images. We restrict the
dataset to the first two classes (“airplane” and “automobile”), and consider a subset of the
original data, with 1, 000 images for training, and 1, 000 for testing. Moreover, all images
are normalized to be of unit Euclidean norm. Compared to the first dataset, this task is
more difficult, as the variability of the images is much larger than for digits. We report
the performance and robustness results in Table 4.3. It can be seen that all classifiers
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Model Train error (%) Test error (%) ρ̂adv
L-SVM 14.5 21.3 0.04
poly-SVM(2) 4.2 15.3 0.03
poly-SVM(3) 4 15 0.04
RBF-SVM(1) 7.6 16 0.04
RBF-SVM(0.1) 0 13.1 0.06
Table 4.3: Training and testing accuracy of different models, and robustness to adversarial
noise for the CIFAR task. Note that for this example, we have ρˆd = 0.39.
Quantity Definition Digits Natural images
Distance between classes ρˆd (see Eq. (3.16)) 0.72 0.39
Distinguishability (linear class.) ‖p1Eµ1(x)− p−1Eµ−1(x)‖2 0.14 0.06
Distinguishability (quadratic class.) 2
√
K‖p1C1 − p−1C−1‖∗ 1.4 0.87
Table 4.4: The parameter ρˆd, and distinguishability measures for the two classification
tasks. For the numerical computation, we used K = 1.
are not robust to adversarial perturbations for this experiment, as ρadv(f)  ρˆd = 0.39.
Despite that, all classifiers (except L-SVM) achieve an accuracy around 85%, and a training
accuracy larger than 92%. Fig. 4.6 illustrates the robustness to adversarial noise of the
learned classifiers, on an example image of the dataset. Compared to the digits dataset,
the distinguishability measures for this task are smaller (see Table 4.4). Our theoretical
analysis therefore predicts a lower limit on the adversarial robustness of linear and quadratic
classifiers for this task.
(a) (b) ∆adv = 0.04 (c) ∆adv = 0.02 (d) ∆adv = 0.03 (e) ∆adv = 0.03 (f) ∆adv = 0.05
Figure 4.6: Same as Fig. 4.5, but for the “airplane” vs. “automobile” classification task.
The instability of all classifiers to adversarial perturbations on this task suggests that the
essence of the classification task was not correctly captured by these classifiers, even if a
fairly good test accuracy is reached. To achieve better robustness, two possibilities exist: use
a more flexible family of classifiers (since our theoretical results suggest that more flexible
families of classifiers achieve better robustness), or use a better training algorithm for the
nonlinear classifiers. The latter solution seems possible in this setting, as the theoretical
limit for quadratic classifiers suggests that there is still room to improve the robustness of
these classifiers.
4.6.2 Multiclass classification using CNN
Since our theoretical results suggest that more flexible classifiers achieve better robustness
to adversarial perturbations in the binary case, we now explore empirically whether the
same intuitions hold for more complex classifiers (deep neural networks), and multi-class
classification settings. It should be noted that, while the classifiers’ flexibility is relatively
well quantified for polynomial classifiers by the degree of the polynomials, this is not
straightforward to do for neural network architectures. In this section, we examine the
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effect of breadth and depth on the robustness to adversarial perturbations of classifiers.
We perform experiments on the multiclass CIFAR-10 classification task. We focus on
baseline CNN classifiers, and learn architectures with 1, 2 and 3 hidden layers. Specifically,
each layer consists of a successive combination of convolutional, rectified linear units and
pooling operations. The convolutional layers consist of 5 × 5 filters with 50 feature maps
for each layer, and the pooling operations are done on a window of size 3×3 with a stride
parameter of 2. We build the three architectures gradually, by successively stacking a new
hidden layer on top of the previous architecture (kept fixed), while re-training the entire
network from scratch. The last hidden layer is then connected to a fully connected layer, and
the softmax loss is used. All architectures are trained with stochastic gradient descent. To
provide a fair comparison of the different classifiers, all three classifiers have approximately
similar classification error (35%). To ensure similar accuracies, we perform an early stop of
the training procedure when necessary. The empirical normalized robustness to adversarial
perturbations ρˆadv(f) of the three networks are compared in Figure 4.7 (a).
We observe first that increasing the depth of the network leads to a significant increase in
the robustness to adversarial perturbations, especially from 1 to 2 layers. The depth of a
neural network has an important impact on the robustness of the classifier, just like the
degree of a polynomial classifier is an important factor for the robustness. Going from 2 to
3 layers however seems to have a marginal effect on the robustness. It should be noted that,
despite the increase of the robustness with the depth, the normalized robustness computed
for all classifiers is relatively small, which suggests that none of these classifiers is really
robust to adversarial perturbations. In Fig. 4.7 (b), we show the effect of the number of
feature maps in the CNN (for a one layer CNN) on the estimated normalized robustness
to adversarial perturbations. Unlike the effect of depth, we observe that the number of
feature maps has barely any effect on the robustness to adversarial perturbations. Finally,
a comparison of the normalized robustness measures of very deep networks VGG-16 and
VGG-19 [SZ14] on ImageNet shows that these two networks behave very similarly in terms
of robustness (both achieve a normalized robustness of 3 · 10−3). This experiment, along
with the experiment in Figure 4.7 (a), empirically suggest that adding layers on top of
shallow network helps in terms of adversarial robustness, but if the depth of the network is
already sufficiently large, then adding layers only moderately improves that robustness.
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Figure 4.7: Evolution of the normalized robustness of classifiers with respect to (a) the
depth of a CNN for CIFAR-10 task, and (b) the number of feature maps.
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We finally discuss recent works that are related or build upon the work presented in this
chapter. The topic of adversarial perturbations applied to deep networks has recently
attracted a lot of attention. The authors of [GSS15] provided an empirical explanation of
the phenomenon of adversarial instability. Specifically, contrarily to the original explanation
provided in [Sze+14], the authors argue that it is the “linear” nature of deep nets that causes
the adversarial instability. Instead, our work adopts a rigorous mathematical perspective to
the problem of adversarial instability and shows that adversarial instability is due to the low
flexibility of classifiers compared to the difficulty of the classification task. In [TV16], the
authors provide an interesting empirical analysis of the adversarial instability, and show that
adversarial examples are not isolated points, but rather occupy dense regions of the pixel
space. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first one that presents quantitative
learning-independent limits on the robustness of classifiers, and shows the existence of a
tradeoff between robustness and risk. The derived limits suggest that achieving a good
robustness to such perturbations is more related to the architecture than the learning.
Although we did not derive a specific upper bound for feedforward deep nets with rectified
activation functions due to the complexity of this architecture, we conjecture that, similarly
to linear classifiers, the upper bound on the adversarial robustness is small in many tasks of
interest for this family of classifiers. This is supported by empirical evidence showing that
deep neural networks have properties very similar to linear classifiers (e.g., flat decision
boundaries, see following chapter for extensive discussion). This would mean that the
required levels of robustness to adversarial perturbations for state-of-the-art deep nets
cannot be achieved with a change of the learning algorithms, and radical improvements in
the robustness to adversarial perturbations would come from a change of the architecture.
Figure 4.8: DeepCAPTCHA example. The large image is the perturbed image, and the
smaller ones are the candidate images. Image taken from [Osa+16].
The existence of fundamental limits on the robustness of classifiers has recently led to
an application that leverages the instability of classifiers to perturbations [Osa+16]. The
authors specifically implement a CAPTCHA program, where the goal is to determine
whether or not a user is human. In this work, a perturbed image is presented along with
candidate images; the goal of the task is then to determine the image of the same class as
the perturbed image in the set of candidate images (see Fig. 4.8 for an illustration). A
bot that tries to solve this task would be fooled due to the perturbation presented in the
original image. Note that a classifier that achieves both a large robustness and low risk
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would break this CAPTCHA system, as it would correctly recognize the perturbed image,
as well as the candidate images. The existence of learning-independent fundamental limits
on the robustness of the family of classifiers guarantees that no classifier will have these
two properties, and therefore guarantees the reliability of this CAPTCHA system.
From a security perspective, the lack of robustness of classifiers to adversarial perturbations
has revealed several vulnerabilities in widely-used applications. For example, in [Car+16],
the authors show that it is possible to send hidden voice commands to mobile phones,
which are unintelligible to the human listener, but are interpreted as commands by devices.
These commands, when sent from an adversarial agent, can for example order the device to
make phone calls, send text messages, or go to suspicious websites, which causes significant
threats to the functioning of the device.
4.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we provided a quantitative analysis of the robustness of classifiers to
adversarial perturbations, and showed the existence of a general upper limit on the ad-
versarial robustness of classifiers. To better understand the implications of this limit, we
derived specialized upper bounds for two families of classifiers. Our upper bounds are
learning-independent, and hold for all classifiers belonging to the considered family. For the
family of linear classifiers, the established limit is very small for most problems of interest.
Hence, for such problems, one cannot find linear classifiers that are robust to adversarial
perturbations, yet achieve a low classification risk. For the family of quadratic classifiers,
the limit on adversarial robustness is usually larger than for linear classifiers, which gives
hope to have classifiers that are robust to adversarial perturbations. In fact, by using an
appropriate training procedure, it might be possible to get closer to the theoretical bound.
The goal of the following chapter is to study the robustness of general classifiers to more
commonly encountered perturbations; that is, random and semi-random noise of the data.
We precisely quantify the relation between the robustness to adversarial perturbations and
these noise models and relate the obtained results to differential geometric quantities of the
decision boundary.
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5.1 Introduction
The existence of learning-independent limits on the robustness to adversarial perturbations
studied in previous chapters is an important phenomenon that shows the vulnerability
of classification models. These limits are however specific to adversarial noise, and do
not apply to other noise models, such as random noise. The goal of this chapter is to
study the robustness of classifiers to other noise regimes encountered in practice, and to
relate these to the adversarial (or worst-case) perturbations studied in the previous chapter.
Specifically, we precisely quantify the robustness of general nonlinear classifiers in two
practical noise regimes. In the random noise regime, datapoints are perturbed by noise
with random direction in the input space. The semi-random regime generalizes this model
to random subspaces of arbitrary dimension, where an adversarial perturbation is sought
within the subspace. In both cases, we derive bounds that precisely describe the robustness
of classifiers as a function of the curvature of the decision boundary. In particular, we
derive the following results:
• In the random regime, we show that the robustness of classifiers behaves as √d times
the distance from the datapoint to the classification boundary (where d denotes the
dimension of the data) provided the curvature of the decision boundary is sufficiently
small. This result highlights the blessing of dimensionality for classifiers, as it implies
that robustness to random noise in high dimensional classification problems can be
achieved even for datapoints that lie very closely to the decision boundary.
• This quantification notably extends to the general semi-random regime, where we
show that the robustness precisely behaves as
√
d/m times the distance to decision
boundary, with m the dimension of the subspace. This result shows in particular
that, even when m is chosen as a small fraction of the dimension d, it is still possible
to find small perturbations that cause data misclassification.
• We empirically show that our theoretical estimates are very accurately satisfied by
state-of-the-art deep neural networks on various sets of data. This in turn leads
Part of this chapter will appear in [FMDF16].
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to quantitative insights on the curvature of the decision boundary that we support
experimentally through the visualization and estimation on two-dimensional sections
of the boundary. In particular, the results suggest that the curvature of the decision
boundary of state-of-the-art classifiers is extremely small.
This chapter is organized as follows: in Section 5.2, we define the notions of robustness to
random and semi-random noise. In Section 5.3, we characterize the robustness of linear
classifiers to random and semi-random noise. In Section 5.4, we show that these results also
apply for general non-linear classifiers, provided the curvature of the decision boundary
is kept small. Experimental results are presented in Section 5.5, where our theoretical
results are shown to be very accurately satisfied by state-of-the-art deep neural networks
on various sets of data. We finally conclude in Section 5.6.
5.2 Definitions and notations
Let f : Rd → RL be an L-class classifier. Given a datapoint x0 ∈ Rd, the estimated label
is obtained by kˆ(x0) = argmaxk fk(x0), where fk(x) is the kth component of f(x) that
corresponds to the kth class. Let S be an arbitrary subspace of Rd of dimension m. In
this chapter, we are interested in quantifying the robustness of f with respect to different
noise regimes. To do so, we define r∗S to be the perturbation in S of minimal norm that is
required to change the estimated label of f at x0;
r∗S(x0) = argmin
r∈S
‖r‖2 s.t. kˆ(x0 + r) 6= kˆ(x0), (5.1)
and we define the robustness as
∆S(x0) := ‖r∗S(x0)‖2.
Note that r∗S(x0) can be equivalently written
r∗S(x0) = argmin
r∈S
‖r‖2 s.t. ∃k 6= kˆ(x0) : fk(x0 + r) ≥ fkˆ(x0)(x0 + r). (5.2)
When S = Rd, r∗(x0) := r∗Rd(x0) is the adversarial (or worst-case) perturbation previously
defined in Eq.(3.2), which corresponds to the (unconstrained) perturbation of minimal
norm that changes the label of the datapoint x0. In other words, ∆adv(x0) = ‖r∗(x0)‖2
corresponds to the minimal distance from x0 to the classifier boundary. In the case where
S ⊂ Rd, only perturbations along S are allowed. The robustness of f at x0 along S is
naturally measured by the norm ∆S(x0) = ‖r∗S(x0)‖2. Different choices for S allow us to
study the robustness of f in two different regimes:
• Random noise regime: This corresponds to the case where S is a one-dimensional
subspace (m = 1) with direction v, where v is a random vector sampled uniformly
from the unit sphere Sd−1. Writing it explicitly, we study in this regime the robustness
quantity defined by mint |t| s.t. ∃k 6= kˆ(x0), fk(x0 + tv) ≥ fkˆ(x0)(x0 + tv), where v
is a vector sampled uniformly at random from the unit sphere Sd−1.
• Semi-random noise regime: In this case, the subspace S is chosen randomly, but
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can be of arbitrary dimension m.1 We use the semi-random terminology as the
subspace is chosen randomly, and the smallest vector that causes misclassification
is then sought in the subspace. It should be noted that the random noise regime is
a special case of the semi-random regime with a subspace of dimension m = 1. We
differentiate nevertheless between these two regimes for clarity, as the perturbation
direction is chosen in a worst-case fashion for subspaces of dimension larger than 1,
whereas the random noise regime does not involve any choice in the direction.
In the remainder of this chapter, the goal is to establish relations between the robustness in
the random and semi-random regimes on the one hand, and the robustness to adversarial
perturbations ∆adv on the other hand. We recall that the latter quantity captures the
distance from x0 to the classifier boundary, and is therefore a key quantity in the analysis
of robustness.
In the following analysis, we fix x0 to be a datapoint classified as kˆ(x0). To simplify the
notation, we remove the explicit dependence on x0 in our notations (e.g., we use ∆S instead
of ∆S(x0) and kˆ instead of kˆ(x0)), and it should be implicitly understood that all our
quantities pertain to the fixed datapoint x0.
5.3 Robustness of affine classifiers
We first assume that f is an affine classifier, i.e., f(x) = W>x + b for a given W =
[w1 . . .wL] and b ∈ RL.
The following result shows a precise relation between the robustness to semi-random noise,
∆S and the robustness to adversarial perturbations, ∆adv.
Theorem 3. Let S be a random m-dimensional subspace of Rd, and f be a L-class affine
classifier. Let
ζ1(m, δ) =
(
1 + 2
√
ln(1/δ)
m
+
2 ln(1/δ)
m
)−1
, (5.3)
ζ2(m, δ) =
(
max
(
(1/e)δ2/m, 1−
√
2(1− δ2/m)
))−1
. (5.4)
The following inequalities hold between the robustness to semi-random noise ∆S , and the
robustness to adversarial perturbations ∆adv:
√
ζ1(m, δ)
√
d
m
∆adv ≤ ∆S ≤
√
ζ2(m, δ)
√
d
m
∆adv, (5.5)
with probability exceeding 1− 2(L+ 1)δ.
The proof can be found in Appendix B. Our upper and lower bounds depend on the functions
ζ1(m, δ) and ζ2(m, δ) that control the inequality constants (for m, δ fixed). It should be
1A random subspace is defined as the span of m independent vectors drawn uniformly at random from
Sd−1.
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Figure 5.1: ζ1(m, δ) and ζ2(m, δ) with δ = 0.05 in function of m.
noted that ζ1(m, δ) and ζ2(m, δ) are independent of the data dimension d. Figure 5.1 shows
the plots of ζ1(m, δ) and ζ2(m, δ) as functions of m, for a fixed δ. For sufficiently large m,
ζ1(m, δ) and ζ2(m, δ) are very close to 1 (e.g., ζ1(m, δ) and ζ2(m, δ) belong to the interval
[0.8, 1.3] for m ≥ 250 in the settings of Figure 5.1). The interval [ζ1(m, δ), ζ2(m, δ)] is
however (unavoidably) larger when m = 1.
The result in Theorem 3 shows that in the random and semi-random noise regimes, the
robustness to noise is precisely related to ∆adv by a
√
d/m factor. Specifically, in the random
noise regime (m = 1), the magnitude of the noise required to misclassify the datapoint
behaves as Θ(
√
d∆adv) with high probability, with constants in the interval [ζ1(1, δ), ζ2(1, δ)].
Our results therefore show that, in high dimensional classification settings, affine classifiers
can be robust to random noise, even if the datapoint lies very closely to the decision
boundary (i.e., ∆adv is small). In the semi-random noise regime with m sufficiently
large (e.g., m ≥ 250), we have ∆S ≈
√
d/m∆adv with high probability, as the constants
ζ1(m, δ) ≈ ζ2(m, δ) ≈ 1 for sufficiently large m. Our bounds therefore “interpolate” between
the random noise regime, which behaves as
√
d∆adv, and the worst-case noise ∆adv. More
importantly, the square root dependence is also notable here, as it shows that the semi-
random robustness remains small even in regimes where m is chosen to be a very small
fraction of d. For example, choosing a small subspace of dimension m = 0.01d results in
semi-random robustness of 10∆adv with high probability, which might still not be perceptible
in complex visual tasks. Hence, for semi-random noise that is mostly random and only
mildly adversarial, affine classifiers remain vulnerable to such noise.
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5.4.1 Decision boundary curvature
We now consider the general case where f is a nonlinear classifier. We derive relations
between the random and semi-random robustness ∆S and worst-case robustness ∆adv using
properties of the classifier’s boundary. Let i and j be two arbitrary classes; we define the
pairwise boundary Bi,j as the boundary of the binary classifier where only classes i and j
are considered. Formally, the decision boundary Bi,j reads as follows:
Bi,j = {x ∈ Rd : fi(x)− fj(x) = 0}.
The boundary Bi,j separates between two regions of Rd, namely Ri and Rj , where the
estimated label of the binary classifier is respectively i and j. Specifically, we have
Ri = {x ∈ Rd : fi(x) > fj(x)},
Rj = {x ∈ Rd : fj(x) > fi(x)}.
R1
R2
p1
B1,2
p2
q1 k 2(p1)
q2 k 1(p2)
Figure 5.2: Illustration of the quantities introduced for the definition of the curvature of
the decision boundary.
We assume for the purpose of this analysis that the boundary Bi,j is smooth. We now
define the curvature of the decision boundary, denoted κ (Bi,j), which measures how Bi,j
bends in different directions in the space Rd. For a given p ∈ Bi,j , we define qi ‖ j(p) to be
the radius of the largest open ball included in the region Ri that intersects with Bi,j at p;
i.e.,
qi ‖ j(p) = sup
z∈Rd
{‖z − p‖2 : B(z, ‖z − p‖2) ⊆ Ri} , (5.6)
where B(z, ‖z−p‖2) is the open ball in Rd of center z and radius ‖z−p‖2. An illustration
of this quantity in two dimensions is provided in Fig. 5.2. It is not hard to see that any ball
B(z∗, ‖z∗−p‖2) centered in z∗ and included in Ri will have its tangent space at p coincide
with the tangent of the decision boundary at the same point. This is shown as follows:
Fact 4. Let p ∈ Bi,j, and z∗ be such that B(z∗, ‖z∗ − p‖2) ⊆ Ri. Assuming that p is a
non-singular point (i.e., ∇(fi − fj)(p) 6= 0), we have z∗ − p is collinear to the gradient of
the decision boundary at p, ∇(fi − fj)(p), and normal to Tp(Bi,j), the tangent space to the
decision boundary at p.
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Proof. We first show that p is a closest point to z∗ on the decision boundary. In fact,
suppose by contradiction that there exists p′ such that ‖z∗ − p′‖2 < ‖z∗ − p‖2 where p′
is on the boundary. Then, clearly p′ belongs to the ball B(z∗, ‖z∗ − p‖2), which is by
assumption included in Ri. This raises a contradiction, as p′ /∈ Ri. Thus, we have the
following relation:
p− z∗ ∈ argmin
r
‖r‖22 subject to (fi − fj)(z∗ + r) = 0.
By writing the Lagrangian of the above minimization problem, we have L(r, λ) = 2r +
λ∇(fi − fj)(z∗ + r). Equating this equation to 0 at p − z∗, we obtain that p − z∗ is
collinear to ∇(fi− fj)(p). The latter vector is moreover orthogonal to the tangent space to
the decision boundary at p by definition.
It should further be noted that the definition in Eq. (5.6) is not symmetric in i and j;
i.e., qi ‖ j(p) 6= qj ‖ i(p) as the radius of the largest ball one can inscribe in both regions
need not be equal. We therefore define the following symmetric quantity qi,j(p), where the
worst-case ball inscribed in any of the two regions is considered:
qi,j(p) = min
(
qi ‖ j(p), qj ‖ i(p)
)
.
This definition describes the curvature of the decision boundary locally at p by fitting the
largest ball included in one of the regions. To measure the global curvature, the worst-case
radius is taken over all points on the decision boundary, i.e.,
q(Bi,j) = inf
p∈Bi,j
qi,j(p), (5.7)
κ(Bi,j) =
1
q(Bi,j)
. (5.8)
The curvature κ(Bi,j) is simply defined as the inverse of the worst-case radius over all
points p on the decision boundary.
R1 R1
R2
B1,2 B1,2
R R
Figure 5.3: Binary classification example where the boundary is a union of two sufficiently
distant spheres. In this case, the curvature is κ(Bi,j) = 1/R, where R is the radius of the
circles.
In the case of affine classifiers, we have κ(Bi,j) = 0, as it is possible to inscribe balls
of infinite radius inside each region of the space. When the classification boundary is a
union of (sufficiently distant) spheres with equal radius R (see Fig. 5.3), the curvature
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U
TpBi,j
p
γ
u
n
Figure 5.4: Normal section of the boundary Bi,j with respect to plane U = span(n,u),
where n is the normal to the boundary at p, and u is an arbitrary in the tangent space
Tp(Bi,j).
κ(Bi,j) =
1
R . In general, the quantity κ(Bi,j) provides an intuitive way of describing the
nonlinearity of the decision boundary by fitting balls inside the classification regions.
It should be noted that there are many existing notions of curvature that one can define
on hypersurfaces [Lee09]. In the simple case of a curve in a two-dimensional space, the
curvature is defined as the inverse of the radius of the so-called oscullating circle. One
way to define curvature for high-dimensional hypersurfaces is by taking normal sections of
the hypersurface, and looking at the curvature of the resulting planar curve (see Fig. 5.4).
Our notion of curvature is similar in spirit, but captures the global bending of the decision
boundary by inscribing balls in the regions separated by the decision boundary.
In the following section, we show a precise characterization of the robustness to semi-random
and random noise of nonlinear classifiers in terms of the curvature of the decision boundaries
κ(Bi,j).
5.4.2 Robustness to random and semi-random noise
We now establish bounds on the robustness to random and semi-random noise in the binary
classification case. Let x0 be a datapoint classified as kˆ = kˆ(x0). We first study the binary
classification problem, where only classes kˆ and k ∈ {1, . . . , L}\{kˆ} are considered. To
simplify the notation, we let Bk := Bk,kˆ be the decision boundary between classes k and kˆ.
In the case of the binary classification problem where classes k and kˆ are considered, the
semi-random robustness and adversarial (or worst-case) robustness defined in Eq. (5.2) are
given as follows:
rkS = argmin
r∈S
‖r‖2 s.t. fk(x0 + r) ≥ fkˆ(x0 + r),
rk = argmin
r
‖r‖2 s.t. fk(x0 + r) ≥ fkˆ(x0 + r).
(5.9)
For a randomly chosen subspace, ∆kS := ‖rkS‖2 is the random or semi-random robustness of
the classifier, in the setting where only the two classes k and kˆ are considered. Likewise,
∆kadv := ‖rk‖2 denotes the worst-case robustness in this setting. It should be noted that
the global quantities r∗S and r
∗ are obtained from rkS and r
k by taking the vectors with
minimum norm over all classes k.
The following result gives upper and lower bounds on the ratio ∆
k
S
∆kadv
in function of the
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curvature of the boundary separating class k and kˆ.
Theorem 4. Let S be a random m-dimensional subspace of Rd. Let κ := κ(Bk). Assuming
that the curvature satisfies
κ ≤ C
ζ2(m, δ)∆kadv
m
d
,
the following inequality holds between the semi-random robustness ∆kS and the adversarial
robustness ∆kadv:(
1− C1‖rk‖2κζ2(m, δ) d
m
)√
ζ1(m, δ)
√
d
m
≤ ∆
k
S
∆kadv
≤
(
1 + C2‖rk‖2κζ2(m, δ) d
m
)√
ζ2(m, δ)
√
d
m
(5.10)
with probability larger than 1− 4δ. We recall that ζ1(m, δ) and ζ2(m, δ) are defined in Eq.
(5.3, 5.4). The constants can be taken C = 0.2, C1 = 0.625, C2 = 2.25.
The proof can be found in Appendix B. This result shows that the bounds relating the
robustness to random and semi-random noise to the worst-case robustness can be extended
to nonlinear classifiers, provided the curvature of the boundary κ(Bk) is sufficiently small.
In the case of linear classifiers, we have κ(Bk) = 0, and we recover the result for affine
classifiers in Theorem 3.
To extend this result to multi-class classification, special care has to be taken. In particular,
if k denotes a class that has no boundary with class kˆ, we have ∆kadv =∞, and the previous
curvature condition cannot be satisfied. It is therefore crucial to exclude such classes that
have no boundary, or more generally, boundaries that are far from class kˆ. We define the
set A of excluded classes k where ∆kadv is large
A = {k : ∆kadv ≥ 1.45
√
ζ2(m, δ)
√
d
m
‖r∗‖2}. (5.11)
Note that A is independent of S, and depends only on d, m and δ. Moreover, the constants
in (5.11) were chosen for simplicity of exposition.
Assuming a curvature constraint only on the close enough classes, the following result
establishes a simplified relation between ∆S and ∆adv.
Corollary 1. Let S be a random m-dimensional subspace of Rd. Assume that, for all
k /∈ A, we have
κ(Bk)∆
k
adv ≤
0.2
ζ2(m, δ)
m
d
(5.12)
Then, we have
0.875
√
ζ1(m, δ)
√
d
m
∆adv ≤ ∆S ≤ 1.45
√
ζ2(m, δ)
√
d
m
∆adv (5.13)
with probability larger than 1− 4(L+ 2)δ.
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Under the curvature condition in (5.12) on the boundaries between kˆ and classes in Ac,
our result shows that the robustness to random and semi-random noise exhibits the same
behavior that has been observed earlier for linear classifiers in Theorem 3. In particular, ∆S
is precisely related to the adversarial robustness ∆adv by a factor of
√
d/m. In the random
regime (m = 1), this factor becomes
√
d, and shows that in high dimensional classification
problems, classifiers with sufficiently flat boundaries are robust to random noise, even if
the image lies very closely to the decision boundary (i.e., ∆adv is small). However, in the
semi-random regime where an adversarial perturbation is found on a randomly chosen
subspace of dimension m, the
√
d/m factor that relates ∆S to ∆adv shows that robustness
to semi-random noise might not be achieved even if m is chosen to be a tiny fraction
of d (e.g., m = 0.01d). In other words, if a classifier is highly vulnerable to adversarial
perturbations, then it is also vulnerable to noise that is overwhelmingly random and only
mildly adversarial.
It is important to note that the curvature condition in (5.12) is not an assumption on
the curvature of the global decision boundary, but rather an assumption on the decision
boundaries between pairs of classes. The distinction here is significant, as junction points
where two decision boundaries meet might actually have a very large (or infinite) curvature
(even in linear classification settings), and the curvature condition in (5.12) typically does
not hold for this global curvature definition.
We finally stress that our results in Theorem 4 and Corollary 1 are applicable to any classifier,
provided the decision boundaries are smooth. If we assume further prior knowledge on the
considered family of classifiers and their decision boundaries (e.g., the decision boundary
is a union of spheres in Rd), similar bounds can further be derived under less restrictive
curvature conditions (compared to Eq. (5.12)).
5.5 Experiments
5.5.1 Estimation of the semi-random robustness
Before delving into the experimental results to confirm our analysis, we first show that the
framework developed in Chapter 3 to estimate the robustness to adversarial perturbations
∆adv(x0) = ‖r∗(x0)‖2 can be modified in a straightforward way to estimate the robustness
in the semi-random noise regime. We recall that Algorithm 2 operates by iteratively
linearizing the classifier’s decision function; the update steps derived for the affine classifiers
(given in closed form) are then used at each iteration of the algorithm. Hence, to extend
Algorithm 2 in the case where the perturbation is constrained to a subspace S, we first
derive the closed form formulas for the optimal subspace perturbations in the case where
the classifier is affine.
Fact 5. For affine classifiers of the form f(x) = W Tx + b, the subspace constrained
perturbations are given as follows:
∀k 6= kˆ(x0), rkS(x0) =
∣∣∣fk(x0)− fkˆ(x0)(x0)∣∣∣
‖PSwk −PSwkˆ(x0)‖22
(PSwk −PSwkˆ(x0)),
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where PS denotes the orthogonal projection operator onto subspace S. The optimal subspace
perturbation r∗S(x0) corresponds to the perturbation r
k
S(x0) with minimal `2 norm.
Proof. We have, for k 6= kˆ(x0),
rkS = argmin
r∈S
‖r‖22 s.t. fk(x0 + r) ≥ fkˆ(x0)(x0 + r)
= argmin
r∈S
‖r‖22 s.t. (wk −wkˆ(x0))
T (x0 + r) + bk − bkˆ(x0) ≥ 0
= argmin
r∈Rd
‖r‖22 s.t. (wk −wkˆ(x0))
T (x0 + PSr) + bk − bkˆ(x0) ≥ 0.
By equating the gradient of the Lagrangian of the above minimization problem to 0, we
obtain
rkS(x0) =
λ
2
PS(wk −wkˆ(x0)), (5.14)
where λ ≥ 0 denotes the Lagrangian multiplier. The complementary slackness condition
reads
λ
(
(wk −wkˆ(x0))
T (x0 + PSr) + bk − bkˆ(x0)
)
= 0.
If λ = 0, then x0 is exactly on the boundary, and we have rkS(x0) = 0. Otherwise, λ > 0,
and we obtain
λ = 2
fkˆ(x0)(x0)− fk(x0)
‖PS(wk −wkˆ(x0))‖22
.
By substituting in Eq. (5.14), we obtain the desired result. The fact that r∗S(x0) is then
obtained as the minimum over all rkS(x0) follows immediately from the argument in Fact
2.
The resulting algorithm for computing the robustness to subspace-constrained perturbations
is provided in Algorithm 3. The decision boundaries are iteratively linearized, and the
update steps derived above are applied until the perturbed image is classified differently
than the original one.
It is important to note that, while the (full) gradients of the classifications functions fk
with respect to the input are required in order to compute the unconstrained worst-case
perturbation (namely, when S = Rd), we only require the projections of the gradients onto
the subspace S for estimating the subspace-constrained perturbation in Algorithm 3. In
common cases where the dimension of the random subspace is m d, the computation of
the subspace constrained perturbation can therefore be more efficient, in addition to using
less information about the classifier.
5.5.2 Experimental results
We now evaluate the robustness of different image classifiers to random and semi-random
perturbations, and assess the accuracy of our bounds on various datasets and state-of-the-art
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Algorithm 3 Computing minimal perturbation in a subspace S
1: input: Image x, classifier f , orthogonal projector PS onto subspace S.
2: output: Perturbation rˆS .
3: Initialize x0 ← x, i← 0.
4: while kˆ(xi) = kˆ(x0) do
5: for k 6= kˆ(x0) do
6: Compute the perturbation rkS(xi) for the linearized classifier as follows:
rkS(xi)←
∣∣∣fk(xi)− fkˆ(x0)(xi)∣∣∣∥∥∥PS (∇fk(xi)−∇fkˆ(x0)(xi))∥∥∥22
PS
(
∇fk(xi)−∇fkˆ(x0)(xi)
)
,
7: end for
8: Set ri to be the perturbation rkS(xi) with minimal `2 norm.
9: Update the current datapoint: xi+1 ← xi + ri
10: i← i+ 1
11: end while
12: return rˆS =
∑
i ri
m/d
Classifier 1 1/4 1/16 1/36 1/64 1/100
LeNet (MNIST) 1.00 1.00± 0.06 1.01± 0.12 1.03± 0.20 1.01± 0.26 1.05± 0.34
LeNet (CIFAR-10) 1.00 1.01± 0.03 1.02± 0.07 1.04± 0.10 1.06± 0.14 1.10± 0.19
VGG-F (ImageNet) 1.00 1.00± 0.01 1.02± 0.02 1.03± 0.04 1.03± 0.05 1.04± 0.06
VGG-19 (ImageNet) 1.00 1.00± 0.01 1.02± 0.03 1.02± 0.05 1.03± 0.06 1.04± 0.08
Table 5.1: β(f ;m) for different classifiers f and different subspace dimensions m. The
VGG-F and VGG-19 are respectively introduced in [Cha+14; SZ14].
classifiers. Specifically, our theoretical results show that the robustness ∆S(x) of classifiers
satisfying the curvature property precisely behaves as
√
d/m∆adv(x). We first check the
accuracy of these results in different classification settings. For a given classifier f and
subspace dimension m, we define
β(f ;m) =
√
m/d
1
|D |
∑
x∈D
∆S(x)
∆adv(x)
,
where S is chosen randomly for each sample x and D denotes the test set. This quantity
provides indication to the accuracy of our
√
d/m∆adv(x) estimate of the robustness, and
should ideally be equal to 1 (for sufficiently large m). Since β is a random quantity (because
of S), we report both its mean and standard deviation for different networks in Table 5.1.
For each network, we estimate the expectation by averaging β(f ;m) on 1000 random
samples, with S also chosen randomly for each sample.
Observe that β is suprisingly close to 1, even when m is a small fraction of d. This
shows that our quantitative analysis provide very accurate estimates of the robustness to
semi-random noise. We visualize the robustness to random noise, semi-random noise (with
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m = 10) and worst-case perturbations on a sample image in Figure 5.5. While random
noise is clearly perceptible due to the
√
d ≈ 400 factor, semi-random noise becomes much
less perceptible even with a relatively small value of m = 10, thanks to the 1/√m factor
that attenuates the required noise to misclassify the datapoint. It should be noted that the
robustness of neural networks to adversarial perturbations has previously been observed
empirically in [Sze+14], but we provide here a quantitative and generic explanation for this
phenomenon. Note also that the generation of the semi-random perturbation in Fig. 5.5
(c) only required the projection of the gradients onto a random 10-dimensional subspace
(as well as evaluations of f), whereas the generation of the adversarial example for Fig.
5.5 (d) required the knowledge of the full gradients of the network with respect to the
input. This example shows that the full knowledge about the network (and in particular,
its gradient) is not needed in order to find an imperceptible adversarial example that causes
misclassification.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 5.5: (a) Original image classified as “Cauliflower”. Fooling perturbations for VGG-F
network: (b) Random noise, (c) Semi-random perturbation with m = 10, (d) Worst-case
perturbation, all wrongly classified as “Artichoke”.
The high accuracy of our bounds for different state-of-the-art classifiers, and different
datasets suggest that the decision boundaries of these classifiers have limited curvature
κ(Bk), as this is a key assumption of our theoretical findings. To support the validity of
this curvature hypothesis in practice, we visualize two-dimensional sections of the classifiers’
boundary in Figure 5.6 in three different settings. Note that we have opted here for a
visualization strategy rather than the numerical estimation of κ(B), as the latter quantity
is difficult to approximate in practice in high dimensional problems. In Figure 5.6, x0 is
chosen randomly from the test set for each data set, and the decision boundaries are shown
in the plane spanned by r∗ and r∗S , where S is a random direction (i.e., m = 1). Specifically,
the following procedure is applied to sample from the boundary Bk:
1. Choose a random direction, and estimate r∗S using Algorithm 3. Compute also the
worst-case perturbation r∗.
2. For each discretized value αi ∈ [−T, T ], do:
(a) Define the datapoint xi = x0 + r∗ + αi(r∗S − r∗).
(b) Project the datapoint xi onto the decision boundary using Algorithm 3: find the
minimal subspace perturbation r2di ∈ span(r∗, r∗S) such that xi + r2di belongs
to the decision boundary. Plot the projected point.
Different colors on the boundary correspond to boundaries with different classes. It can
be observed that the curvature of the boundary is very small except at “junction” points
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where the boundary of two different classes intersect. Our curvature assumption in Eq.
(5.12), which only assumes a bound on the curvature of the decision boundary between pairs
of classes kˆ(x0) and k (but not on the global decision boundary that contains junctions
with high curvature) is therefore adequate to the decision boundaries of state-of-the-art
classifiers according to Figure 5.6. Interestingly, the assumption in Corollary 1 is satisfied
by taking κ to be an empirical estimate of the curvature of the planar curves in Fig. 5.6
(a) for the dimension of the subspace being a very small fraction of d; e.g., m = 10−3d.
While not reflecting the curvature κ(Bk) that drives the assumption of our theoretical
analysis, this result still seems to suggest that the curvature assumption holds in practice,
and that the curvature of such classifiers is therefore very small. It should be noted that a
related empirical observation was made in [GSS15]; our work however provides a precise
quantitative analysis on the relation between the curvature and the robustness in the
semi-random noise regime.
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Figure 5.6: Boundaries of three classifiers near randomly chosen samples. Axes are
normalized by the corresponding ∆adv since our assumption in the theoretical bound
(Corollary 1) depends on the product of ∆advκ. Note the difference in range between x and
y axes. Note also that the range of horizontal axis in (c) is much smaller than the other
two, hence the illustrated boundary is more curved.
We now show a simple demonstration of the vulnerability of classifiers to semi-random
noise in Figure 5.7, where a structured message is hidden in the image and causes data
misclassification. Specifically, we consider S to be the span of random translated and scaled
versions of words “NIPS”, “SPAIN” and “2016” in an image, such that bd/mc = 228. The
resulting perturbations in the subspace are therefore linear combinations of these words
with different intensities.2 The perturbed image x0 + r∗S shown in Figure 5.7 (c) is clearly
indistinguishable from Figure 5.7 (a). This shows that imperceptibly small structured
messages can be added to an image causing data misclassification. This example might
possibly lead to applications in automatic watermarking and steganography, where data is
hidden in an image for tracking or to send hidden messages.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we precisely characterized the robustness of classifiers in a novel semi-random
noise regime that generalizes the random noise regime. Specifically, our bounds relate
2This example departs somehow from the theoretical framework of this chapter, where random subspaces
were considered. However, this empirical example suggests that the theoretical findings in this paper seem
to approximately hold when the subspace S have statistics that are close to a random subspace.
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(a) Image of a “Potflower” (b) Structured perturbation
containing random placement
of words “NIPS”, “2016”, and
“SPAIN”
(c) Classified as “Pineapple”
Figure 5.7: A fooling hidden message, S consists of linear combinations of random words.
the robustness in this regime to the robustness to adversarial perturbations. Our bounds
depend on the curvature of the decision boundary, the data dimension, and the dimension of
the subspace to which the perturbation belongs. Our results show, in particular, that when
the decision boundary has a small curvature, classifiers are robust to random noise in high
dimensional classification problems, even if the robustness to adversarial perturbations is
small. Moreover, for semi-random noise that is mostly random and only mildly adversarial
(i.e, the subspace dimension is small), our results show that state-of-the-art classifiers
remain vulnerable to such perturbations. To improve the robustness to semi-random noise,
our analysis encourages to impose geometric constraints on the curvature of the decision
boundary, as we have shown the existence of an intimate relation between the robustness
of classifiers and the curvature of the decision boundary.
In the following chapters, we focus on the study of the classifiers’ robustness to structured
geometric transformations of the images.
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transformations
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, we studied the robustness of classifiers to different types of
perturbations in the data. The notion of robustness to perturbation is intimately related
to that of invariance, which refers to the robustness of the classifier output to geometric
transformations in the data (e.g., translation, rotations, etc...). The focus of this chapter
is to study and quantify the invariance of classifiers. While the human visual system is
invariant to some extent to geometric transformations, it is unclear whether automatic
classifiers enjoy the same invariance properties. We propose in this chapter a principled and
systematic method to measure the robustness of arbitrary image classifiers to geometric
transformations. In particular, we design a new framework that can be applied to any
low dimensional transformation group T (e.g., rotations, translations, ...) and to any
classifier regardless of the particular nature of the classifier. For a given image, we define
the invariance measure as the minimal distance between the identity transformation and a
transformation in T that is sufficient to change the decision of the classifier on that image.
In order to define the transformation metric, our novel key idea is to represent the set of
transformed versions of an image as a manifold; the transformation metric is then naturally
captured by the geodesic distance on the manifold. Hence, for a given image, our invariance
measure essentially corresponds to the minimal geodesic distance on the manifold that
leads to a point where the classifier’s decision is changed. A global invariance measure is
then derived by averaging over a sufficiently large sample set. Equipped with our generic
definition of invariance, we leverage the techniques used in the analysis of manifolds of
transformed visual patterns [DG05; Wak+05; JDV08] and design a method built on the
efficient Fast Marching algorithm [KS98; Tsi95] to compute the invariance of classifiers.
Using the proposed method, we quantify the invariance of several classifiers, and provide a
comparative study of classifiers with respect to their invariance to geometric transformations.
We show in particular that convolutional neural network (CNN) architectures and classifiers
based on scattering transforms [BM13] have a larger invariance score when compared to
other classifiers, such as SVM classifiers. We highlight moreover that the invariance of
convolutional neural networks increases with the network depth. While this was previously
known to hold in simple settings where toy images and simple transformation sets are
Part of this chapter has been published in [FF15].
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considered, our approach provides a quantitative and systematic method to verify this
in more complex settings. Our proposed method moreover quantitatively demonstrates
that convolutional neural networks (CNN) classifiers are not sufficiently invariant to small
combinations of translations, rotations and dilations of the image, despite the common
belief that these classifiers have good invariance properties. To improve the invariance
properties of classifiers, we show that data augmentation, where transformed images are
added to the training set, can be a very effective solution. By providing a systematic tool
to assess the classifiers in terms of their robustness to geometric transformations, we bridge
a gap towards understanding the invariance properties of different families of classifiers.
The chapter is organized as follows: in Section 6.2, we propose a mathematical formulation
of the problem of quantifying the invariance of a classifier to geometric transformations.
In Section 6.3, we propose an algorithm for computing this quantity, and we perform
experiments on the invariance of classifiers in Section 6.4. We finally conclude in Section
6.5.
6.2 Problem formulation
6.2.1 Definitions
We consider a mathematical model where images are represented as functions x : R2 → R,
and we denote by L2 the space of square integrable images. Let T be a Lie group consisting
of geometric transformations on R2, and we denote by p the dimension of T (i.e., number
of free parameters), which is assumed to be sufficiently small in this chapter (i.e., p ≤ 6).
For any transformation τ that belongs to T , we denote by xτ the image x transformed by
τ . That is, xτ (u1, u2) = x(τ−1(u1, u2)). Examples of Lie groups include the rotation group
SO(2) (p = 1, described by one angle) and the similarity group (p = 4, described by a 2D
translation vector, a dilation and an angle).
Consider an image classification task, where the images are assigned discrete labels in
L = {1, . . . , L}, and let kˆ be an arbitrary image classifier. Formally, kˆ is a function defined
on the space of square integrable images L2, and takes values in the set L. Our goal is to
evaluate the invariance of kˆ with respect to T . Given an image x, we define the invariance
score of kˆ relative to x, ∆T (x)1, to be the minimal normalized distance from the identity
transformation to a transformation τ that changes the classification label, i.e.,
∆T (x) = min
τ∈T
d(e, τ)
‖x‖L2
subject to kˆ(xτ ) 6= kˆ(x), (6.1)
where e is the identity element of the group T and d : T × T → R+ is a metric on T
that we define later (Section 6.2.2). The invariance score quantifies the resilience of the
classifier to transformations in T ; larger values of ∆T (x) indicate a larger invariance. It
is worth noting that the definition of ∆T is tightly related to the definition of adversarial
perturbations in Chapter 3. Specifically, we consider here geometric perturbations (instead
of arbitrary additive perturbations) and focus on the minimal such transformation (in the
1We remove the explicit dependence on the classifier kˆ to simplify notations. The classifier will be clear
from the context.
66
6.2. Problem formulation
sense of a metric defined on T ).
Finally, for a given distribution of data points µ, the global invariance score of the classifier
kˆ to transformations in T is defined by
ρT (kˆ) = Ex∼µ∆T (x). (6.2)
The quantity ρT (kˆ) depends on kˆ as well as the distribution of data points µ. To simplify
notations, we have omitted the dependence on µ, assuming the distribution is clear from
the context. We estimate in practice the global invariance by taking the empirical average2
over training points: ρˆT (kˆ) = 1m
∑m
j=1 ∆T (xj ; kˆ).
6.2.2 Transformation metric
We discuss and introduce the distance used for the invariance score ∆T (x). It should be
noted that T is possibly a multi-dimensional group (i.e., the transformations in T are
described by several parameters of different nature such as translation, rotation, scale, ...);
hence, defining a trivial metric that measures the absolute distance between transformation
parameters is of limited interest, as it combines parameters possibly of different nature.
Instead, a more relevant notion of distance is one that depends on the underlying image
x. In that case, the distance d(τ1, τ2) quantifies the change in appearance between images
xτ1 and xτ2 , rather than an absolute distance between the two transformations. Consider
for example the image distance dx(τ1, τ2) = ‖xτ1 − xτ2‖L2 . While dx explicitly depends
on the underlying image x, it fails to capture the intrinsic geometry of the family of
transformed images. To illustrate this point, we consider a simple example of images in
Fig. 6.1 with two transformed versions xτ1 and xτ2 of a reference image xτ0 . Note that
dx(τ0, τ1) = dx(τ0, τ2), as both transformed objects (xτ1 and xτ2) have no intersection
with the reference object (xτ0). However, it is clear that xτ2 incurred a large rotation
and translation, while xτ1 underwent a slight vertical translation. Hence, the distance
metric should naturally satisfy d(τ0, τ1) < d(τ0, τ2), which is not the case for the image
distance. This is crucial in our setting, as a classifier that recognizes the similarity of the
objects in xτ2 and xτ0 is certainly more robust to transformations than a classifier that
merely recognizes the similarity between xτ1 and xτ0 , and should be given a higher score.
This example underlines a well-known fundamental issue with the L2 distance that fails
to capture the intrinsic distance of the curved manifold of transformed images (see e.g.,
[TDSL00; DG05]). To correctly capture the intrinsic structure of the manifold, we define d
to be the length of the shortest path belonging to the manifold (i.e., the geodesic distance).
For illustration, we show in Fig. 6.2 images along the geodesic path from xτ0 to xτ2 ; the
geodesic distance is then essentially the sum of local L2 distances between transformed
images over the geodesic path. We formalize these notions as follows.
LetM(x) be the family of transformed imagesM(x) = {xτ : τ ∈ T }. Equipped with the
L2 metric, M(x) defines a metric space and a continuous submanifold of L2. Following
the works of [Wak+05] and [JDV08] that have considered similar manifolds in different
contexts, we callM(x) an Image Appearance Manifold (IAM), and we follow here their
approach. Assuming that γ : [0, 1] 7→ T is a C1 curve in T , and that xγ(t) is differentiable
2In practice, it is sufficient to consider an empirical average over a sufficiently large random subset of
the training set. The number of samples is chosen to achieve a small enough confidence interval.
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x⌧0 x⌧1 x⌧2
Figure 6.1: Schematic representation of the problem encountered by using metric the L2
metric. Black pixels indicate pixels with value 0, and xτ1 , xτ2 are obtained by applying a
combination of rotation and translation to xτ0 . Original image taken from [GBS05].
x⌧0 x⌧2
Figure 6.2: Images along the geodesic path from xτ0 to xτ2 . Original image taken from
[GBS05].
with respect to t, we define the length L(γ) of γ as
L(γ) =
∫ 1
0
∥∥∥∥ ddtxγ(t)
∥∥∥∥
L2
dt. (6.3)
Note that Eq. (6.3) is expressed in terms of the L2 metric in the image appearance manifold
and corresponds to summing the local L2 distances between transformed images over the
path xγ . We now show that L(γ) can be expressed as a length associated to a Riemannian
metric on T that we now derive. Defining the map
F : T →M, τ 7→ xτ ,
we have
d
dt
xγ(t) = (F ◦ γ)′(t) = dFγ(t)(γ′(t)),
where dFτ denotes the differential of F at τ , and γ′ is derivative of γ. It follows that
L(γ) =
∫ 1
0
√
gγ(t)(γ′(t), γ′(t))dt
where gτ is the Riemannian metric (i.e., a positive bilinear form on TτT , the tangent space
of T at τ), given by:
gτ (v, w) = 〈dFτ (v), dFτ (w)〉L2 for all v, w ∈ TτT .
Note that g can be equivalently seen as the pullback of the L2 metric onM(x) along F .
By choosing a basis in the tangent space, the length L(γ) can be equivalently written
L(γ) =
∫ 1
0
√
γ′(t)TGγ(t)γ′(t)dt,
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where Gγ(t) is the p× p positive definite matrix associated to the bilinear form g.
Having defined the length of a curve on T , the geodesic distance between two points τ1, τ2
is defined as the length of the shortest curve joining the two points:
d(τ1, τ2) = inf{L(γ) : γ ∈ C1([0, 1]), γ(0) = τ1, γ(1) = τ2}.
Finally, our problem therefore consists in computing the global invariance score, or equiv-
alently ∆T (x) defined in Eq. (6.1), where d is the geodesic distance. In other words,
our problem becomes that of computing the minimal geodesic distance from the identity
transformation to a transformation that is sufficient to change the estimated label of kˆ.
6.3 Invariance score computation
We now propose a generic method for computing the invariance score ∆T (x). The key
to an efficient and accurate approximation of ∆T (x) lies in the effective computation of
geodesics on the manifold (T , G) that we address as follows.
Let u(τ) = d(e, τ) be the geodesic map that measures the geodesic distance between the
(fixed) identity element and τ . The geodesic map satisfies the following Eikonal equation
[Pey+10]
‖∇u(τ)‖G−1τ = 1 for τ ∈ T \{e}, and u(e) = 0, (6.4)
where ‖x‖A =
√〈x, x〉A with 〈x, y〉A = xTAy. Moreover, it was proved in [CL83] that
the geodesic map u is the unique viscosity solution of the Eikonal equation, provided
that τ → G(τ) is continuous. Many numerical schemes rely on the Eikonal equation
characterization to approximate the geodesic map. We use here the popular Fast Marching
(FM) method [KS98], a fast front propagation approach that computes the values of the
discrete geodesic map in increasing order. To simplify the exposition of FM, we focus
here on the case where the manifold T is two-dimensional (i.e., p = 2). The extension to
arbitrary dimensions is straightforward, and we refer to [Pey+10; SV03] for more complete
explanations and computations.
We assume that the manifold T is sampled using a regular grid; let T∗ be the sampling
of T , and U be the discrete vector that approximates u at the nodes. The structure of
Fast Marching is almost identical to Dijkstra’s algorithm for computing shortest paths on
graphs [Dij59]. The main difference lies in the update step, which bypasses the constraint
of propagation along edges. For a given node τ , define N (τ) to be the set of neighbours of
τ (see illustration in Fig. 6.3).
In the FM algorithm, each grid point is tagged either as Known (nodes for which distance
is frozen), or Unknown (nodes for which distance can change in subsequent iterations).
Initially, the grid points are set to Unknown, and U is set to ∞, except U(e) that is set
to zero. At each iteration of FM, the unknown node τmin with smallest U is selected, and
tagged as Known. Then, each unknown neighbour τ ∈ N (τmin) is visited, and U(τ) is
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T⇤
⌧ ⌧min
⌧˜
t⌧min + (1  t)⌧˜
⌧a
⌧b
Figure 6.3: Schematic representation of the discretized manifold T∗, and the Fast Marching
update rule. In this figure, we have N (τ) = {τ˜ , τmin, τa, τb}.
Algorithm 4 Computation of the invariance score ∆T (x) (for p = 2)
Initialize U(e) = 0, U =∞ otherwise, and tag all nodes as unknown.
while termination criterion is not met do
Select the unknown node τmin that achieves minimal distance U .
Tag τmin as known.
If kˆ(xτmin) 6= kˆ(x), set ∆T (x; kˆ)← U(τmin)/‖x‖L2 and terminate.
for all unknown τ ∈ N (τmin) do
Update U(τ) to be the minimum of itself, U(τmin)+‖τ−τmin‖Gτ and the expression
in Eq.(6.5).
end for
end while
updated as follows: U(τ) is set to be the minimum of itself, U(τmin) + ‖τ − τmin‖Gτ and
min
t∈[0,1]
tU(τmin) + (1− t)U(τ˜) + ‖tτmin + (1− t)τ˜ − τ‖Gτ , (6.5)
for each known τ˜ such that (τ, τmin, τ˜) forms a triangle (see Fig. 6.3). It is worth noting
that, unlike Dijkstra, FM seeks the optimal point (possibly outside the set T∗) on the
neighbourhood boundary that minimizes the estimated distance at τ , under a linear
approximation assumption (Eq. (6.5)). Fortunately, the problem in Eq. (6.5) can be solved
in closed form, as it corresponds to the minimization of a scalar quadratic equation [SV03].
The proposed method, which uses FM algorithm to compute ∆T (x), is given in Algorithm
4 in the two dimensional case. The algorithm is stopped whenever a transformation that
changes the classification label is found.3 The nodes and metrics are generated on-the-fly
in order to avoid spending unnecessary ressources on far-away nodes that might be farther
than the minimal transformation that satisfies kˆ(x) 6= kˆ(xτ ) and therefore never visited.
3To ensure the termination of the algorithm (even if no successful transformation is found) we limit the
number of iterations N to 50, 000. However, in all our experiments, this limit was never reached, and the
algorithm terminated by successfully finding a transformation that satisfies kˆ(xτ ) 6= kˆ(x).
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The complexity of the proposed method is O(N log(N)), where N is the number of visited
nodes if a min-heap structure is used (for constant p, and constant cost for evaluation of kˆ).
It is important to note however that the complexity of the algorithm has an exponential
dependence on the dimension p since our method involves the enumeration of simplices in
dimension p; this is however not a big limitation as our main focus goes to low-dimensional
transformation groups.
Finally, we note that when the metric is isotropic (i.e., Gτ is proportional to the identity
matrix for all τ), FM provides a consistent scheme [Pey+10]. That is, as the discretization
step tends to zero, the solution computed by the algorithm tends towards the viscosity so-
lution of the Eikonal equation. Unfortunately, for arbitrary anisotropic metrics, consistency
is however not guaranteed, and the exact computation of the geodesics becomes much more
difficult and computationally demanding (see [SV00; BC11; Lin03; Mir14]). We empirically
observed that the anisotropy of the considered metric is generally not very large in the
vicinity of e (although it exceeds the theoretical limit of guaranteed consistency), which
leads to approximately accurate estimates of the geodesic distance using the proposed
method, when the discretization step is sufficiently small. It should finally be noted that
all previous methods addressing the metric anisotropy can readily be applied to our setting.
At the expense of higher computational cost, these methods provide theoretical guarantees
on the accuracy of the geodesic distance estimation.
6.4 Experiments: analysis of the invariance of classifiers
We propose now a set of experiments to study the invariance of classifiers in different
settings. In particular, we consider the following transformation groups:
• Ttrans: in-plane translations of the image (p = 2),
• Tdil+rot: dilations and rotations around the center of the image (p = 2),
• Tsim: similarity transformations that describe combinations of translations, dilations
and rotations around the center of the image (p = 4).
In all experiments, we used a discretization step of 0.5 pixels for translations, pi/20 radians
for rotation, and 0.1 for dilation for the proposed method. Finally, the transformed images
have the same size as the original image, and we use a zero-padding boundary condition.
6.4.1 Evaluation of invariance on MNIST handwritten digits dataset
We first compare the invariance of different classifiers on the MNIST handwritten digits
dataset [LeC+98a]. We consider the following classifiers:
1. Linear SVM [Fan+08b],
2. SVM with RBF kernel [CL11],
3. Convolutional Neural Network [VL15]: we employ a baseline architecture with
two hidden layers containing each a convolution operation (5×5 filters with 32 feature
maps for the first layer and 64 for the second layer), a rectified linear unit nonlinearity,
and a max pooling over 2× 2 windows followed by a subsampling. The architecture
is trained with stochastic gradient descent, with a softmax loss.
4. Scattering transform followed by a generative PCA classifier. The same
71
Chapter 6. Quantifying invariance to geometric transformations
Group L-SVM RBF-SVM CNN Scat. PCA
Test error (%) 8.4 1.4 0.7 0.8
Translations (T = Ttrans) 0.8 1.3 1.7 2.1
Dilations + Rotations (T = Tdil+rot) 0.8 1.5 1.9 1.8
Similarity (T = Tsim) 0.6 1.1 1.5 1.6
Table 6.1: Accuracy and invariance scores of different classifers on the MNIST dataset.
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Figure 6.4: Distance map with Tdil+rot group (left), and correctly classified regions (right),
for the four tested classifiers on a “4” digit image. Details for a): the color code indicates
the geodesic distance from the identity transformation (shown by red dot at the center).
For each classifier, the minimal transformation for which the output of the classifier is not
correct (i.e., not “4”) is indicated, along with the corresponding transformed image and
geodesic path. Details for b): the region where the classifier correctly outputs the label “4”
is shown in white. Geodesic paths are also shown.
settings as in the MNIST handwritten classification example [BM13] were used. In
particular, the features are obtained using a two-level scattering operator, with a
spatial size window parameter determined using a cross-validation procedure. A
generative PCA classifier is then trained by fitting an affine subspace to the scattering
features of each class, and a label is determined at test time by selecting the subspace
index with smallest error norm when projecting onto the affine subspaces.
Table 6.1 reports the performance of the different classifiers under study, and their invariance
scores ρˆT (kˆ) using the proposed method. As expected, the linear and RBF-SVM classifiers
compare poorly to other classifiers in terms of invariance. This is due to the construction
of the CNN and Scat. PCA, which explicitly take into account the invariance. Moreover, it
can be noted that Scat. PCA outperforms CNN in terms of robustness to translations, and
global similarity transformations, even if the two classifiers have similar test errors. This
result is in agreement with the theoretical evidence in [BM13; Mal12] showing that scattering
representations are invariant to deformations. It should be noted however that the notion
of invariance developed in the latter papers is concerned with the feature representation
step rather than the overall classification architecture (i.e., mapping from the input to
label; hence including feature representation and classification), which is measured by our
invariance score.
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To get further insights on the invariance of the classifiers, we focus on the two-dimensional
group Tdil+rot, and show in Fig. 6.4 (a) the geodesic distance map for an example image of
digit “4” computed starting from the identity transformation (shown by a red dot at the
center). Moreover, we overlay the minimally transformed images that change the labels of
each of the classifiers, along with the corresponding geodesic paths. On this example, the
Scat. PCA classifier is the most robust: a large dilation, accompanied with a rotation is
required to change the classification label. In contrast, the linear SVM is easily “fooled”
with a slight dilation. In Fig. 6.4 (b) we illustrate in white the region of the Rotation-Scale
plane, where the classifier outputs the correct label “4”. Interestingly, the CNN and Scat.
PCA classifiers are largely invariant to dilations (indicated by the vertical shape of the
white region), while being moderately robust to rotations.
The geodesic distance map strongly depends on the considered image. To show this point,
we do the same experiment as above, but using a “0” digit image and show the results
in Fig. 6.5. Observe that the distance maps have very different shapes, which can be
explained by the fact that the digit “0” only changes slightly as a rotation is applied, while
the appearance of digit “4” is strongly affected by rotation. Also, observe that CNN and
scattering classifiers are robust to rotations in this example, and a dilation is needed in
order to switch the label of the original image in this example.
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Figure 6.5: Distance map with Tdil+rot group (left), and correctly classified regions (right),
for the four tested classifiers on a “0” digit image. Details for a): the color code indicates
the geodesic distance from the identity transformation (shown by red dot at the center).
For each classifier, the minimal transformation for which the output of the classifier is not
correct (i.e., not “0”) is indicated, along with the corresponding transformed image and
geodesic path. Details for b): the region where the classifier correctly outputs the label “0”
is shown in white. Geodesic paths are also shown.
6.4.2 Evaluation of invariance on CIFAR-10 natural images dataset
In this second experimental section, we perform experiments on the CIFAR-10 dataset
[KH09]. We focus on baseline CNN classifiers, and learn architectures with 1, 2 and 3
hidden layers. Specifically, each layer consists of a successive combination of convolutional,
rectified linear units and pooling operations. The convolutional layers consist of 5× 5 filters
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with respectively 32, 32 and 64 feature maps for each layer, and the pooling operations
are done on a window of size 3 × 3 with a stride parameter of 2. We build the three
architectures gradually, by successively stacking a new hidden layer on top of the previous
architecture (kept fixed). The last hidden layer is then connected to a fully connected
layer, and the softmax loss is used. Moreover, the different architectures are trained with
stochastic gradient descent. On the test set, the error of the architectures with 1, 2 and
3 layers are respectively 35.6%, 25.0% and 22.7%. For completeness, we also consider a
Network-in-Network deep neural network [LCY14] that is known to achieve very good
results on the CIFAR-10 dataset. Specifically, the network is composed of 3 micro-networks,
containing each a convolutional layer, rectified nonlinearity, a multilayer perceptron with 2
hidden layers, and a max-pooling. Compared to the other tested architectures, the NiN
deep net is therefore a significantly more complex architecture. We train this neural network
(without pre-processing), and obtain an error rate of 11.7 %.
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Figure 6.6: Invariance scores of CNNs on Ttrans, Tdil+rot and Tsim, for the CIFAR-10 dataset.
We show in Fig. 6.6 the invariance scores of the different architectures. Our approach
captures the increasing invariance with the number of layers of the network, for the three
groups under study. This result is in agreement with empirical studies and previous known
belief [Goo+09; BCV13] that invariance increases with the depth of the network. However,
while previous results were measuring the invariance with respect to a one dimensional
transformation group (e.g., rotation only), the proposed method provides a systematic and
principled way of verifying the increased invariance of CNNs with depth on more complex
groups (e.g., similarity transformations). Interestingly enough, it should be noted that
despite the relatively small difference in performance between the two and three layers
architectures, the invariance score strongly increases. This highlights once again that
invariance and test error capture two different properties of classifiers.
We further visualize the invariance level of the NiN network on the CIFAR-10 dataset
and show in Fig. 6.7 some sample images from the training set sorted according to their
invariance score ∆T for the similarity group. It should be noted that despite the high
accuracy achieved by the NiN network, the distinction between the transformed and original
images is hardly perceptible for most sampled images; a slight transformation of the image
is therefore sufficient to change the label of the NiN classifier. For the top-scored images
however, the difference between the original and the minimally transformed images is clearly
perceptible even though a human observer is likely to correctly recognize the class of the
transformed images. For completeness, we perform the same experiment on the translations
group (i.e., T = Ttrans) and illustrate the sorted images in Fig. 6.8. It can be observed that
the network is much less robust to combinations of 2D translations, rotation and dilation,
74
6.4. Experiments: analysis of the invariance of classifiers
than to translation alone. In fact, note that the difference between the transformed images
and original images in Fig. 6.8 is more pronounced than in Fig. 6.7. In the following section,
we quantify the effect of data augmentation, a widely used technique in classification for
improving the accuracy and invariance.
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Figure 6.7: Sample images from the CIFAR-10 dataset and their invariance to similarity
transformations ∆T (x) (with T = Tsim) for the NiN classifier. The odd rows show the
original images, and the even rows show the minimally transformed images changing the
prediction of the classifier. The invariance score ∆T (x) is indicated on each transformed
image. All original images are correctly classified by the NiN classifier. We have
ρT (kˆ) = 1.15.
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Figure 6.8: Sample images from the CIFAR-10 dataset and their invariance to translation
∆T (x) (with T = Ttrans) for the NiN classifier. The odd rows show the original images,
and the even rows show the minimally transformed images changing the prediction of the
classifier. The invariance score ∆T (x) is indicated on each transformed image. All original
images are correctly classified by the NiN classifier. We have ρT (kˆ) = 1.82.
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6.4.3 Effect of data augmentation on the invariance
In vision tasks, it is common practice to augment the training data with artificial examples
obtained by slightly distorting the original examples to achieve invariance. Although this
practice is known to improve the classification performance of the classifiers on many tasks,
its effect on the invariance of the classifier is not quantitatively understood. We quantify
in this section the effect of data augmentation on the invariance by training classifiers on
augmented training sets, where randomly selected images from the training set undergo
random transformations4 from the similarity group Tsim, and are then added to the training
set. We perform experiments on the MNIST task, where L-SVM, RBF-SVM and CNN
classifiers (introduced in Section 6.4.1) are used, as well as the CIFAR-10 task, where the
NiN classifier (introduced in Section 6.4.2) is used. Fig. 6.9 shows the invariance score with
respect to the number of added transformed samples for the different classifiers on the two
tasks. Note that all classifiers improve their invariance score as more transformed samples
are added to the training set. Moreover, the RBF-SVM improves its invariance score by
around 50% with mere additions of artificial examples in the training set, and outperforms
the invariance of CNN (without data augmentation). Interestingly, the invariance score
of the augmented RBF-SVM classifier is comparable to Scat. PCA classifier, which is
carefully designed to satisfy invariance properties. Observe finally that data augmentation
similarly improves the invariance score of CNN and NiN classifiers substantially on the
MNIST and CIFAR-10 classification tasks. We further illustrate this point qualitatively by
comparing minimally transformed images that change the estimated label of the classifier
for classifiers that are trained with and without data augmentation. The results are shown
in Fig. 6.10. Note that the minimal transformations required to change the label are
substantially larger for networks that are trained with data augmentation than without
data augmentation. This provides a qualitative confirmation to the results in Fig. 6.9. This
experiment highlights the power of a simple technique, data augmentation, for increasing
the invariance of classifiers.
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Figure 6.9: Invariance score versus number of additional training samples, for MNIST and
CIFAR-10, with T = Tsim.
While random data augmentation strategies definitely improve the invariance of a classifier
as we have shown above, it should be noted that better data augmentation strategies can
4Random transformations are constrained as follows: translation of at most 3 pixels in each direction, a
scaling parameter between 0.7, and 1.3, and a rotation of at most 0.2 radians.
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Figure 6.10: Qualitative comparison between the invariance of the original NiN network
and the one trained using augmented samples, on randomly chosen samples. Images with
green label represent the original images along with the correct label. The two rows below
original images represent the minimally perturbed images required to modify the estimated
label, respectively for the original NiN and the NiN trained with 30′000 augmented samples.
be devised for improving the invariance of classifiers [Faw+16; LCB07; Pau+14; Hau+16;
CJF16]. Specifically, in [Faw+16], we propose a worst-case data augmentation approach,
where a transformation is sought to maximize the classification loss for each image. This
approach is shown to yield better invariance to geometric transformations, and better
accuracy when used as a data augmentation tool, compared to the random augmentation
approach. Unfortunately, this method however requires solving an optimization problem
for each training point (or at least for each image belonging to a set whose size grows
linearly with the number of training points), and does not therefore scale to large and
high-dimensional classification tasks. A different data augmentation approach is intro-
duced in [Pau+14], where this computational difficulty is alleviated by applying the same
transformation to all training datapoints, and the transformation set is moreover coarsely
discretized. This approach goes however against the initial intent, as different samples
might require different transformations to improve the invariance of classifiers. In [Hau+16],
an interesting alternative data augmentation approach is introduced, where a generative
model on the transformations is first learned by registering pairs of images in the data set.
Data augmentation is then performed by sampling transformations from this generative
model which are then applied to the images in the training set. While yielding to a boost of
the accuracy of the classifier, it should be noted that the success of this approach entirely
depends on the goodness of the learned generative model. For natural images, learning
such a generative model might be complex from a computational perspective in addition to
the difficulty of finding registering transformations. The design of automatic and adaptive
data augmentation strategies for large-scale datasets is therefore still an open problem that
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deserves investigation, as the improvements on the invariance obtained with augmentation
can be very large as shown above.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed a systematic approach for measuring the invariance of any
classifier to low-dimensional transformation groups. Using a manifold perspective, we were
able to convert the problem of assessing the classifier’s invariance to that of computing
geodesic distances. We proposed a numerical algorithm based on the Fast Marching method
to compute this invariance score, and applied it to several classification instances and
datasets. Using the proposed approach, we also quantified the increasing invariance of
CNNs with depth, and highlighted the importance of data augmentation for increasing the
invariance of classifiers.
Unfortunately, the proposed approach for measuring the invariance to transformations
cannot be used to model complex and potentially high-dimensional nuisance spaces such
as the set of occlusions, or piecewise affine transformations. In the following chapter, we
develop a probabilistic framework for studying the robustness of arbitrary classifiers to such
nuisance factors.
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nuisances
7.1 Introduction
In addition to the geometric transformations considered in the previous chapter, complex
nuisances such as occlusions, illumination changes or image compression might affect the
data in real-world classification tasks. Nuisance variables account for variability that has no
effect on the result of the task, and should be ideally factored out of the classification system.
The goal of this chapter is to develop a generic framework for quantitatively assessing
the robustness of classifiers to such nuisance factors. While in the previous chapter, the
techniques we developed were specifically crafted to low-dimensional transformation groups,
the aim of this chapter is to propose a modular framework that can potentially apply to
more diverse high-dimensional nuisance sets.
Specifically, we develop a general probabilistic framework for assessing and analyzing the
robustness of classifiers to nuisance factors. The outcomes of the proposed framework
are two-fold: the estimation of the robustness of classifiers to arbitrary nuisances and the
sampling of nuisances that cause data misclassification. The latter outcome can be used to
visualize and possibly improve the robustness to nuisances. In more details, we first propose
a formal definition of the average robustness to nuisance, and provide a provably efficient
Monte-Carlo estimate. In a second step, we focus on problematic regions of the nuisance
space, where the classifier outputs low confidence scores for highly probable nuisance values.
We propose a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling mechanism to quickly reach
such regions of the nuisance space. This allows us to visualize problematic samples for a
given classifier, and gain further insights into regions of the nuisance space which cause
misclassification. Our framework is generic and can be applied to any parametrizable
nuisance space and any classifier. To illustrate the proposed framework, we apply it to
several classification architectures, three classification datasets and three nuisance spaces.
We quantify in particular the effect of data augmentation, dropout, spatial transformer
network layers [JSZ+15] on the robustness of CNNs, and compare state-of-the-art deep
neural networks trained on natural image datasets in terms of their robustness to standard
nuisances. Our results provide insights into the important features used by the classifier to
distinguish between classes, through the visualization of the nuisances that transform an
Part of this chapter will appear in [FF16].
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image to a different class. Our experiments also demonstrate that state-of-the-art classifiers
are only mildly robust to standard nuisances, and that more effort should therefore be
spent to improve this robustness.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2, we introduce our probabilistic framework
for assessing the robustness to nuisances of classifiers. In Section 7.3, we provide experimental
results on several datasets in order to illustrate the behavior of our algorithms, and we
conclude in Section 7.4.
7.2 Measuring the effect of nuisance variables
7.2.1 Definitions
We consider an arbitrary classifier that is provided through its conditional distribution
pcl(c|x), which represents the probability that an image x is classified as c by the classifier.
In neural network architectures, this discrete conditional distribution pcl(·|x) corresponds to
the probability vector that can be read at the last layer of the neural network (i.e., after the
softmax layer), after a feedforward pass of the input x. Let T denote the set of nuisances,
which can for example represent the set of affine transformations, diffeomorphisms, or
occlusions that might corrupt the data. Similarly to the previous chapter, for a particular
element in the nuisance set τ ∈ T , we define xτ to be the image x transformed by τ .1
We adopt a Bayesian framework and equip the nuisance space T with a prior probability
distribution pT (τ ) that captures our region of interest in the nuisance space. For example,
when T denotes the occlusion nuisance set, pT (τ ) might take large values for small occlusions
(covering small parts of the image), and smaller values for large occlusions. In some cases,
the prior distribution pT (τ ) might depend on the image; hence, for the sake of generality,
we denote our prior distribution by pT (τ |x).
We now define a quantity that allows us to measure the robustness of a classifier with
respect to a nuisance set T . Consider an image x with a ground truth label y(x). The
quantity pcl(y(x)|x) reflects the confidence that x is classified as y(x), and therefore should
be large when the classifier is accurate. For a given nuisance τ ∈ T , the expression
pcl(y(x)|τ ,x) := pcl(y(x)|xτ ) corresponds to the probability that the transformed image
xτ is also classified as the ground truth y(x). For a classifier to be robust, this quantity
should also be large for typical τ . We define the robustness µT (x) as the expectation of
this quantity, weighted by pT (τ |x):
µT (x) :=
∫
τ
pcl(y(x)|τ ,x)pT (τ |x)dτ = E
τ∼pT (·|x)
(pcl(y(x)|τ ,x)). (7.1)
Note that our quantity µT (x) depends on the prior distribution pT (τ |x); a classifier with a
large µT (x) will have high classification confidence in highly probable regions of the nuisance
space, but µT (x) is only mildly affected by the classifier confidence in low probability
regions of T . In a Bayesian inference setting, µT (x) is called the marginalized likelihood,
where the likelihood term pcl(y(x)|τ ,x) is marginalized over pT .
1We assume in the remaining of this chapter that the nuisances τ are represented by vectors.
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Given a data distribution pd, we define the global robustness to nuisance variables in T as
the average of µT (x) over the samples x, i.e.,
νT :=
∫
x
µT (x)pd(x)dx = E
x∼pd
(
E
τ∼pT (·|x)
[pcl(y(x)|τ ,x)]
)
(7.2)
It should be noted that the quantities µT and νT are bounded between 0 and 1. The
global robustness νT measures the average confidence that typical images perturbed with
nuisances chosen according to the prior distribution pT (τ |x) are classified as y(x).
Observe that the approach we follow here for defining robustness in Eq. (7.1) is different
from the one in Chapter 6, where the robustness to geometric transformations was measured
as the distance from the identity element to the minimal transformation that changes the
label of the classifier. Specifically, the average confidence computed over a user-defined
prior on the nuisance space is considered in this chapter. This approach therefore does
not only take into account the worst-case nuisance parameter, but all high-probability
nuisance regions in the computation. This Bayesian framework, where a prior distribution
on the nuisance space defines the importance of nuisance variables with respect to the
classification problem, allows us to model more complex and high dimensional nuisance
sets, while making the framework adaptive to the user-specific requirements that will be
encoded in this prior distribution.
7.2.2 Estimation of the global robustness score
The global robustness measure νT is a continuous quantity that involves an integration over
the image space, as well as the nuisance space. We estimate these quantities using a Monte
Carlo approximation method, and define the empirical quantities µˆT and νˆT as follows:
µˆT (x) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
pcl(y(x)|τ i,x), with τ i iid∼ pT (τ |x), (7.3)
νˆT =
1
M
M∑
j=1
µˆT (xj), with xj
iid∼ pd. (7.4)
µT (x) is approximated by the average of the likelihood pcl(y(x)|τ i,x) over iid samples
generated from the prior distribution pT (τ |x). The global robustness measure is then
naturally defined as the empirical average of µˆT (xj), over iid samples from the data
distribution.
The computation of Eq. (7.3, 7.4) involves the transformation and classification of NM
samples. For computational purposes, it is therefore crucial that the empirical quantities
approximate the true quantities with a small number of samples. The following result
derives theoretical guarantees on the approximation error with respect to the number of
samples N and M .
Theorem 5. Let t > 0, and δ ∈ (0, 1). We have |νˆT − νT | ≤ t with probability exceeding
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1− δ as long as
M ≥ ln(2/δ)
2t2
. (7.5)
Moreover, when the prior distributions are data-independent (i.e., pT (τ |x) = pT (τ )), the
above condition becomes
NM ≥ ln(2/δ)
2t2
. (7.6)
Proof. Our main ingredient for proving this result is Hoeffding’s inequality. We recall this
inequality as follows:
Theorem 6 (Hoeffding’s inequality). Let (Xi, i ≥ 1) be a sequence of independent random
variables such that 0 ≤ Xi ≤ 1. If X¯n = 1n (X1 + · · ·+Xn), then for all t > 0
P
({∣∣X¯n − E(X¯n)∣∣ ≥ t}) ≤ 2 exp (−2nt2) .
Case (a). We start our proof by considering the case where the prior distribution does
not depend on the image: pT (τ |x) = pT (τ ), to establish the result in Eq. (7.6). We have:
νT =
∫
x
∫
τ
pcl(y(x)|x, τ )pT (τ )pd(x)dτdx,
νˆT =
1
M
M∑
j=1
1
N
N∑
i=1
pcl(y(xj)|xj , τ i) := 1
M
1
N
M∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
Zj,i.
The random variables τ i and xj are independent, hence {Zj,i}(j,i) are pairwise independent.
Note moreover that Zj,i ∈ [0, 1], and that E(Zj,i) = νT for any j, i. Hence, by applying
Hoeffding’s inequality, we obtain
P (|νˆT − νT | ≥ t) ≤ 2 exp(−2NMt2).
Setting δ = 2 exp(−2NMt2), we obtain the desired result in Eq.(7.6).
Case (b). We now consider the general case where the the prior distribution pT (τ |x)
depends on the image, and our goal is to establish the result in Eq. (7.5). We have:
νT =
∫
x
∫
τ
pcl(y(x)|x, τ )pT (τ |x)pd(x)dτdx,
νˆT =
1
M
M∑
j=1
1
N
N∑
i=1
pcl(y(xj)|xj , τ i) := 1
M
1
N
M∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
Zj,i.
In this case, the random variables Zj,i and Zj,i′ are not independent in general (for i 6= i′).
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We therefore introduce the random variable
Wj =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Zj,i,
and note that {Wj}j are pairwise independent, as the random variables {xj} are chosen
independently. Note moreover that E(Wj) = E(Zj,i) = νT , and that Wj ∈ [0, 1]. We apply
Hoeffding’s inequality for Wj and obtain
P (|νˆT − νT | ≥ t) ≤ 2 exp(−2Mt2).
By setting δ = 2 exp(−2Mt2), we obtain the desired result in Eq.(7.5).
For prior distributions on nuisance spaces that are independent of the datapoint x, the
above result shows that, by choosing N and M in the order of 100, one can obtain very
accurate estimates for νˆT . When the nuisance prior is data-dependent, the worst-case result
becomes independent of N , and one needs more samples to derive accurate estimates. In
many cases of interest however, the independent case applies as the prior distribution does
not significantly differ for different images. It should finally be noted that the bounds in
Theorem 5 do not depend on the dimension of the nuisance space; this shows that the
approximate quantity νˆT can be very accurate (for moderately large N and M) even for
high dimensional nuisance spaces.
7.2.3 Estimation of the problematic nuisances
While νT measures the average likelihood of the classifier (i.e., confidence of correct
classification, when nuisance samples are drawn from the prior distribution), it is also
crucial to visualize and understand the problematic regions of the nuisance space where
the classifier has low confidence on transformed images. The problematic regions of the
nuisance space are mathematically described by the posterior distribution pcl(τ |y(x),x),
where we define pcl(y(x)|τ ,x) = 1 − pcl(y(x)|τ ,x) to be the probability that xτ is not
classified as y(x). Sampling from this posterior distribution allows us to “diagnose” the
set of nuisance parameters that can cause classification errors. Using the Bayes rule, the
posterior distribution can be written as the normalized product of the likelihood and prior
distribution
pcl(τ |y(x),x) = 1
Z
pcl(y(x)|τ ,x)pT (τ |x),
with Z the normalizing constant. It should be noted that this posterior distribution is
typically a complex high dimensional distribution, where specialized sampling algorithms
do not apply. To sample from this posterior distribution, we adopt here the celebrated
Metropolis MCMC method for sampling from high dimensional distributions [Met+53]. The
sample values are produced iteratively, where the distribution of the next sample depends
only on the current sample value (hence making the samples sequence a Markov Chain).
At each iteration, the algorithm picks a candidate for the next sample by sampling from a
proposal distribution q, which guides the exploration of the nuisance space T . Then, with
some probability paccept, the candidate is either accepted, in which case the candidate value
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Algorithm 5 Metropolis algorithm for sampling from pcl(τ |y(x),x)
Initialization: Start with a randomly initialized sample in the nuisance set τ (0) ∈ T .
For each iteration s of the random walk on the nuisance space T , do:
Draw a sample τ ′ ∼ q(τ |τ (s)).
Let
paccept = min
(
1,
pcl(y(x)|τ ′,x)pT (τ ′|x)q(τ (s)|τ ′)
pcl(y(x)|τ (s),x)pT (τ (s)|x)q(τ ′|τ (s))
)
.
Generate a uniform sample in u ∈ [0, 1].
If u ≤ paccept, τ (s+1) ← τ ′; otherwise, τ (s+1) ← τ (s).
is used in the next iteration, or rejected. The acceptance probability is controlled by the
ratio between the probability of the posterior distribution at the candidate sample to that
of the current sample. The algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 5.
Figure 7.1: Example map of the (un-normalized) posterior distribution pcl(τ |y(x),x) when
T = 2d translations. We overlay samples obtained using the Metropolis MCMC method.
In practice, we set the proposal distribution q(·|τ ) ∼ N (τ , σ2propI). It should be noted that
the above algorithm can be applied to any parametrizable nuisance space T , and any prior
distribution pT (in particular prior distributions where sampling is difficult, as sampling
from this prior distribution is not required) in order to find problematic samples of the
nuisance space. Fig. 7.1 illustrates the samples drawn using the Metropolis algorithm
when T is the set of 2D translations of an arbitrary image and baseline classifier. It
can be seen that samples obtained with Metropolis confine to highly probable regions
of the nuisance space (these correspond to nuisance parameters with low classification
confidence). In particular, it should be noted that the Metropolis method relying on a
Markov Chain random walk for sampling is much more efficient than the standard approach
where independent samples are drawn from pT (τ |x), and accepted or rejected depending
on the values of their likelihood. This Metropolis method is therefore particularly suited to
our framework, as it can efficiently find “problematic samples”, even if the average score
µT (x) ≈ 1.
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7.3 Experimental evaluation
7.3.1 MNIST handwritten digits
We evaluate in this section different classifiers in terms of their robustness to the set T of
affine transformations. We parametrize the elements in T with vectors τ ∈ R6 representing
the column-reshaped 2× 3 standard matrix representations of affine transformations. We
consider a Gaussian prior distribution on T given by pT = N (e,Σ), where e is the identity
affine transformation, and Σ ∈ R6×6 is a covariance matrix that penalizes large changes
in the appearance of the image. To define the notion of appearance change, we follow a
similar approach to that used in the previous chapter. Specifically, we quantify the change
in appearance between two elements τ 0 and τ 1 in T using the geodesic distance on the
manifold of transformed samples {xτ : τ ∈ T }. Recall that this distance can be written
d(τ 0, τ 1) = inf
γ
∫ 1
0
√
γ(t)TGγ(t)γ(t)dt, (7.7)
where the infimum is taken over all C1 curves γ that satisfy γ(0) = τ 0 and γ(1) = τ (1),
and G denotes a Riemannian metric on the manifold T . When τ1 is in the neighborhood
of τ 0, we can approximate the matrix Gγ(t) (for any t) by Gτ0 , provided Gγ(t) is slowly
varying with γ(t). By assuming a constant Gγ(t) = Gτ0 = G, the distance in Eq. (7.7)
can be computed in closed-form:
d(τ 0, τ 1) =
√
(τ 1 − τ 0)TG(τ 1 − τ 0).
We therefore naturally set the prior distribution on T in order to penalize large variations
in the appearance of the image, by defining
pT (τ |x) ∝ exp
(−αd(e, τ )2) = exp (−(τ − e)TΣ−1(τ − e)) ,
with Σ−1 = αG, and α is a parameter controlling the “magnitude” of the transformation. In
that sense, our prior distribution penalizes changes in the appearance of the image (assuming
a constant Riemannian metric), and favors nuisance regions that do not significantly distort
the data. While we use this prior distribution in this experiment, it should be noted that
our framework is generic, and not limited to such a prior. We show in Fig. 7.3 transformed
versions of arbitrary MNIST images with transformations drawn from the prior distribution
using different values of α.
We consider two baseline CNN architectures on the MNIST task, CNN-1 and CNN-2, of
respectively 1 and 2 hidden layers. We then consider the following modifications of these
baseline neural networks:
• Dropout regularization: We use a dropout regularization (with probability p = 0.5)
at the last fully connected layer of the network,
• Data Augmentation (DA): At the training stage, we apply a small random trans-
lation to the samples with probability 0.1. In other words, we randomly translate
10% of the samples at the training stage.
• Spatial Transformer Network (STN) [JSZ+15]: We use a model where the
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Figure 7.2: Original images are shown in row 1. Samples drawn from prior distribution
with α = 100 [row 2, mild transformations], α = 50 [row 3, medium transformations], and
α = 10 [row 4, severe transformations].
Model Test error (%) νˆT (α = 100) νˆT (α = 50) νˆT (α = 10)
CNN-1 1.26 0.90 0.76 0.30
+ Dropout 0.88 0.90 0.77 0.31
+ DA 1.04 0.93 0.85 0.44
+ STN 0.93 0.96 0.90 0.52
CNN-2 1.16 0.94 0.83 0.36
+ Dropout 0.68 0.93 0.82 0.37
+ DA 1.09 0.94 0.87 0.48
+ STN 0.79 0.96 0.90 0.53
Table 7.1: Robustness to affine transformations of several networks on the MNIST dataset.
Each network is trained for 50 epochs.
localization network is a two layer CNN which operates on the image input. The output
from the localization network is a 6 dimensional vector specifying the parameters of
the affine transformation. This network is trained with data augmentation.
Dropout, DA and STN are often used in order to improve the classification performance.
The goal here is to see the effect of these techniques on the robustness to nuisance factors.
Table 7.1 reports the affine robustness νˆT with N = M = 1000 for the different networks
for three transformation regimes (mild, medium and severe transformations respectively
obtained by setting α = 100, 50, 10). By comparing CNN-1 and CNN-2, it can be seen
that increasing the number of layers leads to a better affine invariance of the model. This
result is in line with the conclusions of the previous chapter showing that an increase in the
number of layers of a deep convolutional network leads to improved robustness to similarity
transformations. While dropout regularization leads to significant improvement in test
accuracy, it has barely any effect on the robustness of the classifier to affine transformations.
This shows that robustness and test accuracy capture two different properties of the classifier.
In fact, while the robustness property measures the effect of nuisance variables that might
occur in real-world applications on the classification function, the test set usually contains
a restricted set of images following the same distribution as the training set. Conversely,
data augmentation (with translated samples) has led in this example to a decrease in the
test accuracy, while boosting the robustness to transformations. Moreover, the addition of
STN layers also improves the robustness of classifiers to transformations in the data.
Among the tested classifiers, CNN-2-STN has the maximum robustness for all parameters α,
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Figure 7.3: Samples drawn from the posterior distribution p(τ |y(x),x) with α = 100. On
the left, the original image, and then the transformed images with nuisances sampled from
the posterior distribution for the CNN-2 with Spatial Transformer Network. The estimated
label by the classifier of each transformed image is shown on top of each image. All shown
images are misclassified by the classifier.
with an robustness score larger than 0.9 for mild and medium transformations (α = 100, 50).
In other words, the classifier correctly classifies transformed samples with confidence
surpassing 90%. Nevertheless, despite these large average scores, this same network can
wrongly classify images that are however quite easily identifiable by a human observer. To
see this, we show in Fig. 7.3 transformed images with samples drawn from the posterior
distribution pcl(τ |y(x),x) using the sampling technique of Section 7.2.3.2 Quite interestingly,
these samples have a large variation, thereby showing that multiple regions of the nuisance
space of the classifier can cause data misclassification. For example, relatively small
transformations of a digit 2 can cause it to be a 7, 8 or 3. This shows the existence of many
“directions” that potentially cause the classifier to misclassify.
7.3.2 Natural images classification
VGG-CNN-S VGG-16 VGG-19 GoogLeNet
0.62 0.68 0.68 0.67
Table 7.2: Robustness to piecewise affine transformations νˆT of different networks trained
on ImageNet
We now conduct experiments on deep neural networks that are trained on the ImageNet
dataset. Specifically, we consider 4 different pre-trained networks: VGG-CNN-S [Cha+14],
VGG-16, VGG-19 [SZ14], and GoogLeNet [Sze+15]. We evaluate the robustness of these
networks to piecewise affine transformations. Specifically, the image is divided into cells, and
each cell undergoes a different affine transformation. We parametrize the transformations
using motion vectors defined for regularly spaced control points in the image. More
precisely, a transformation is parametrized by a set of motion vectors stacked in an array
V ∈ R2×L, where L defines the number of control points. We then define a prior distribution
pT = N (02L,Σ), where 02L denotes the zero motion vector, and where Σ is a covariance
matrix whose correlations decay with the distance between control points. Specifically,
if u,v ∈ R2 denote two control points, we set the correlation between these points to
be σ
2
‖u−v‖22
, where σ is a constant controling the magnitude of the correlations. In the
experiments below, we use σ = 20. This prior distribution, which forces nearby control
points to have similar motion vectors, incorporates a smoothness constraint on the set of
2We post-processed the samples obtained using Metropolis (section 7.2.3) by keeping only the samples
having a label different than y(x). The depicted samples are randomly chosen from this set.
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transformations, and results in having well-behaved and natural transformations. It should
be noted that the work in [Fre+15] defined a similar prior distribution on motion fields in a
different context. We illustrate in Fig. 7.4 images transformed with nuisance parameters
sampled from the introduced prior distribution.
Figure 7.4: Transformed versions of images taken from the ILSVRC 2012 validation
dataset.
We report the robustness measures νˆT of the different networks in Table 7.2, for M = 200
and N = 100. It can be noted that VGG-CNN-S is slightly worse than other networks
in terms of robustness to piecewise affine transformations. We recall that numbers in
Table 7.2 indicate the confidence of the classifier on transformed samples; for example, the
VGG-CNN-S correctly classifies transformed samples (see examples of images in 7.4) with
confidence of 62%. The comparison between the different classifiers confirms once again
the result highlighted in the previous section, namely that depth improves the robustness
to nuisance factors (in particular piecewise affine transformations), as VGG-16, 19 and
GoogLeNet contain substantially more layers than VGG-CNN-S. The overall scores shown
in Table 7.2 show however that these state-of-the-art networks correctly classify samples
with confidence lower than 70%, for small enough piecewise affine transformations of the
data (see Fig. 7.4 for example images).
We visualize images with nuisances sampled using the proposed method in 7.2.3 from the
posterior pcl(τ |y(x),x) in Fig. 7.5 for the different networks. For some examples, a “natural”
transformation of the image leads to a label change: observe that the “Gyromitra” is indeed
transformed to be visually similar to an image representing a “hen”. These examples provide
insights into the concepts that the deep network uses to discriminate between the classes.
In particular, observe that the required nuisance parameter τ to transform a “white wolf”
onto an “arctic fox” or “Samoyed” is rather intuitive for a human. In particular, the deep
network heavily relies on the deformation of the “nose” cue in order to change the estimated
label, and therefore uses this cue in order to distinguish between these neighbouring classes.
It should be noted however that in other cases, the transformation is not well interpretable
from a human perspective. Specifically, in many images, relatively small transformations
are sufficient to change the image class to labels that are very different from a human
perspective (e.g., lampshade → sea slug, necklace, ...). This shows deficiencies in the
concepts learned by these classifiers, and that the context of the image is probably not
sufficiently used to infer the label (e.g., the context of a scene representing a lamp shade is
very different from sea slug). In fact, while it is possible to modify the geometric aspect
of an object (e.g., lampshade) using a nuisance transformation from T , the overall scene
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VGG-CNN-S VGG-16
Goldfinch GoldfinchBee eater Goldfinch
VGG-19 GoogleNet
Goldfinch
Gyromitra HenHen CockHen
Kite Vulture Vulture Vulture Vulture
White wolf Arctic fox Samoyed Arctic fox Samoyed
Lampshade Sea slug Necklace Soap dispenser Goblet
Original image
Figure 7.5: Robustness of different networks trained on ImageNet to piecewise affine
transformations. The left column displays original images, and the other columns show the
transformed images, where transformations are sampled from the posterior pcl(τ |y(x),x) for
4 different classifiers. The estimated label of each image is shown on top. A post-processing
step was applied similarly to the experiment in Fig. 7.3 (see footnote 2).
context (characterized by the shadings, neighbouring objects, etc...) is much more difficult
to alter and should ideally be properly modeled by the classifier to achieve robustness.
To further understand the features learned by the classifier to discriminate between two
specific classes, we apply the proposed sampling mechanism in Section 7.2.3, but this time
with a slightly modified likelihood function. Specifically, given a target label t 6= y(x),
we set the likelihood to be the probability that the transformed image, xτ , is classified
as t. Formally, the likelihood is given by pcl(t|τ ,x). This view slightly differs from the
formulation in Section 7.2.3 and experiment in Fig. 7.5, where the likelihood represented
the probability of the transformed image to be classified as any other class (different than
the original class, y(x)); i.e., pcl(y(x)|τ ,x). Instead, we now fix the target label t, and wish
to sample nuisance variables such that the transformed image is confidently labeled as t. By
doing so, we visualize the differences between two classes from the point of view of the deep
neural network. In our experiment, we considered a fixed original image x (with label “white
wolf”), and we ran the experiment three times, each time with a different target label (“polar
bear”, “arctic fox”, and “Samoyed”). We illustrate in Fig. 7.6 the average transformations
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obtained when sampling from the posterior distribution pcl(τ |t,x), for the three different
experiments.3 The depicted results show that the deep neural network captures, in this case,
intuitive and interpretable features to distinguish between the different animals. Specifically,
the transformation from a “white wolf” to a “polar bear” involves enlarging the nose, and
reducing the size of the ears. Moreover, the transformation to an “arctic fox” transforms
the nose. Interestingly (and perhaps surprisingly), the network succeeds in finding very
plausible transformations (from the human point of view) for this example, which shows
that the network uses the correct features in these binary classification tasks. It should
nevertheless be noted that, for other images, the network can change the estimated label
with a small transformation that is difficult to interpret (see Fig. 7.5).
(a) Polar bear
(b) Arctic fox
(c) Samoyed
Figure 7.6: How to transform a white wolf into (a) a polar bear, (b) an Arctic fox,
(c) a Samoyed dog? For each of the three target labels, the left image represents the
motion vectors of the average sampled transformations. For clarity, we overlayed on top of
the motion vectors the original image classified as “white wolf”. The right image depicts
the result of applying this (average) transformation to the original “white wolf” image.
Experiments performed on the VGG-16 classifier.
3Similarly to the previous experiments, we restrict ourselves to the images that are misclassified. The
average is therefore taken over the transformations that have an estimated label t.
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7.3.3 Face recognition
Figure 7.7: Robustness of VGG-Faces classifier to artificial occlusion. Left column: original
image, with correct label. Columns 2 to 4 are samples from the posterior distribution. On
top of each image, we indicate the estimated label. A post-processing step was applied
similarly to the experiment in Fig. 7.3 (see footnote 2).
We finally consider a face recognition application, where we consider the very recent
VGG-Face classifier from [PVZ15], and measure the robustness of this classifier to simple
occlusions. Specifically, we consider a nuisance set T where b occluding rectangles corrupt
the images: any pixel belonging to one of the rectangles is “erased” and set to zero. We
consider a prior probability distribution on this nuisance space that penalizes the total area
of occluded pixels to favor small occluding boxes. Specifically, we set
pT (τ ) ∝ exp
(−Op/σ2) , (7.8)
where Op is the number of occluded pixels by the b rectangles, and τ ∈ R4b is a parametriza-
tion of the state consisting of b rectangles, each parametrized with 4 scalars (upper left
and lower right point). In the experiments, we set σ = 2000, b = 3. For the Metropolis
algorithm, we use a Gaussian proposal with standard deviation σprop = 5, and set the
number of iterations to 1000. To favor diverse samples from the posterior, we perform
several runs with different random initializations.
We illustrate different samples from the posterior distribution pcl(τ |y(x),x) in Fig. 7.7.
Interestingly, it can be seen that with relatively small occluding boxes, one can change the
estimated label of the classifier. More surprising, these simple occlusions can cause trivial
errors in the estimated label (e.g., Aamir Khan → Craig Robinson, or Daniel Craig → Anna
Gunn). This lack of robustness is specifically problematic in a face recognition system as it
can be exploited by intruders for fraudulous identification in systems using face recognition.
The proposed sampling tool is thus important to assess the robustness to such nuisances,
and to reveal the weaknesses of such classifiers before their deployment in possibly hostile
environments. It should be noted moreover that the proposed sampling approach explores
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Figure 7.8: Evolution of the log-likelihood log(pcl(y(x)|τ ,x)) in one run of the Metropolis
algorithm.
diverse nuisance parameters causing data misclassification, and does not seek to obtain the
minimal nuisance parameter causing misclassification. We illustrate in Fig. 7.8 the evolution
of the log-likelihood term (i.e., the log of the misclassification probability log(pcl(y(x)|τ ,x)))
in the Metropolis algorithm. Notice that, after approximately 100 iterations, the algorithm
reaches regions of the nuisance space with large likelihood. Note also that the log-likelihood
is not monotonously increasing, which suggests that the algorithm is not stuck in a single
region of the nuisance space. It should further be noted that, similarly to the visualization in
Fig. 7.5, one can draw conclusions on the features used in the face recognition. Specifically,
we observed that in many cases, the classifier changes label by adding a relatively small
occluding box on the person’s nose (and not the eyes, as one would expect), which shows
that this represents an important feature in this automatic face recognition system. To
illustrate this point, we show in Fig. 7.9 the average samples from the posterior causing
data misclassification. It can be seen that the occluding boxes largely concentrate around
the nose, which shows the importance of this cue for this classifier.
7.4 Conclusion
We proposed a simple and generic probabilistic framework for measuring the average
robustness to nuisance variables, as well as for sampling problematic nuisance variables.
Our framework can deal with any type of parametrizable nuisance factors, as long as a prior
distribution that defines the region of interest on this space is defined. The proposed tool
allows us to discover the “weak spots” of any given classifier by appropriately sampling likely
nuisance vectors that cause misclassification. Moreover, the visualization of problematic
samples provides insights onto the features learned by the system. We believe that the
proposed framework is not only an important tool to assess the robustness of a classifier
under unexpected nuisance variations, but that it will also open new possibilities for
improving the robustness of classifiers to specific nuisances.
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Figure 7.9: Average over all nuisance samples from the posterior leading to a misclassifica-
tion, for two different images. Left: the nuisance parameters are illustrated without the
original image. Right: same image, where the face image is shown in the background.
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8 Conclusions
8.1 Summary
In this thesis, we analyzed the robustness of classifiers to a wide range of perturbations
in the data, spanning from adversarial noise to random noise, as well as more structured
nuisances such as geometric transformations and occlusions.
We first studied the adversarial robustness of classifiers, where data points undergo minimal
perturbations that change the estimated label of the classifier. The computation of
adversarial perturbations specifically requires solving a non-convex optimization problem
that uses the knowledge of the classification model. Our first contribution in this thesis was
a new optimization algorithm to efficiently estimate adversarial perturbations. Through
extensive simulations, we showed that the proposed optimization algorithm outperforms
existing methods in the task of robustness estimation, and can lead to an improvement in
the robustness when fine-tuning with perturbed data points. Our study moreover provided
a confirmation that current classifiers are extremely unstable to adversarial perturbations,
despite achieving impressive classification accuracy. Next, we proposed a theoretical analysis
of the instability of classifiers to adversarial perturbations, and showed the existence of
learning-independent limits on the robustness of classifiers. These limits are derived for
fixed classification families (e.g., the family of linear classifiers), and show that in common
classification tasks, it is not possible to find robust and accurate classifiers in the family
independently of the training procedure. We specifically quantified this tradeoff for linear
and quadratic classifiers, and showed that the fundamental limit on the robustness increases
with the flexibility of the classification family.
Then, we analyzed quantitatively the robustness of classifiers in a novel noise regime that
unifies adversarial and random noise. We specifically derived upper and lower bounds
on the robustness of classifiers in this generalized noise regime based on the curvature of
the classifier’s decision boundary. Provided the curvature is sufficiently small, our bounds
show specifically that robustness to random noise can be achieved in high dimensional
classification tasks, even if the classifier has a poor robustness to adversarial perturbations.
This result quantitatively justifies empirical observations showing that state-of-the-art
classifiers are robust to random noise, even when the same classifiers have very low robustness
to adversarial perturbations. Our bounds also show that these classifiers remain unstable
to semi -random noise that is mostly random, and only slightly adversarial.
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We finally presented methods for quantifying the robustness of classifiers to structured
perturbations encountered in computer vision classification tasks, such as geometric transfor-
mations and occlusions. Specifically, we first proposed a method for quantifying invariance
to geometric transformations. Our novel invariance score is based on the distance between
the identity transformation and the minimal transformation required to change the esti-
mated label of the classifier. To precisely define this distance on the transformation space,
we used a manifold representation of the set of transformed images, and defined the distance
to be the geodesic distance on the manifold. We proposed a numerical algorithm for the
computation of this invariance measure, and showed that state-of-the-art classifiers are
not robust to small similarity transformations. Using our invariance score, we highlighted
moreover that adding transformed samples to the training set can lead to a significant
increase in the invariance score. We finally extended this idea of quantifying the robustness
to general nuisance spaces. To do so, we specifically proposed a novel probabilistic model,
where the nuisance space was equipped with a prior distribution that captures the region
of interest, and where the likelihood associated to a nuisance parameter is defined as the
probability of misclassification of the transformed image. Using this model, we provided
methods for estimating the robustness, and for sampling problematic nuisance vectors from
the nuisance set. The visualization of problematic samples allows us to explore the different
regions of the nuisance space causing misclassification, and further provides insights onto
the discriminative features used by the classifier.
In summary, this thesis offers important theoretical and empirical results in the analysis of
the robustness of classifiers to a diverse set of perturbations. By identifying and thoroughly
analyzing the quantities that affect the robustness of classifiers, our results moreover pave
the way towards designing classifiers with improved robustness properties.
8.2 Future directions
Several questions related to the adversarial instability of classifiers remain open. In
particular, while we thoroughly studied fundamental limits on the adversarial robustness
for the family of linear and quadratic classifiers, establishing such limits for more complex
classifiers deserves more investigation. We believe that it might be possible to derive similar
bounds for more complex classifiers by using the general result in Lemma 1, along with
explicit parameters (τ, γ) for the specific class of functions under consideration. Results
from algebraic geometry (e.g., [NZ03]) suggest that the explicit computation of these
parameters might be possible for large families of functions, such as the family of piecewise
linear functions. This latter family of functions is particularly of interest, as deep nets with
rectifier nonlinearities are piecewise affine. Identifying an upper bound on the adversarial
robustness of deep nets in terms of the depth of the network would be a great step towards
having a better understanding of such systems. In particular, this would allow us (just
like in the linear case) to determine how far is the robustness of current deep nets from
the maximum achievable robustness. Establishing sufficiently small upper bounds on the
robustness of such families of classifiers would show that the current instability to adversarial
perturbations of deep nets is more related to the architecture, rather than to the learning
algorithm used for the training. In other words, the design of robust classifiers would then
necessarily come from a “complexification” of the current deep architectures, just like we
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were able to obtain more robust classifiers by increasing the degree of polynomial classifiers.
In general, one of the fundamental goals of this thesis is to provide an analysis of the
robustness properties of classifiers, in the perspective of improving the classifiers’ robustness
to various forms of perturbations that might appear in practical systems. While many
recent works have proposed learning methods for improving the robustness (e.g., [GR14;
LHL15; Hua+15]), it would be interesting to look for different architectures that improve
the robustness. In the future, we would like to use the insights derived in this thesis in
order to propose new robust classification architectures. For example, this can come by
imposing geometric constraints on the decision boundaries of the classifier, as we have
shown in Chapter 5 that classifiers with sufficiently small curvature have a small robustness
to semi-random noise. Hence, by constraining the decision boundaries of classifiers to have
a large curvature, we might be able to achieve higher robustness to perturbations. Note
however that enforcing geometric constraints on the decision boundary is not an easy task,
as the decision boundary cannot be expressed in closed-form for most interesting classifiers,
and one would therefore need to find surrogates to the curvature of the decision boundary.
Another line of research is to develop methods to visualize the decision boundary of high-
dimensional classifiers. While we provided in Chapter 5 a simple way to visualize the
decision boundary through the projection of the boundary on a two-dimensional plane,
it is important to derive more systematic and complete methods that take into account
the complexity of the classifier’s decision boundary. Visualizing the effect of the classifier
in the input space is certainly an important problem that would help us have a better
understanding of the classification models that are often treated as black boxes. Of
particular interest is how the classifier partitions the input space into different regions,
where a region is a subset of the input space where the estimated label is constant. It
should however be noted that the high dimensionality of most interesting classification
problems (e.g., ImageNet) is a major challenge to developing such insightful visualization
tools. In particular, the preservation of the geometry of the input space (to some extent) is
an important requirement that makes the development of such tools challenging.
While we assumed in this thesis to have full knowledge of the classifier when computing
adversarial examples, an interesting direction of research is to assess the robustness of clas-
sifiers to perturbations, when the adversary has only limited knowledge of the classification
model. Our study of the robustness of classifiers to semi-random noise (Chapter 5) can
be seen as a starting point for this analysis. In fact, we have shown that state-of-the-art
classifiers are not robust to such noise that is only partially adversarial, and therefore does
not require the full knowledge of the gradient of the classification function. The projection
of the classifier gradients onto low-dimensional random subspaces is indeed sufficient to
compute such perturbations. Building on this work, we believe it is possible to design
attacks that use minimal information about the classifier f (e.g., only few evaluations of
f , but not the gradient). This can have many applications in the field of computer and
mobile security as recently outlined in [Car+16].
Finally, while this thesis is mainly concerned with the problem of classification, we believe
that the framework proposed in this thesis can be extended to various forms of machine
learning tasks (e.g., detection, image segmentation). We believe this is a subject that is
definitely worth investigation.
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A Appendix for Chapter 4
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We begin by proving the following inequality:
Lemma 4. Let z1, . . . , zn be non-negative real numbers, and let 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. Then,
n∑
i=1
zγi ≤ n1−γ
(
n∑
i=1
zi
)γ
.
Proof. We prove that the quantity∑n
i=1 z
γ
i
(
∑n
i=1 zi)
γ =
n∑
i=1
(
zi∑n
i=1 zi
)γ
is bounded from above by n1−γ . To do so, let ui = zi∑n
i=1 zi
, and let us determine the
maximum of the concave function g(u1, . . . , un−1) = u
γ
1 + · · · + (1 − u1 − · · · − un−1)γ .
Setting the derivative of g with respect to ui to zero, we get
uγ−1i − (1− u1 − · · · − un−1)γ−1 = 0,
hence ui = 1− u1 − · · · − un−1. We therefore get u1 = · · · = un−1, and conclude that the
maximum of
∑n
i=1
(
zi∑n
i=1 zi
)γ
is reached when z1 = · · · = zn and the value of the maximum
is n1−γ .
We now prove Lemma 1, that we recall as follows:
Lemma 1. Let f be an arbitrary classifier that satisfies (A) with parameters (τ, γ). Then,
ρadv(f) ≤ 41−γτ
(
p1Eµ1(f(x))− p−1Eµ−1(f(x)) + 2‖f‖∞R(f)
)γ
.
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Proof. The goal is to find an upper bound on ρadv(f) = Eµ(∆adv(x; f)).
ρadv(f) = p1Eµ1(∆adv(x)) + p−1Eµ−1(∆adv(x))
= p1
(
Eµ1(∆adv(x)|f(x) ≥ 0)Pµ1(f(x) ≥ 0) + Eµ1(∆adv(x)|f(x) < 0)Pµ1(f(x) < 0)
)
+ p−1
(
Eµ−1(∆adv(x)|f(x) < 0)Pµ−1(f(x) < 0) + Eµ−1(∆adv(x)|f(x) ≥ 0)Pµ−1(f(x) ≥ 0)
)
.
Using assumption (A), the following upper bounds hold:
Eµ±1(∆adv(x)|f(x) ≥ 0) ≤ τEµ±1(f(x)γ |f(x) ≥ 0)
Eµ±1(∆adv(x)|f(x) < 0) ≤ τEµ±1((−f(x))γ |f(x) < 0)
Hence, we obtain the following inequality on ρadv(f):
ρadv(f) ≤ τp1
(
Eµ1(f(x)γ |f(x) ≥ 0)Pµ1(f(x) ≥ 0) + Eµ1((−f(x))γ |f(x) < 0)Pµ1(f(x) < 0)
)
+ τp−1
(
Eµ−1((−f(x))γ |f(x) < 0)Pµ−1(f(x) < 0) + Eµ−1(f(x)γ |f(x) ≥ 0)Pµ−1(f(x) ≥ 0)
)
.
Using Jensen’s inequality, we have E(Xγ) ≤ E(X)γ , for any random variable X, and γ ≤ 1.
Using this inequality together with P(A) ≤ P(A)γ , we obtain
ρadv(f) ≤ τ
(
(p1Eµ1(f(x)|f(x) ≥ 0)Pµ1(f(x) ≥ 0))γ + (p1Eµ1(−f(x)|f(x) < 0)Pµ1(f(x) < 0))γ
+
(
p−1Eµ−1(−f(x)|f(x) < 0)Pµ−1(f(x) < 0)
)γ
+
(
p−1Eµ−1(f(x)|f(x) ≥ 0)Pµ−1(f(x) ≥ 0)
)γ)
.
We use the result in Lemma 4 with n = 4, and obtain
ρadv(f) ≤ τ41−γ
(
p1Eµ1(f(x)|f(x) ≥ 0)Pµ1(f(x) ≥ 0) + p1Eµ1(−f(x)|f(x) < 0)Pµ1(f(x) < 0)
+ p−1Eµ−1(−f(x)|f(x) < 0)Pµ−1(f(x) < 0) + p−1Eµ−1(f(x)|f(x) ≥ 0)Pµ−1(f(x) ≥ 0)
)γ
.
Note moreover that the following equality holds
− p1Pµ1(f(x) < 0)Eµ1(f(x)|f(x) < 0)
= 2p1Pµ1(f(x) < 0)|Eµ1(f(x)|f(x) < 0)|+ p1Pµ1(f(x) < 0)Eµ1(f(x)|f(x) < 0),
Using the above equality along with a similar one for p−1Pµ−1(f(x) ≥ 0)Eµ−1(f(x)|f(x) ≥
0), the following upper bound is obtained
ρadv(f) ≤ τ41−γ
(
p1Eµ1(f(x)|f(x) ≥ 0)Pµ1(f(x) ≥ 0) + p1Eµ1(f(x)|f(x) < 0)Pµ1(f(x) < 0)
− p−1Eµ−1(f(x)|f(x) < 0)Pµ−1(f(x) < 0)− p−1Eµ−1(f(x)|f(x) ≥ 0)Pµ−1(f(x) ≥ 0)
+ 2p1Pµ1(f(x) < 0)|Eµ1(f(x)|f(x) < 0|+ 2p−1Pµ−1(f(x) ≥ 0)|Eµ−1(f(x)|f(x) ≥ 0|)
)γ
,
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which simplifies to
ρadv(f) ≤ τ41−γ
(
p1Eµ1(f(x))− p−1Eµ−1(f(x)) + 2p1Pµ1(f(x) < 0)|Eµ1(f(x)|f(x) < 0)|
+ 2p−1Pµ−1(f(x) ≥ 0)|Eµ−1(f(x)|f(x) ≥ 0)|
)γ
,
Observe moreover thatR(f) = p1Pµ1(f(x) < 0)+p−1Pµ−1(f(x) ≥ 0), and that |Eµ−1(f(x)|f(x) ≥
0)| is bounded from above by ‖f‖∞. We therefore conclude that
ρadv(f) ≤ τ41−γ
(
p1Eµ1(f(x))− p−1Eµ−1(f(x)) + 2R(f)‖f‖∞
)γ
.
A.2 Discussion on the norms used to measure the magnitude
of adversarial perturbations
The goal of this section is to discuss different ways of measuring the robustness to adversarial
perturbations.
Given a datapoint x, let η > 0 be such that we know a priori that all points in the region
R(x) = {z : N(z − x) ≤ η},
have the same true class as x (i.e., a human observer would classify all images in this region
similarly). Here N : Rd → R+ defines a norm in the image space. Note that R(x) only
depends on the dataset, but does not depend on any classifier f . We defined the robustness
of f to adversarial perturbations, at x, to be
∆adv(x) = min
r
N(r) subject to f(x+ r)f(x) ≤ 0.
The classifier f is said to be not robust at x if
∆adv(x) ≤ η. (A.1)
In words, this means that there exists a point z in the region R(x) (i.e., z and x are
classified in the same way by a human observer), but z is classified differently than x by f .
Our main theoretical result provides upper bounds to ρadv(f) (the expectation of ∆adv(x))
in terms of interpretable quantities (i.e., distinguishability and risk): ρadv(f) ≤ U(µ,R(f)).
Using this upper bound and Eq. (A.1), we certify that f is not robust to adversarial
perturbations when the following sufficient condition holds:
U(µ,R(f)) ≤ η. (A.2)
The main difficulty in the above definitions lies in the choice of N and η: how can (N, η)
be chosen to guarantee that R(x) contains all images of the same underlying class as
x? In the original paper [Sze+14], N is set to be the `2 norm, but no η is formally
103
Appendix A. Appendix for Chapter 4
derived; classifiers are said to be not robust to adversarial perturbations when ρadv(f)/
√
d
is judged to be “sufficiently small”. For example, it appears from Table 1 in [Sze+14] that if
ρadv(f)/
√
d . 0.1, the minimum required perturbation is thought to be small enough to
guarantee that the images do not change their true underlying label. Motivated by the fact
that pixels (or features) have limited precision, [GSS15] consider instead the `∞ norm, and
ideally assume that a perturbation that have `∞ norm smaller than the precision of the
pixels (e.g., 1/255 of the dynamic range for 8-bit images) is guaranteed to conserve the true
underlying class. While this corresponds to setting η to be the precision of the pixels, in
practice it is set to be much larger for the MNIST case, as the images are essentially binary.
In our case, the `2 norm is considered, and we define the quantity ρd to be the average
norm of the minimal perturbation required to transform a training point to a training point
of the opposite class1:
ρd =
1
m
m∑
i=1
min
j:y(xj)6=y(xi)
‖xi − xj‖2.
We assume that the image x+ r is of the same underlying label as x if ‖r‖2 is one order
of magnitude smaller than ρd. This corresponds to setting η = ρd/10. A summary of the
different choices is shown in Table A.1.
N η
[Sze+14] ‖ · ‖2 -
[GSS15] ‖ · ‖∞ Determined by the image precision (in theory). Larger in practice.
Ours ‖ · ‖2 ρd/10
Table A.1: Different choices of N and η in different papers.
All the above choices represent proxies of what we really would like to capture (i.e., the
notion of perceptibility and class change). They all have some benefits and drawbacks,
which we mention briefly now. We first acknowledge that the `∞ norm with η ≈ 0.1 blocks
class changes (and therefore provides a sufficient condition for certifying the non-robustness
of classifiers) for images that are essentially binary (e.g, MNIST digit images). In those
cases, the `∞ norm seems more appropriate to use than the `2 norm. However, in order to
compare both norms, we need to carefully (and fairly) choose the η parameter for both
norms. In fact, if it is acknowledged that N = ‖ · ‖∞ and η = 0.1 provides a valid region R
where underlying image classes do not change, then N = ‖ · ‖2 and η = 0.1 also provides
a valid region, as ‖r‖∞ ≤ ‖r‖2 for any vector r. It is therefore all a matter of choosing a
right threshold η that is fair for all norms, if we wish to compare the norms for the task
that we have at hand. A comparison between the `∞ and `2 norm is provided in [Goo15],
and it is concluded that, while the `2 norm allows for class changes within its region, the `∞
essentially blocks the class changes and therefore constitutes a better choice. In more details,
the comparison goes as follows: it is first argued that by choosing N = ‖ · ‖2 and η = 3.96,
the region R contains both a “natural” 3 and 7, and therefore does not provide a valid
region. To show the benefits of the `∞ norm, the author proceeds by considering N = ‖ · ‖∞
and η = 3.96/
√
d ≈ 0.1414. It is then argued that this region blocks previous attempts for
class changes, and therefore the `∞ norm provides a better choice for the task at hand.
While this type of comparison is important in order to reach a better understanding of the
1We consider here a non-normalized version of the data robustness ρd for simplicity of the exposition.
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norms used to measure the adversarial examples, it is not conclusive as it is unfair to the
`2 norm. Let us recall the following inequalities
∀r ∈ Rd, ‖r‖∞ ≤ ‖r‖2 ≤
√
d‖r‖∞. (A.3)
For a fixed η0 > 0, define the regions:
R∞ = {z : ‖z − x‖∞ ≤ η0},
R2 = {z : ‖z − x‖2 ≤ η0
√
d}.
It should be noted that for any η0, we have R∞ ⊂ R2 using Eq. (A.3). Not only that, but
R∞ constitutes a tiny portion of R2 in high dimensional spaces (i.e., the volume of R∞
over that of R2 decays exponentially with the dimension). Therefore, a comparison of R2
to R∞ will typically lead to problematic images in R2 but not in R∞, as R2 is much bigger
than R∞. Therefore, the fact that R∞ is a much smaller set than R2 (i.e., it contains
much less images) is already known from Eq. (A.3) and is not conclusive in terms of the
comparison of the two norms for measuring the robustness to adversarial perturbations.
Just like the comparison of R2 to R∞ is unfair to the `2 norm, saying that the `2 norm is
better than the `∞ norm because R∞ contains much more images (potentially problematic
ones with class changes, for sufficiently large η0) that are not in R′2 = {z : ‖z − x‖2 ≤ η0}
is unfair to the `∞ norm.
One possible way for providing a fair comparison between both norms is to find the coefficient
c such that R∞ has the same volume as the following `2 ball
R′′2 = {z : ‖z − x‖2 ≤ η′′0
√
d}, with η′′0 = η0c.
Using mathematical derivations that we omit for the flow of this short discussion, we obtain
c =
√
2
epi ≈ 0.48 asymptotically as d → ∞. We argue that the comparison of R∞ to R′′2
provides a more conclusive experiment than comparing R∞ to R2, as it highlights the
advantage of one norm with respect to the other without biases on the volume of the region.
In practice, this new comparison implies the following change for the “3” vs. “7” example
in [Goo15]: instead of allowing perturbations of max-norm 0.1414, perturbations with `∞
norm up to ≈ 0.3 are allowed. This will result in images that are roughly twice as much
perturbed, for the `∞ case. Even with this comparison, it is possible that the max-norm in
this case will also block attempts to change the class, as the images are essentially binary.
We believe that the `∞ is probably a better choice in this case.
However, this is not a general statement, as in some cases of non-binary images, the `2 norm
might be a better choice. We illustrate the above statement on a toy example where the goal
is to classify sport balls. Some example images are shown in Fig. A.1. In this example, the
`∞ norm between any two images is less than 0.11. Setting η0 = 0.11 with N = ‖ · ‖∞ does
not define a valid region (i.e., it does not guarantee that no class changes will occur within
the region). On the other hand, the region R′′2 computed with η0 = 0.11 (i.e., η′′0 = 0.0532)
rightfully excludes the images b) and c) from the space of valid perturbations of a). This
toy example provides a proof of concept that shows that, in some cases, the `2 norm might
actually be a better choice than the `∞ norm.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure A.1: Example images in a toy classification problem where the goal is to distinguish
the different balls (a: basketball, b: soccer). (c) represents an umbrella that does not
belong to any class. Black pixels are equal to 0, white pixels are equal to 1, grey pixels are
set around 0.9.
In conclusion, we stress that this example has no intention of proving that the `2 norm
is universally better than the `∞ norm to measure the norm of adversarial perturbations.
Through this discussion and example, we show that there is no universal answer to which
norm one has to use to measure the robustness to adversarial perturbations, as it is strongly
application-dependent. We believe more theoretical research in that area is needed in order
to fully grasp the advantage of each norm, and probably design new norms that are suitable
for measuring adversarial perturbations.
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B.1 Proof of Theorem 3 (affine classifiers)
Lemma 5 ([DG03]). Let Y be a point chosen uniformly at random from the surface of
the d-dimensional sphere Sd−1. Let the vector Z be the projection of Y onto its first m
coordinates, with m < d. Then,
1. If β < 1, then
P
(
‖Z‖22 ≤
βm
d
)
≤ βm/2
(
1 +
(1− β)m
(d−m)
)(d−m)/2
≤ exp
(m
2
(1− β + lnβ)
)
.
(B.1)
2. If β > 1, then
P
(
‖Z‖22 ≥
βm
d
)
≤ βm/2
(
1 +
(1− β)m
(d−m)
)(d−m)/2
≤ exp
(m
2
(1− β + lnβ)
)
.
(B.2)
Lemma 6. Let v be a random vector uniformly drawn from the unit sphere Sd−1, and Pm
be the projection matrix onto the first m coordinates. Then,
P
(
β1(δ,m)
m
d
≤ ‖Pmv‖22 ≤ β2(δ,m)
m
d
)
≥ 1− 2δ, (B.3)
with β1(δ,m) = max((1/e)δ2/m, 1−
√
2(1− δ2/m), and β2(δ,m) = 1 + 2
√
ln(1/δ)
m +
2 ln(1/δ)
m .
Proof. Note first that the upper bound of Lemma 5 can be bounded as follows:
βm/2
(
1 +
(1− β)m
d−m
)(d−m)/2
≤ βm/2 exp
(
(1− β)m
2
)
, (B.4)
using 1 + x ≤ exp(x). We find β such that βm/2 exp
(
(1−β)m
2
)
≤ δ, or equivalently,
β exp (1− β) ≤ δ2/m. It is easy to see that when β = 1eδ2/m, the inequality holds. Note
however that 1eδ
2/m does not converge to 1 as m→∞. We therefore need to derive a tighter
bound for this regime. Using the inequality β exp(1− β) ≤ 1− 12(1− β)2 for 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, it
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follows that the inequality β exp(1 − β) ≤ δ2/m holds for β = 1 −
√
2(1− δ2/m). In this
case, we have 1−
√
2(1− δ2/m)→ 1, as m→∞. We take our lower bound to be the max
of both derived bounds (the latter is more appropriate for large m, whereas the former is
tighter for small m).
For β2, note that the requirement β exp(1− β) ≤ δ2/m is equivalent to − ln(β) + (β − 1) ≥
2
m ln(1/δ). By setting β = β2(δ,m), this condition is equivalent to 2
√
ln(1/δ)
m −ln(β2(δ,m)) ≥
0, or equivalently, 2z − ln(1 + 2z + 2z2) ≥ 0, with z =
√
ln(1/δ)
m . The function z 7→
2z − ln(1 + 2z + 2z2) ≥ 0 is positive on R+. Hence, β2(δ,m) satisfies β exp(1− β) ≤ δ2/m,
which concludes the proof.
We now prove our main theorem for linear classifiers that we recall as follows:
Theorem 3. Let S be a random m-dimensional subspace of Rd. The following inequalities
hold between the norms of semi-random perturbation r∗S and the worst-case perturbation r
∗.
Let ζ1(m, δ) = 1β2(m,δ) , and ζ2(m, δ) =
1
β1(m,δ)
.
ζ1(m, δ)
d
m
‖r∗‖22 ≤ ‖r∗S‖22 ≤ ζ2(m, δ)
d
m
‖r∗‖22, (B.5)
with probability exceeding 1− 2(L+ 1)δ.
Proof. For the linear case, r∗ and r∗S can be computed in closed form. We recall that (Fact
5), for any subspace S, we have
rkS =
∣∣∣fk(x0)− fkˆ(x0)(x0)∣∣∣
‖PSwk −PSwkˆ(x0)‖22
(PSwk −PSwkˆ(x0)), (B.6)
where rkS was defined in Eq. (5.9). In particular, when S = Rd, we have
rk =
∣∣∣fk(x0)− fkˆ(x0)(x0)∣∣∣
‖wk −wkˆ(x0)‖22
(wk −wkˆ(x0)). (B.7)
Let k 6= kˆ(x0). Define, for the sake of readability
fk =
∣∣∣fk(x0)− fkˆ(x0)(x0)∣∣∣ ,
zk = wk −wkˆ(x0).
Note that
‖rk‖22
‖rkS‖22
=
‖PSzk‖22
‖zk‖22
. (B.8)
The projection of a fixed vector in Sd−1 onto a random m dimensional subspace is equivalent
(up to a unitary transformation U) to the projection of a random vector uniformly sampled
from Sd−1 into a fixed subspace. Let Pm be the projection onto the first m coordinates.
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Observe that
‖PSzk‖22 = ‖UTPmUzk‖22 = ‖PmUzk‖2, (B.9)
Hence, we have
‖PSzk‖22
‖zk‖22
= ‖Pmy‖22, (B.10)
where y is a random vector distributed uniformly in the unit sphere Sd−1. We apply Lemma
6, and obtain
P
(
β1(m, δ)
m
d
≤ ‖Pmy‖22 ≤ β2(m, δ)
m
d
)
≥ 1− 2δ. (B.11)
Hence,
P
{
1
β2(m, δ)
d
m
≤ ‖r
k
S‖22
‖rk‖22
≤ 1
β1(m, δ)
d
m
}
≥ 1− 2δ. (B.12)
Using the multi-class extension in Lemma 7, we conclude that
P
{
ζ1(m, δ)
d
m
≤ ‖r
∗
S‖22
‖r∗‖22
≤ ζ2(m, δ) d
m
}
≥ 1− 2(L+ 1)δ. (B.13)
Lemma 7 (Binary case to multiclass). Assume that, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , L]}\{kˆ(x0)}
P
(
l ≤ ‖r
k
S‖2
‖rk‖2 ≤ u
)
≥ 1− δ. (B.14)
Then, we have
P
(
l ≤ ‖r
∗
S‖2
‖r∗‖2 ≤ u
)
≥ 1− (L+ 1)δ. (B.15)
Proof. Let p := arg mini ‖ri‖2. Note that we have P
(‖r∗S‖2
‖r∗‖2 ≥ u
)
≤ P
(‖rpS‖2
‖rp‖2 ≥ u
)
≤ δ.
Moreover, we use a union bound to bound the the other bad event probability:
P
(‖r∗S‖2
‖r∗‖2 ≤ l
)
≤ P
(⋃
k
{‖rkS‖2
‖rk‖2 ≤ l
})
≤ Lδ, (B.16)
(B.17)
We conclude by using the fact that
P
(
l ≤ ‖r
∗
S‖2
‖r∗‖2 ≤ u
)
= 1− P
(‖r∗S‖2
‖r∗‖2 ≤ l
)
− P
(‖r∗S‖2
‖r∗‖2 ≥ u
)
. (B.18)
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Figure B.1: Bounding ‖xγ − x‖2 in terms of κ.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 4 and Corollary 1 (nonlinear classi-
fiers)
First, we present an important geometric lemma and then use it to bound ‖r∗S‖2. For the
sake of the general readability of the section, some auxiliary results are given in Section
B.2.1.
In the following result, we show that, when the curvature of a planar curve is constant and
sufficiently small, the distance between a point x and the curve at a specific direction θ
is well approximated by the distance between x and a straight line (see Figure B.1 for an
illustration).
Lemma 8. Let γ be a planar curve of constant curvature κ. We denote by r the distance
between a point x and the curve γ. Denote moreover by T the tangent to γ at the closest
point to x (see Figure B.1). Let θ be the angle between u and v as depicted in Figure B.1.
We assume that rκ < 1. We have
−C1rκ tan2(θ) ≤ ‖xγ − x‖2‖u‖2 − 1 (B.19)
Moreover, if
tan2(θ) ≤ 0.2
rκ
,
then, the following upper bound holds
‖xγ − x‖2
‖u‖2 − 1 ≤ C2rκ tan
2(θ). (B.20)
We can set C1 = 0.625 and C2 = 2.25.
Proof of upper bound. We consider two distinct cases for the curve γ. In the case where γ
is concave-shaped (Fig. B.1, right figure), we have
‖xγ − x‖2
‖u‖2 ≤ 1,
and the upper bound in Eq. (B.20) directly holds. We therefore focus on the case where γ
is convex-shaped as illustrated in the left figure of Fig. B.1. Define R := 1/κ, one can write
using simple geometric inspection
R2 = sin(θ)r′2 + (R+ r − r′ cos(θ))2, (B.21)
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where r′ = ‖xγ − x‖2. The discriminant of the second order equation (with variable r′) is
equal to
∆ = 4
(
(R+ r)2 cos2(θ)− (2rR+ r2)) .
We have ∆ ≥ 0 as θ satisfies the two assumptions tan2(θ) ≤ 0.2R/r and r/R < 1. The
smallest solution of this second order equation is given as follows
r′ = (R+ r) cos(θ)−
√
(R+ r)2 cos2(θ)− 2Rr − r2. (B.22)
Using some simple algebraic manipulations, we obtain
r′ =
r
cos(θ)
((
R
r
+ 1
)
cos2(θ)− R
r
cos2(θ)
√
1− tan2(θ)2Rr + r
2
R2
)
. (B.23)
Using the inequality in Lemma 11 together with the two assumptions, we get
r′ ≤ r
cos(θ)
 cos2(θ) + R
r
cos2(θ) tan2(θ)
(
2Rr + r2
2R2
)
+
R
r
cos2(θ) tan4(θ)
(
2Rr + r2
2R2
)2.
(B.24)
With simple trigonometric identities, the above expression can be simplified to
r′ ≤ r
cos(θ)
(
1 +
r
R
(
sin2(θ)
2
+
sin4(θ)
cos2(θ)
(
1 +
r
2R
)2))
. (B.25)
We expand this quantity, and obtain
r′ ≤ r
cos(θ)
(
1 +
(
sin2(θ)
2
+
sin4(θ)
cos2(θ)
)
r
R
+
sin4(θ)
cos2(θ)
r2
R2
+
sin4(θ)
4 cos2(θ)
r3
R3
)
. (B.26)
Since sin2(θ) tan2(θ) = tan2(θ)− sin2(θ), we have
r′ ≤ r
cos(θ)
(
1 + tan2(θ)
(
r
R
+
r2
R2
+
r3
4R3
))
. (B.27)
According to the assumptions r/R < 1, therefore
r′ ≤ r
cos(θ)
(
1 + 2.25 tan2(θ)
r
R
)
. (B.28)
Since r/ cos(θ) = ‖u‖2, one can finally conclude on the upper bound
‖xγ − x‖2
‖u‖2 − 1 ≤ 2.25rκ tan
2(θ). (B.29)
Proof of lower bound. When the curve is convex shaped (Fig. B.1 left), we have ‖xγ−x‖2 ≥
‖u‖2, and the desired lower bound holds. We focus therefore on the case where γ has a
111
Appendix B. Appendix for Chapter 5
concave shape, and coincides with with γ2 (see Fig. B.1 right). The following equation
holds using simple geometric arguments
R2 = sin(θ)r′2 + (R− r + r′ cos(θ))2. (B.30)
where r′ = ‖xγ − x‖2. Solving this second order equation gives
r′ = −(R− r) cos(θ) +
√
(R− r)2 cos2(θ)− r2 + 2Rr. (B.31)
After some algebraic manipulations, we get
r′ =
r
cos(θ)
(
−
(
R
r
− 1
)
cos2(θ) +
R
r
cos2(θ)
√
1 + tan2(θ)
2Rr − r2
R2
)
. (B.32)
Using the inequality in Lemma 12, together with the fact that rκ < 1, we obtain
r′ ≥ r
cos(θ)
 cos2(θ) + R
r
cos2(θ) tan2(θ)
(
2Rr − r2
2R2
)
− R
r
cos2(θ) tan4(θ)
2
(
2Rr − r2
2R2
)2.
(B.33)
Using simple trigonometric identities, the above expression is simplified to
r′ ≥ r
cos(θ)
(
1 +
r
R
(
−sin
2(θ)
2
− sin
4(θ)
2 cos2(θ)
(
1− r
2R
)2))
. (B.34)
When expanding it, we obtain
r′ ≥ r
cos(θ)
(
1−
(
sin2(θ)
2
+
sin4(θ)
2 cos2(θ)
)
r
R
+
sin4(θ)
2 cos2(θ)
r2
R2
− sin
4(θ)
8 cos2(θ)
r3
R3
)
. (B.35)
Since sin2(θ) tan2(θ) = tan2(θ)− sin2(θ), we have
r′ ≥ r
cos(θ)
(
1− tan2(θ)
(
r
2R
+
r3
8R3
))
. (B.36)
Using again the assumption r/R < 1, we obtain
r′ ≥ r
cos(θ)
(
1− 0.625 tan2(θ) r
R
)
. (B.37)
Since r/ cos(θ) = ‖u‖2, one can rewrite it as
‖xγ − x‖2
‖u‖2 − 1 ≥ −0.625rκ tan
2(θ), (B.38)
which completes the proof.
We now use the previous lemma to bound the semi-random robustness of the classifier, i.e.
‖rkS‖2, to the worst-case robustness ‖rk‖2 in the case where the curvature is sufficiently
small.
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Figure B.2: Left: To prove the upper bound, we consider a ball B included in Rk that
intersects with the boundary at x∗. Upper bounds on ‖rkS‖2 derived when the boundary is
∂B are also valid upper bounds for the real boundary Bk. Right: Normal section to the
decision boundary Bk = ∂B along the normal plane U = span
(
rTS , r
k
)
. We denote by γ
the normal section of boundary Bk, along the plane U , and by Tx∗Bk the tangent space to
the sphere ∂B at x∗.
Theorem 4. Let S be a random m-dimensional subspace of Rd. Define α := √m/d, and let
κ := κ(Bk). Assuming that κ ≤ Cα2ζ2(m,δ)‖rk‖2 , the following inequalities hold between ‖rkS‖2
and the worst-case perturbation ‖rk‖2
ζ1(m, δ)
α2
(
1− C1‖r
k‖2κζ2(m, δ)
α2
)2
≤ ‖r
k
S‖22
‖rk‖22
≤ ζ2(m, δ)
α2
(
1 +
C2‖rk‖2κζ2(m, δ)
α2
)2
(B.39)
with probability larger than 1− 4δ. The constants can be taken C = 0.2, C1 = 0.625, C2 =
2.25.
Proof of upper bound. Denote by x∗ the point belonging to the boundary Bk that is closest
to the original data point x0. By definition of the curvature κ (see Eq. 5.7), there exists a
point z∗ such that the ball B centered at z∗ and of radius 1/κ = ‖z∗ − x∗‖2 is inscribed in
the region Rk = {x ∈ Rd : fk(x) > fkˆ(x0)(x)} (see Fig. B.2 (a)).1
Observe that the worst-case perturbation along any subspace S that reaches the ball B is
larger than the perturbation along S that reaches the region Rk, as B ⊆ Rk. Therefore,
any upper bound derived when the boundary is the sphere of radius 1/κ; i.e., Bk = ∂B is
also a valid upper bound for boundary Bk (see Fig. B.2 (a)). It is therefore sufficient to
derive an upper bound in the worst case scenario where the boundary Bk = ∂B, and we
consider this case for the remainder of the proof of the upper bound.
We now consider the linear classifier whose boundary is tangent to Bk at x∗. For a
randomly chosen subspace S, we denote by rTS the worst-case subspace perturbation for
this linear classifier. We then focus on the intersection between the boundary Bk and
the two-dimensional plane U spanned by the vectors rk and rTS . This normal section
of the boundary cuts the ball B through its center as the tangent spaces of the decision
1For a fixed point x∗ on the boundary, the maximal radius 1/κ might not be achieved. To prove the
result in the general case where the supremum is not achieved, one can consider instead a sequence (κn)n
converging to κ, such that the balls of radius 1/κn and intersecting the boundary at x∗ are included in Rk.
The same proof and results follow by taking the limit on the bounds derived with ball of radius 1/κn.
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boundary and the ball coincide. See Figure B.2 for a clarifying figure of this two-dimensional
cross-section. We define the angle θˆ as denoted in Figure B.2, such that cos(θˆ) = ‖r
k‖2
‖rTS ‖2
.
We apply our result on linear classifiers in Theorem 3 for the tangent classifier. We have
1
cos(θˆ)2
=
‖rTS ‖22
‖rk‖22
≤ 1
α2
ζ2(m, δ), (B.40)
with probability exceeding 1− 2δ. Hence, using tan2(θˆ) ≤ (cos2(θˆ))−1 and the assumption
of the theorem, we deduce that
tan2(θˆ) ≤ 1
α2
ζ2(m, δ) ≤ 0.2
κ‖rk‖2 ,
with probability exceeding 1− 2δ. Note moreover that
‖rk‖2κ ≤ 0.2α
2
ζ2(m, δ)
< 1.
Hence, the assumptions of Lemma 8 hold with probability larger than 1− 2δ. Using the
notations of Figure B.2, we therefore obtain from Lemma 8
‖xγ − x0‖2
‖rTS ‖2
− 1 ≤ C2κ‖rk‖2 tan2(θˆ) (B.41)
with probability larger than 1− 2δ.
Observe that ‖xγ−x0‖2 ≥ ‖rkS‖2, and that tan2(θˆ) ≤ ‖r
T
S ‖22
‖rk‖22
. Hence, we obtain by re-writing
Eq. (B.41)
P
(
‖rkS‖22
‖rk‖22
≤
{
1 + C2κ‖rk‖2 ‖r
T
S ‖22
‖rk‖22
}2 ‖rTS ‖22
‖rk‖22
)
≥ 1− 2δ. (B.42)
Using the inequality in Eq. (B.40), we obtain
P
(
‖rkS‖22
‖rk‖22
≤
{
1 + C2κ‖rk‖2 ζ2(m, δ)
α2
}2 ζ2(m, δ)
α2
)
≥ 1− 2δ,
which concludes the proof of the upper bound.
Proof of the lower bound. We now consider the ball B′ of center z∗ and radius 1/κ =
‖z∗−x∗‖2 that is included in the region Rkˆ(x0). Since the ball B′ is, by definition, included
in the region Rkˆ(x0), any lower bound on ‖rkS‖2 when the decision boundary coincides with
∂B′ is also a valid lower bound for any Bk (see Fig. B.3 (a)). We consider this case in the
remainder of the proof.
To derive the lower bound, we consider the cross-section U ′ spanned by the vectors rkS and
rk (Figure B.3 (b)). We have ‖rk‖2κ < 1; using the lower bound of Lemma 8, we obtain
−C1κ‖rk‖2 tan2(θ˜) ≤ ‖r
k
S‖2
‖xT − x0‖2 − 1 (B.43)
114
B.2. Proof of Theorem 4 and Corollary 1 (nonlinear classifiers)
rk
Bk
B′
x∗
x0
rkS
(a)
rkS
xT
θ˜
 γ
x0
x∗ Tx∗Bk
rk
(b)
Figure B.3: Left: To prove the lower bound, we consider a ball B′ included in Rkˆ(x0) that
intersects with the boundary at x∗. Lower bounds on ‖rkS‖2 derived when the boundary
is the sphere ∂B′ are also valid lower bounds for the real boundary Bk. Right: Cross
section of the problem along the plane U ′ = span (rkS , rk). γ denotes the normal section of
Bk = B′ along the plane U ′.
for any S. Observe moreover that
tan2(θ˜) ≤ 1
cos(θ˜)2
=
‖xT − x0‖22
‖rk‖22
.
Hence, the following bound holds:
‖xT − x0‖22
‖rk‖22
(
1− C1κ‖rk‖2 ‖xT − x0‖
2
2
‖rk‖22
)2
≤ ‖r
k
S‖22
‖rk‖22
.
Let rTS denote the worst-case perturbation belonging to subspace S for the linear classifier
Tx∗Bk. It is not hard to see that rTS is collinear to rkS (see Lemma 10 for a proof). Hence,
we have rTS = xT − x0. By applying our result on linear classifiers in Theorem 3 for the
tangent classifier Tx∗Bk, we have:
P
(
ζ1(m, δ)
α2
≤ ‖r
T
S ‖22
‖rk‖22
≤ ζ2(m, δ)
α2
)
≥ 1− 2δ.
We therefore conclude that
P
(
ζ1(m, δ)
α2
{
1− C1κ‖rk‖2 ζ2(m, δ)
α2
}2
≤ ‖r
k
S‖22
‖rk‖22
)
≥ 1− 2δ,
which concludes the proof of the lower bound.
The goal is now to extend the previous result, derived for binary classifiers, to the multiclass
classification case. To do so, we show the following lemma.
Lemma 9 (Binary case to multiclass). Let p = arg mini ‖ri‖2. Define the deterministic set
A =
{
k : ‖rk‖2 ≥ 1.45
√
ζ2(m, δ)
√
d
m
‖r∗‖2
}
. (B.44)
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Assume that, for all k ∈ Ac, we have
P
(
l ≤ ‖r
k
S‖2
‖rk‖2 ≤ u
)
≥ 1− δ. (B.45)
and that
P
(
‖rpS‖2 ≥ 1.45
√
ζ2(m, δ)
√
d
m
‖r∗‖2
)
≤ t. (B.46)
Then, we have
P
(
l ≤ ‖r
∗
S‖2
‖r∗‖2 ≤ u
)
≥ 1− (L+ 1)δ − t. (B.47)
Proof. Note first that
P
(‖r∗S‖2
‖r∗‖2 ≥ u
)
≤ P
({‖rpS‖2
‖rp‖2 ≥ u
})
≤ δ. (B.48)
We now focus on bounding the other bad event probability P
(‖r∗S‖2
‖r∗‖2 ≤ l
)
. We have
P
(‖r∗S‖2
‖r∗‖2 ≤ l
)
= P
(
min
k/∈A
‖rkS‖2 = ‖r∗S‖2,
‖r∗S‖2
‖r∗‖2 ≤ l
)
+ P
(
min
k∈A
‖rkS‖2 = ‖r∗S‖2,
‖r∗S‖2
‖r∗‖2 ≤ l
)
(B.49)
The first probability can be bounded as follows:
P
(
min
k/∈A
‖rkS‖2 = ‖r∗S‖2,
‖r∗S‖2
‖r∗‖2 ≤ l
)
≤ P
(⋃
k/∈A
‖r∗S‖2
‖r∗‖2 ≤ l
)
≤ Lδ. (B.50)
The second probability can also be bounded in the following way
P
(
min
k∈A
‖rkS‖2 = ‖r∗S‖2,
‖r∗S‖2
‖r∗‖2 ≤ l
)
≤ P
(
min
k∈A
‖rkS‖2 = ‖r∗S‖2
)
= P
(
∃k ∈ A, ‖rkS‖2 ≤ ‖r∗S‖2
)
.
(B.51)
Observe that, for k ∈ A, we have ‖rkS‖2 ≥ ‖rk‖2 ≥ 1.45
√
ζ2(m, δ)
√
d
m‖r∗‖2. Hence, we
conclude that
P
(
min
k∈A
‖rkS‖2 = ‖r∗S‖2,
‖r∗S‖2
‖r∗‖2 ≤ l
)
≤ P
(
1.45
√
ζ2(m, δ)
√
d
m
‖r∗‖2 ≤ ‖r∗S‖2
)
(B.52)
≤ P
(
1.45
√
ζ2(m, δ)
√
d
m
‖r∗‖2 ≤ ‖rpS‖2
)
≤ t.
(B.53)
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Corollary 1. Let S be a random m-dimensional subspace of Rd. Assume that, for all
k /∈ A, we have
κ(Bk)‖rk‖2 ≤ 0.2
ζ2(m, δ)
m
d
(B.54)
Then, we have
0.875
√
ζ1(m, δ)
√
d
m
≤ ‖r
∗
S‖2
‖r∗‖2 ≤ 1.45
√
ζ2(m, δ)
√
d
m
(B.55)
with probability larger than 1− 4(L+ 2)δ.
Proof. Using Theorem 4, we have that for all k /∈ A, the result in Eq. (B.39) holds with
probability exceeding 1− 4δ. We simplify the result with the assumption κ(Bk)‖rk‖2 ≤
0.2
ζ2(m,δ)
m
d . Hence, the bounds of Theorem 4 can be written as follows
ζ1(m, δ)
α2
(1− 0.2C1)2 ≤ ‖r
k
S‖22
‖rk‖22
≤ ζ2(m, δ)
α2
(1 + 0.2C2)
2 , (B.56)
which leads to the following bounds:
ζ1(m, δ)
d
m
0.8752 ≤ ‖r
k
S‖22
‖rk‖22
≤ ζ2(m, δ) d
m
1.452, (B.57)
with probability exceeding 1− 4δ.
By using Lemma 9, together with the fact that t = δ, we obtain
P
(
0.875
√
ζ1(m, δ)
√
d
m
≤ ‖r
∗
S‖2
‖r∗‖2 ≤ 1.45
√
ζ2(m, δ)
√
d
m
)
≥ 1− 4(L+ 2)δ, (B.58)
which concludes the proof.
B.2.1 Useful results
B
x∗
x0
S
Tx∗(∂B)
rBS
rTS
Figure B.4: The worst-case perturbation in the subspace S when the decision boundary is
∂B and Tx∗(∂B) (denoted respectively by rBS and rTS ) are collinear.
Lemma 10. Let x0 ∈ Rd, and x∗ denote the closest point to x0 on the sphere ∂B (see
Fig. B.4). Let Tx∗(∂B) be the tangent space to ∂B at x∗. For an arbitrary subspace S, let
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rTS and r
B
S denote the worst-case perturbations of x0 on the subspace S, when the decision
boundaries are respectively Tx∗(∂B) and ∂B. Then, the two perturbations rTS and rBS are
collinear.
Proof. Assuming the center of the ball B is the origin, the points on the sphere ∂B satisfy
equation: ‖x‖2 = R, where R denotes the radius. Hence, the perturbation rBS is given by
rBS = argmin
r∈Rd
‖r‖22 such that ‖x0 + PSr‖22 = R2. (B.59)
By equating the gradient of Lagrangian of the above constrained optimization problem to
zero, we obtain the following necessary optimality condition
r + λPS(x0 + PSr) = 0.
It should further be noted that PSrBS = r
B
S . Indeed, if r
B
S had a component orthogonal to
S, the projection of rBS onto S would have strictly smaller `2 norm, while still satisfying
the condition in Eq.(B.59). Hence, the necessary condition of optimality becomes
(1 + λ)r + λPSx0 = 0,
from which we conclude that rBS is collinear to PSx0.
It should further be noted that rTS can be computed in closed form (see Fact 5), and is
collinear to PS(x∗ − x0), which is itself collinear to x0, as the the center of the ball was
assumed to be the origin. This concludes the proof.
Lemma 11. If x ∈ [0, 2(√2− 1)],
√
1− x ≥ 1− x
2
− x
2
4
. (B.60)
Lemma 12. If x ≥ 0,
√
1 + x ≥ 1 + x
2
− x
2
8
. (B.61)
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